




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SPEECHES FROM THUCYDIDES.

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SPEECHES

FROM

THUCYDIDES

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.

FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

BY

HENRY MUSGRAVE WELKINS, M.A.

FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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PREFACE.



IN the good old days, before the Ecclesiastical Commission had equalised the revenues of so many of the Anglican sees, a Prelate, on his promotion from a poor to a wealthy Bishopric, received the felicitations of a curate, who piously expressed his 'trust that the honour conferred might only prove a prelude to his Lordship's translation to a heavenly mitre.' 'Sir,' replied the Bishop, 'I prefer the original to the translation.'

The certainty of a similar verdict from the Academical public in my own case, need not deter a writer, who, in the following version of the speeches interwoven with the narrative of Thucydides, has not aspired beyond the modest aim of aiding, so far as lay in his power, the candidate for classical honours at our Universities and Colleges. Such an aim, however, involves no sacrifice of taste or freedom : the style of translation now in vogue in the 'Honour Schools' of Oxford, and also at that illustrious citadel of scholarship, the University of Cambridge, being sufficiently liberal to satisfy the taste of the general reader.¹ The opportunities of access to scholars

¹ There is much truth in the following remark of the *Saturday Review*, Jan. 15, 1870 : 'This is an age

in which, if all cannot be scholars, yet nearly all educated people like to know something, even at second-

and professors afforded by residence at College, have made me familiar with the Oxford standard of translation, which is close but idiomatic. In the execution of my task, I have been much indebted to the valuable counsels of the late Professor Conington, and to the kindness with which several Tutors and Examiners, especially the Rev. John R. T. Eaton, late Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Public Examiner, and Editor of 'The Politics of Aristotle:' the Rev. Thomas Fowler, Fellow and Tutor of Lincoln College, and Public Examiner: and Mr. Hugh E. P. Platt, Fellow and Tutor of the same College: have revised portions of my MS. But these gentlemen are not responsible for any errors the version may contain. Clearer evidence of the style of translation fashionable at Cambridge cannot be desired, than that given by the Rev. R. Burn, Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, in his excellent paper 'On the Course of Reading for the Classical Tripos.'¹ After stating that strict fidelity is required, 'so far as is consistent with elegant and idiomatic English,' he adds, 'The object of the translator should be to present the sense of the whole passage in an

hand, of the great works of classical literature.'—p. 89. Professor Conington's observations (*Quarterly Review*, July, 1861, p. 104) on the increasing demand for, and the educational value of, translations from the classics, are worth citing. 'Schoolmasters,' he says, 'are, we fancy, beginning to tolerate, under certain modifications, what they cannot exterminate, while they see that among their elder pupils at any rate the practice of translation into English—one of the most valuable parts of a classical education—may be

greatly facilitated by the use of good models; those who acquire the classical language with little or no help from masters—probably an increasing class—find the book a natural substitute for the living teacher; and there is a large class of readers to whom Latin and Greek are as unattainable as Coptic, yet who are interested in knowing what the ancients thought and said.'

¹ *Student's Guide to the University of Cambridge*, pp. 120, 121, Cambridge: 1862.

English dress. All affectation or forced imitation of the peculiarities of any English writer should be avoided, and the version made to flow as naturally as possible.¹

At present, so far as English versions are concerned, the field, for all practical purposes, is occupied solely by the portly pedantry of Bloomfield, the grotesque likeness of Hobbes, the hideous fidelity of Dale, and the vagrant slipshod paraphrase of Crawley. Mr. Dale's version, though in many respects useful, is not always a safe guide even for passmen, for whom it is intended. A purely literal² transcript of so difficult an author often deepens the darkness of the original; besides, he frequently vitiates the sense by his mistranslation of the particles. Thus, he is constantly giving γάρ an argumentative, when it has what grammarians call an epexegetic sense: as in Bk. II. ch. 37, 1: IV. 126, 2; he sometimes even confounds οὐ with μή, as I have shown in a note on μὴ μόνον αὐτοφώρους, Bk. VI. 38, 4; he turns ἄλλων, which Göller would have told him how to construe, into nonsense, Bk. VII. 61, 1; and loses the thread of the argument, Bk. III. 45, 4, by referring τούτου and τόδε to the same subject.³ Again (Bk. III. chs. 38 & 42), he misconstrues the phrase λόγον προθεῖναι, which, as Poppo

¹ In order to give a clearer idea of the degree of freedom allowed, Mr. Burn adds: 'The translation of the *Republic of Plato* by Davies and Vaughan, or that of the *Phædrus* by Wright, or of the *Oration against Aphobus* by Kennedy, may be taken as examples of the best style of rendering.'

² Dryden, in the Preface to his translation of Ovid's *Epistles*, compares verbal translation to 'danc-

ing on ropes with fettered legs: ' remarking of the old school of literal translators, that 'all their translations require to be translated into English.' Dr. Johnson was doubtless right in saying that the first merit of a translation consists in its being read with pleasure by those who do not know the original.

³ See also notes at pp. 203, 208, below.

(ed. min., in his note on ch. 38, 1) could have informed him, applies to the magistrates who *ex officio* sanctioned a fresh discussion of the Mytilenean question: not, as he takes it, to the politicians who proposed the reopening of the case. See also Schömann, 'De Com. Athen.' pp. 82, 108; 'Index Oratt. Att.' *in voce* προτίθημι.

The editions on which I have chiefly relied, are those of Krüger (German), 1860: Dr. Arnold, Oxford, 1830–1835: Göller's second¹ edition, Leipsic, 1836: 'Notes upon Books I. and II.,' by Messrs. Sheppard and Evans, London, 1857: the Rev. P. Frost's edition of the VIth and VIIth books, London, 1867: and, above all, the larger edition of Poppo, 10 vols., Leipsic, 1821–1838, and the smaller one in 4 vols., Leipsic, 1846–1866. The latter is, on the whole, the best annotated edition of the great historian; it is not a mere abridgment of the larger work: nor does it dispense with reference to it. Where the same information is contained in both, I have, in almost every instance, quoted the smaller² edition, as more likely to be in the student's hands. It seemed needless to cite either edition by the page, save in exceptional cases: for instance, in a remark on τῆς δυνάμεως τότε κ.τ.λ., p. 13, where the note alluded to will be found among the annotations, not on the text, but on the Scholia: and at p. 108, where Poppo, in his 'Commentary,' refers the reader to the Prolegomena, vol. i. ed. maj. The text of Poppo, ed. min., has generally been followed. To the aid derived from Mr. Grote's graphic portraiture of that tragic drama of Grecian history, the

¹ Where Göller is cited, the second edition is meant, unless the first is expressly mentioned.

² Designated, in the notes, by the abbreviation, ed. min.: as the larger work is by the symbol, ed. maj.

Peloponnesian War, my warmest acknowledgments are due. Whatever may be thought of his enthusiastic advocacy of the popular cause, or of those occasional blemishes which exact scholarship would have shunned, none can fail to admire the originality, the breadth, and symmetry of his views, his masterly analysis of character, and his forcible delineation of events.

The marginal notes have been restricted, with few exceptions, to the necessary defence of my choice of contested versions of difficult passages. There are however many knotty points, which the reader must not suspect me of settling on arbitrary principles, simply because I have scrupled to encumber my page with annotations. In such cases, the grounds which have influenced my adoption of particular phrases or constructions, will readily be discovered in one or another of the editions quoted above: chiefly, perhaps, in the smaller work of Poppo.

The ancient grammarians¹ noticed the partiality of Thucydides for connecting particles: a partiality due, in a great degree, to the peculiar structure of his composition. The embarrassment they cause the student will, I trust, excuse the care I have devoted to their elucidation. My chief authority has been the learned and elaborate commentary of Klotz on Devarius, Leipsic, 1840: a work as precious as it is scarce. Bishop Ellicott, in his admirable annotations on the Epistles of St. Paul, constantly cites it: and it is frequently referred to in Poppo's minor edition. Several of my renderings, however, though rarely unsupported by authority, are tendered

¹ See Mure's *Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 264.

only as approximations; a limitation I beg leave to extend to many of the critical notes. For, if there is any classic on whose text positive dogmatism or contemptuous censure is especially intolerable, it is the author, the most difficult and perhaps the most valuable part of whose historical masterpiece I have attempted to array in the current English prose of the nineteenth century.

The political illustration of Thucydides I have been content to leave to some future editor or translator of the whole text. Any venture of mine within this province of criticism, even if partially successful, would have swollen my volume to a most inconvenient size.

INTRODUCTION.



A COMPLETE REVIEW of the style of Thucydides lies within the province of an editor of his entire text, or of a work of literary criticism. In the former capacity, the subject has been discussed in the voluminous pages of Poppo: in the latter, it has been essayed by the profound learning, the shallow censure, and pretentious bigotry of Colonel Mure. As a translator of a fraction only of the Attic historian's work, I have thought it better to restrict this Introduction, in the first place, to an exposition of the principal difficulties which beset the translator of Thucydides: and, secondly, to some examination of the speeches themselves, with a view, especially, to the purposes they serve in relation to the narrative.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE CHIEF DIFFICULTIES WHICH BESET THE TRANSLATOR OF THUCYDIDES.

ANY complaint of the obstacles arising from the multitudinous array of modern editors and commentators, among whom the wretched translator moves with the ease and fluency of a Dutchman in six pairs of inexpressibles, would be as likely to provoke a smile from the Academical public as the reply of the High Church Curate, who, when asked by the late Bishop of Oxford what was the chief obstacle to his parochial usefulness, answered—'My Rector.' Yet the student is the more to be pitied, inasmuch as the chief sinners against his peace are those very German editors, through whose interminable lucubrations,

now rich in hints of magical felicity, now teasing with obvious comment and torturing with inevitable inference, he is bound, on pain of treason to his author, to plod his dreary way. Of how many annotators on the Attic historian may it not be said: 'Nimium intelligendo faciunt ut nihil intelligant!' While a Poppo exults in an ostentatious parade of authorities,¹ a Göller revels in the fantastic subtleties of German criticism, and a Krüger outdoes his predecessors in the field of conjectural ingenuity.

'These leave the sense, their learning to display,
And those explain the meaning quite away.'

I. The obscurity which haunts, like a shadow, the subtle page of Thucydides, is too patent an attribute of his rhetorical style to need more than passing comment. Even in his own days, he seems to have stood in the same relation to his countrymen as Dante to the modern Italians; for Dionysius² positively asserts that the Athenians of the age of Pericles could no more have understood their great historian without an interpreter than they could a foreign tongue. Tully³ notes his love of pregnancy and condensation: qualities, he remarks, fatal at times to clearness of expression. 'Some passages,' says a modern critic,⁴ 'we can hardly be said to read at all, in the familiar sense of the term. We study, decipher, interpret them. But continuous fluent perusal is out of the question.'

¹ Scholarship, the handmaid of the translator, is too often the mistress of the commentator.

² *De Thucyd. Judic.* cap. 49, sub fin. He especially condemns (ib. cap. 46) the impenetrable darkness of the clause, *καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας τύχης, κ.τ.λ.* (Thucyd. ii. 62, 5), which, he says, τῶν Ἡρακλητειῶν σκοτεινῶν ἀσυφεστέρα ἔχει τὴν δῆλωσιν. A version of the passage will be found at p. 82 of this work.

³ *Brutus*, vii. sub fin. It is rarely indeed that the translator can condense Thucydides. Opportunities, however, do occur: for instance, the

words *εὐνοίαν ἔχουσα πρᾶξαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἐπινοοῦμεν* (ii. 11, 2) are, perhaps, adequately rendered by the phrase 'heartily wishing us success: ' nor is the assertion, *διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἢ ξύβασις κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐγένετο* (vi. 10, 2) unduly compressed by taking *ἐγένετο* and *κατ' ἀνάγκην* together; e.g. 'the convention was extorted by the pressure of calamity.' Possibly, too, the phrase *τῆς πόλεως τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν* (bk. ii. 63, 1) is fairly reflected by the English terms 'the imperial dignity of our country.'

⁴ Mure, *Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 158.

In evolving the difficult problem 'ex fumo dare lucem,' it is sometimes requisite to change the entire machinery of a period, in order to bring out the leading idea, which struggles feebly into life, oppressed by the weight of words, and the quaint forms in which it is encased. His irregular constructions, too, are a fertile source of mystery. 'He cannot,' says Professor Sellar,¹ 'follow the direction of thought which the structure of a sentence seems to force on many writers; but as his period advances, he adopts some combination of words, inconsistent with the consecutiveness of his expression, but more exactly representing the particular aspect of the facts on which he is dwelling for the moment.'

It is impossible to accept the solution proffered by Marcellinus,² that, so far from condescending to level his style to popular comprehension, Thucydides courted an obscurity penetrable only by the intellectual and refined. The fact, however, that he was not a popular author with his own countrymen, is undeniable; it is attested by Tully,³ and jocosely asserted in the well-known lines of the 'Anthology':⁴

Ὁ φίλος, εἰ σοφός εἶ, λάβε μ' ἐς χέρας· εἰ δὲ πέφυκας
νηῖς Μουσάων, ῥίψον ἄ μὴ νοεῖε·
εἰμὶ γὰρ οὐ πάντεσσι βατός· παῦροι δ' ἀγάσαντο
Θουκυδίην Ὀλόρου, Κεκροπίδην τὸ γένος.

An explanation less improbable may be found in the personal bias⁵ of the author: in the imperfect development of the lan-

¹ *Oxford Essays*, 1857, p. 309.

² He speaks of him as ἀσαφῶς λέγων ἐπιτηδέες, ἵνα μὴ πᾶσιν εἴη βατός, μηδὲ εὐτελής φαίνεται παντὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ νοούμενος εὐχερῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς λίαν σοφοῖς δοκιμαζόμενος παρὰ τοῦτοις θαυμάζεται.—*Vita Thucyd.* cap. 35.

³ 'Huic (Caton) amatores desunt, sicuti multis jam ante seculis et ipsi Thucydidi.'—*Brutus*, cap. xvii.

⁴ Jacobs, vol. iv. p. 231.

⁵ Marcellinus says that, of the three kinds of style, he chose the 'lofty': ἐξήλωσε τὸν ὑψηλὸν (χαρακ-

τῆρα), ὡς ὄντα τῇ φύσει πρόσφοροι τῇ οἰκείᾳ. He adds (cap. 40) that the style thus adopted naturally involved poetical phraseology and construction. Müller (*Lit. of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 133) remarks that 'the constructions of Thucydides are marked by a freedom more suitable to antique poetry than to prose.' If the reader will turn to note ⁴, p. 176, below, he will see that I have governed ναυκρατόρων by κατεστραμμένοι, understood; a construction which, in ordinary prose, would have required ὑπό, but which is in strict

guage, especially in its poverty of abstract¹ terms, at the time he wrote; and, to a certain extent, in the classic conception of the style congenial to history; a style which even Dionysius² thinks should be poetical rather than prosaic, and endued with a sustained elevation of tone clearly distinguishing it from the dialect of familiar converse. Indeed, it is not as orations intended for delivery, but as integral parts of the history, that the speeches before us must be judged. Such, it is evident, was the light in which they were regarded by some of the ablest of the ancient critics whose opinions are cited by Dionysius. They acknowledged, he says,³ that the orations which enliven the narrative of Thucydides were unsuitable models for aspirants to fame in forensic or political discussion: but contended they afforded an excellent training school for intending votaries of history: which, it seems, they assumed would rarely be studied by the people at large, but only within the pale of a privileged clique of the highest culture and refinement. In a similar vein Quintilian⁴ warns the candidate for the honours of the Forum against an imitation, not of Thucydides alone, but of the great historians in general, on the ground of the wide distinction recognised by taste and fashion between the oratorical and historical styles. ‘*Historia quoque,*’ says that excellent rhetorician, ‘*alere orationem quodam molli jucundoque succo potest. Verum et ipsa sic est legenda, ut sciamus plerasque ejus virtutes oratori esse vitandas. Est enim proxima poëtis, et quodammodo carmen solutum: et scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum: totumque opus non ad actum rei pugnamque presentem, sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii famam componitur; ideoque et verbis liberioribus et remotioribus figuris narrandi tædium evitat. Itaque, ut dixi, neque illa*

analogy with poetical usage; e.g. *πληγείς ευγατρός*, Eur. *Or.* 591: *χειρός οὐ πληρομένω*, Æsch. *Ag.* 826.

¹ ‘For nations, like individuals, first perceive and then abstract. They advance from particular images to general terms.’ (Lord Macaulay, *Essays*, vol. i. p. 12.) Attic prose, in the hands of Thucydides, reminds us of Addison’s saying of Milton—

‘the language sunk under him.’

² *De Thucyd. Jud.* cap. 51: ‘*Εγὼ δὲ οὔτε αὐχμηρὰν καὶ ἀκόσμητον καὶ ἰδιωτικὴν τὴν ἱστορικὴν εἶναι πραγματείαν ἀξιῶσαιμ’ ἄν, ἀλλ’ ἔχουσάν τε καὶ ποιητικόν· οὔτε παντάπασι ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ’ ἐκβιβηκεῖαν τῆς ἐν ἴθει.*

³ *Ib.* cap. 50, sub init.

⁴ *Instit. Orat.* x. i. 31.

Sallustiana brevitās, quā nihil apud aures vacuas atque eruditas potest esse perfectius, apud occupatum variis cogitationibus judicem, et sœpius ineruditum, captanda nobis est: neque illa Livii lactea ubertas satis docebit eum, qui non speciem expositionis sed fidem quærit. Adde quod M. Tullius ne Thucydidem quidem aut Xenophontem utiles oratori putat, quanquam illum bellicum canere, hujus ore Musas esse locutas existimet.' And when Cicero, in a memorable passage,¹ mentions our author's speeches as embodying the very qualities an advocate should avoid, he is not, as Göller² shows, looking at their intrinsic value as component parts of a history, but speaking with a view to their practical utility as models for a pleader at the Roman bar.

2. I need only touch on the necessity of breaking up, in an English version, those long-drawn and complicated sentences, which in the page of other Greek authors,³ as well as Thucydides, puzzle the reader from the remarkable contrast they present to the modest unambitious periods of the most popular models of English composition. In the days of Thucydides a natural reaction had set in against the Sententious, or, as Aristotle calls it, 'jointed,'⁴ structure of the early Greek annalists; and the easy excursive simplicity of Herodotus, arrayed in the flowing garb of what critics call the Periodic style, had won general admiration. Thucydides, however, in adopting the mode of composition fashionable in his day, has been frequently led, by the fulness of the ideas which crowded on his mind, into a prolixity and involution in the arrangement of his clauses fertile of embarrassment to the student. In many cases he does not seem to have reflected how much of

¹ *Orator*, ix. 'Thucydides res gestas et bella narrat et prælia graviter sanè et probè, sed nihil ab eo transferri potest ad forensem usum et publicum. Ipsæ illæ conciones ita multas habent obscuras abditasque sententias, vix ut intelligantur; quod est in oratore civili vitium vel maximum.'

² Second edition, vol. i. p. 56.

³ Mure (*Lit. of Greece*, vol. iv. p. 128) cleverly accounts for this phe-

nomenon of Attic prose: which, instead of being based on the forms of written narrative, like that of modern Europe, was cast in the mould, and founded on the principles, of public oratory.

⁴ *Rhet.* iii. 9. The epithet indicates the inartificial mode in the which the sentences of the earlier writers were linked together, with little attempt at logical connection or modulated cadence.

the information he wishes to convey will fall within the legitimate orbit of a period; at one moment, the sense is obscured by a host of ancillary circumstances which he strives to bring within the scope of a single sentence: at another, by the suspension of the main idea in favour of some collateral notion parenthetically¹ introduced.

3. One of the most striking peculiarities of his rhetorical diction, is a studied antithetical arrangement of opinions and arguments. Antithesis—that favourite ornament of Gibbon—is, in itself, not only one of the legitimate graces of style, but, as Aristotle² has shown, an essential aid to perspicuity. Thucydides, however, in the oratorical portions of his work, employs the figure with a lavishness in which no succeeding writer of equal eminence has indulged, and which is the more remarkable in one who lay under no temptation to redeem poverty of thought by rhetorical embellishment. The curious contrast, everywhere discernible, between the ease, the graphic power and spirited flow of his narrative, and the wearisome monotony of the decorative art which loads too many³ of his speeches, has been traced to the influence of the literary taste prevalent in his day, seconded by his own personal bias. ‘When composition,’ says Mure,⁴ ‘becomes an art, the newborn zeal of its early professors leads them, in theorising on its principles, to prefer exaggerated or affected forms in their efforts to reduce those principles to practice. And this crisis in the history of literary style as invariably coincides with a similar crisis in the state of intellectual culture at large; artifice and subtlety of expression being accompanied by a proportional amount of artifice and subtlety in doctrine and sentiment.’

Elsewhere⁵ he says: ‘Thucydides flourished in the very

¹ Dionysius (*De Thucyd. Idiom.* 2) pointedly complains of the *αι μεγαζὸν παρεμπιπτόσεις*, which, he says, *ἐὰν μακροῦν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν κομίζονται.*

² *Rhet.* iii. 9, 8.

³ Such qualities are, however, far less flagrant in the later than in the earlier orations. It seems as if ‘more mature practice in composi-

tion, and the influence of his own strong common sense, had gradually taken off the edge of that extreme subtlety of thought and expression, under the influence of which he had commenced his undertaking.’—Mure, *Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 596.

⁴ Vol. iv. p. 121.

⁵ Vol. v. pp. 161, 162.

acme of that period of his native literature, in which the faults exemplified in his pages chiefly prevailed; when, in the early progress of intellectual culture, subtlety of doctrine and sentiment was accompanied by rhetorical artifice of style. While he was thus peculiarly exposed to these sophistical influences, the peculiarity of his own genius rendered him the more susceptible of their power. . . . His rhetorical mannerism reflects the vicious taste of his age, working on his own natural turn for nice distinctions and logical refinements.¹

Independently of this, two special influences seem to have had a share in forming his rhetorical style. Dionysius² expressly says it was modelled, to a great extent, on the oratory of Gorgias, whose eloquence had recently captivated Athens. The scanty remains of the Sicilian sophist curiously illustrate the antithetical mannerism of the historian, of whose turns of thought and expression phrases like the following—*τῷ φρονίμῳ τῆς γνώμης παύοντες τὸ ἄφρον τῆς ῥώμης*³—*θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχοῦντων, κολασταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκως εὐτυχοῦντων—χρήματα κτᾶσθαι μὲν ὡς χρῶτο, χρῆσθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο*⁴—will forcibly remind the reader. With such evidence, we hardly need the testimony of Cicero, who notes the Sicilian rhetorician's excessive partiality for studied oppositions of thought and language, as well as for the figure termed by Aristotle Parisosis, a favourite expedient with Thucydides⁵ for securing the

¹ A curious parallel may be found in the following remarks of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. v. 9—'The extraordinary instances of attempted antithesis cited by Aristotle from Epicharmus may well lead us to suppose that this sort of false taste was not uncommon in the earlier writers, or rather in those who flourished, like Thucydides, when attention first began to be paid to style; that is, between the time of the simplicity of mere nature, and that of the simplicity of good sense and perfected taste.' Cicero had evidently formed a similar opinion. After comparing the style of Thucydides to Falernian whose softness

had been spoilt by age, he adds, 'ipse Thucydides, si posterius fuisset, multo maturior fuisset et mitior.'—*Brutus*, 83.

² *De Thucyd. Idiom.* 2. *De Thucyd. Judic.* 24.

³ This very idea is, curiously enough, repeated by Thucydides, with a slight difference of form, in the sentiment with which Diodotus closes his harangue, bk. iii. 48. See p. 118, below.

⁴ *Fragmenta Gorgiæ apud Baierum, Oratt. Att.* §§ 5, 19, 21.

⁵ Even the favourable criticism of Marcellinus, the biographer of Thucydides, acknowledges for its client a limited partiality for this

equipoise of clauses antithetically balanced. ‘*Paria paribus adjuncta,*’ says Tully,¹ ‘*et similiter definita itemque contrariis relata contraria, quæ suâ sponte, etiamsi id non agas, cadunt plerumque numerose, Gorgias primus invenit, sed iis est usus intemperatius.*’ Critics have also noticed those coincidences² between the text of Thucydides and the extant orations of Antiphon, the earliest Attic prose writer of whose works any portion has survived, which go far to confirm the tradition, recognised apparently by Plato,³ of the historian’s early initiation in the rhetorical art by his countryman and cotemporary, whom he has himself mentioned, in accents redolent of a pupil’s⁴ gratitude, as a great master of thought and language.

The salient feature of the Thucydidean predilection for antithesis is undoubtedly the favourite opposition between Words and Deeds, which, though more or less diffused throughout his work, is nowhere so prominent as in the Funeral Speech which he places on the lips of the Olympian Pericles. In the earlier stages of mental culture, the maxim which gives the tone to the exordium of this oration—that of the propriety of paying honours to the brave in acts rather than words—may have worn an air of novelty; and it may very possibly have been the original text of the Periclean address. The fundamental idea, however, which underlies the sentiment, that of the contrast between Words and Deeds, and the implied superior value of the latter in the business of life, is repeated no less than eighteen times in this harangue, of which indeed it may be said to form the keynote. It is singular that a composition replete with admirable maxims of policy, and

figure: ἐξήλωσεν ἐπ’ ὀλίγον τὰς Γοργίου τοῦ Λεοντίνου παρισώσεις καὶ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἐνδοκιμύσας κατ’ ἐκείνο καιροῦ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι.—*Vita Thucyd.* § 36.

¹ *Orator*, c. 52.

² Not only in the artifices of antithesis—especially the opposition between λόγος and ἔργον, though here the resemblance is very marked—and alliteration, but in the peculiarities of his syntax: such as the substitution of adjectival and participial

phrases for abstract nouns: e.g. ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ δικαίῳ οὐχ ἦσσαν ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ· τὸ ὑμέτερον εὐσεβὲς παρῆς· Antiphon, *De Cæde Herod.* §§ 7, 96; τὸ θυμούμενον τῆς γνώμης, id. *Tetralog.* i. iii. 3, an expression literally adopted by Thucydides, and certainly more significant of a transitory state of feeling than an abstract noun would be.

³ *Menæxenus*, p. 236. Steph.

⁴ See Dr. Arnold’s note on *Thucyd.* viii. 68.

breathing some of the noblest sentiments on record, should be disfigured by the tasteless iteration of an antithetical quibble. If the substance of the speech is Periclean, the mould in which it is cast, and the mechanism of its structure, are essentially Thucydidean.¹ The modern translator, writing at an epoch when the current of popular taste sets strongly in favour of simplicity of style and diction, may claim forgiveness, if, when confronted by such a phenomenon, he tries to tone down rather than bring out in prominent relief the eccentricities of his author. Nor is he guilty of any real infidelity² to the original in so doing; he is only substituting the idiom of one age for that of another. Without venturing to decide how many varieties of meaning the antithesis in question may have presented to an Athenian, it is impossible not to see that the idea is susceptible of almost indefinite modifications in various contexts. Thus, in the clause *οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι* (bk. ii. 40), the opposition lies between action and debate; in the words, *οὐ λόγων κόμπος τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια* (ib. 41), between a rhetorical vaunt and the actual truth; in another chapter,³ the 43rd of the same book, a more subtle contrast is apparently drawn between the incentives to patriotism afforded, on the one hand, by rhetorical eulogies of that virtue, and, on the other, by the palpable evidence of the power of his country which everywhere greeted the eye of the Athenian.⁴ Again, a little below, in the noble passage concluding with the clause *τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδαιτᾶται, ἔργον*, as opposed to *γνώμη*, represents the inanimate memorials of the tomb as contrasted with the living memories of heroic deeds enshrined in the hearts of the brave. In the same chapter, too, we find these identical terms antithetically arranged in the phrase *γιγνώσκουτες τὰ δέοντα, καὶ*

¹ It is impossible not to recognise a studied caricature of the rhetorical style of Thucydides in the Funeral Speech embodied in the *Menexenus* of Plato. The inveterate opposition of *λόγος* and *ἔργον*, *ἰδία* and *δημοσία*, are pointedly travestied in the first sentence.

² Unless, indeed, the translator

shirks an antithesis altogether, as Mure has done in his version of the grand passage, bk. ii. ch. 43. See note ², p. 74 of this Work.

³ See note ², p. 73, below.

⁴ This idea of the meaning of the antithesis is shadowed forth in Dr. Arnold's paraphrase of the passage.

ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυρόμενοι, where the antagonist notions are those of shrewdness in counsel, and sensibility to shame in action. Elsewhere,¹ λόγοι represents ‘political debates,’ ἔργα ‘public business;’ while, in another passage,² λόγῳ is opposed to ἔργῳ as ‘nominally’ to ‘really.’ It is only now and then that we meet the antithesis in so bald a shape that the translator, driven from the field of compromise, is compelled to take the bull by the horns. An instance of the kind presents itself on the threshold of the closing chapter of the Funeral Speech: where I only regret that I did not feel at liberty to strangle the antithesis.³

4. I have acted on a similar principle in those numerous passages where Thucydides subsidises artifice of structure by artifice of sound; in other words, where he has summoned alliteration to the support of antithesis, its natural ally. This figure, one of those aids that nature lends to art to give fragranciness to contrast—its true Aristotelian⁴ function—is employed by Thucydides with a vicious exuberance and a subtlety so perceptibly artificial as to be utterly inartistic; a license noted by Dionysius as quite out of keeping with the general character of his style, so remarkable for its stately and elevated tone, and with his contempt of mere embellishment⁵ for its own sake. Some allowance must, however, be made, not only for

¹ Bk. vi. 38, 4.

² Bk. vi. 78, 3.

³ ‘Another favourite antithetical commonplace of the Historian and his orators, is a similar contrast between the correlative ideas, Public or common (δημόσιον, κοινόν), and Private or peculiar (ἴδιον), in property, feeling, or interest in the affairs of life.’ (Mure, vol. v. p. 595.) Sometimes, however, this opposition is pregnant with a deeper significance than is obvious at first sight. See note ¹, p. 74, below: and the rendering of ἴδιον κίνδυνον and κοινήν ὠφελίαν, iii. 14, 1.

⁴ *Rhet.* iii. 9, 8. See Müller, *Literature of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 135.

⁵ Οἱ μειρακίῳδες σχηματισμοὶ τῶν ἀντιθέτων τε καὶ παρομοίων (allitera-

tion) ἤκιστα τῷ χαρακτῆρι τούτῳ προσήκοντες, ἀστηράν ἔχοντι τὴν ἀγωγὴν, καὶ τοῦ κομψοῦ πλεῖστον ἀφαισηκότι, κ.τ.λ. (*De Thucyd. Idiom.* § 17.) In illustration of this last remark, we may observe that similes are much less frequent in the speeches of Thucydides than in those of Demosthenes. Even Alcibiades, the florid and, at times, poetical tone of whose address is noted by Poppo (ed. maj. *Comment.* vi. 18, 5—στορίσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα), seems painfully at a loss for an illustration, where it was not far to seek. I allude to the passage, bk. vi. 18, 6, where, as the reader will see, he substitutes, in the words ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, a vague comparison for a particular image. See p. 199, below.

the influence of cotemporary taste—which indeed is clearly traceable even in Æschylus—but for the temptations under which a Greek writer lay to play upon words, owing to the facilities afforded by those compound verbs and nouns in which his language was so exuberantly rich,¹ and by its fertile affinities of inflection. So that it is perhaps enough if, in some of these curious passages, the English translator preserves the opposition of sense without re-echoing the coincidence of sound, save when his own language, unforced, yields a ready equivalent. Thus, in bk. ii. 62, 3, where a point is made by the apposition of *φρονήματι* and *καταφρονήματι*, I have discarded the alliteration and contented myself with the English counterparts, pride and disdain;² in another passage, on the other hand (bk. i. 122, 4), I have contrasted *καταφρόνησις* and *ἀφροσύνη* by an approximate rendering, which, as the reader will see, echoes, however imperfectly, the antithesis of sound as well as sense. The—if designed—tasteless alliteration of *ὑπεριδέιν* and *προιδεῖν* (iv. 62, 2), which Thucydides characteristically places on the lips of the Sicilian³ Hermocrates, I have not condescended to repeat; in other cases, I have been obliged to satisfy myself with English representatives, more or less partial, of the intended contrast. Perhaps, for instance, the significant Greek compounds, *προεπιβουλεύειν* and *ἀντεπιβουλεύειν* (i. 33, 4), are sufficiently rendered by the English equivalents ‘to forestall’ and ‘countermine intrigues;’ *ἐπανάστησαν* and *ἀπέστησαν*, so effectively opposed by Cleon (ii. 39, 2), find ready correlatives in the Latinised terms ‘insurrection’ and ‘defec-

¹ So much so, that similar cadences may be found in Demosthenes, where the alliteration is probably unstudied. Later rhetoricians ascribed, with characteristic pedantry, a coincidence of sound probably fortuitous to a studied use of the figure *Paromoiosis*. Such, for instance, is the comment of Hermogenes, who lived in the reign of the Emperor M. Aurelius (vol. iii. p. 284), on the accidental concurrence of *προσῆκει* and *προθύμως* (Demosth. *Olynth.* i. 9, 5). Bremi, in a sensible note on a similar

juxtaposition (ib. 11, 13), says: ‘In his rebus Demosthenes perquam sobrius est, nec, ut Isocrates, harum elegantiarum avidus; sed fere omnibus in locis fieri non posse videtur, ut sententia aliis quam his ipsis verbis exprimitur.’

² Dionysius (*de Thucyd. Jud.* 46) marks this alliteration as unworthy of Pericles, on whose lips it is placed.

³ Sicily was the home and nursery of the florid and elaborate rhetoric of Gorgias, Polus and Licymnius.

tion; and even Hermocrates, who stands committed to two puns in one chapter, might possibly, considering the great advantage which his adverbial compounds give him over his translator, think his terse antithesis, *εὐπρεπῶς ἄδικοι ἐλθόντες, εὐλόγως ἄπρακτοι ἀπίασιν*, fairly echoed by the following version — ‘They visited our shores with excellent pretexts for doing wrong, and will leave them with excellent reasons for doing nothing.’¹

5. When Marcellinus² complained of the difficulty of following the sense of Thucydides, he may have had in view some of those passages where it is needful to supply a link between two clauses, sentences, or, at times, paragraphs. In many cases this license, if a necessary freedom deserves that name, simply consists in a scholarlike interpretation of that highly significant particle, *γάρ*: so reticent to an English, so suggestive to an Athenian ear, of some notion intended to be mentally supplied by the quick apprehension of the audience. Yet even in these instances, I have rarely acted without editorial authority, or philological sanction, such as that of Klotz and Hartung. It may, however, be as well to specify the principal passages in which I have availed myself of this expedient; the reader can then judge for himself of the mode in which I have applied a recognised principle of translation. Thus, at p. 14, bk. i. 40, 6, I have represented the notion latent in the particle *γάρ* (*εἰ γὰρ τοὺς κακόν, κ.τ.λ.*) by the words ‘a principle you dare not infringe,’ interposed between the two sentences on Poppo’s authority (ed. min.), which I have also followed in a similar case at p. 43, bk. i. 120, 1, as a marginal note will show. Again, at p. 19, i. 68, 4, Poppo admits the necessity of supplying a connecting link between *πολεμήσονται* and *οὐ γὰρ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.* In my version, however, I have referred *γάρ* to *ἐπιβουλεύοντας* instead of *προπαρεσκευασμένους*. In another instance, at p. 55, the pregnant force of the same particle in the adjoining sentence (*πλέον γὰρ ἡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ., i. 142, 5*) is brought out, as the note explains, by interpolating the clause ‘and we shall find it easy to make descents.’ By a similar expedient Poppo and Göller relieve the embarrassed sense in a well-

¹ Bk. iv. 61, sub fin. See p. 150, below.

² *Vita Thucydidis*, cap. 56, where he calls him *ἀσαφής τὴν εἰάνοιαν*.

known passage in the speech of Demosthenes (iv. 10, 3), as the reader will find from my note at p. 139: and, with the sanction of the former critic,¹ I have, at p. 52, elicited the latent significance of γάρ by introducing the clause, ‘And we *may* meet with reverses,’ between the sentence ending with μεταποιεῖσθαι and that commencing with ἐνδέχεται. Again, at p. 79, bk. ii. 60, 6, it is evident that γάρ, in the clause ὁ τε γὰρ γνούς, κ.τ.λ., denotes the logical relation of the sentence in which it occurs, to some idea not palpably expressed. Perhaps that relation is represented by the clause I have inserted, ‘Qualities all indispensable in a statesman.’ Similarly, at p. 150, bk. iv. 61, 7, the implicit force of the particle in the clause οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ., has, I trust, not been misrepresented by the intervening clause—‘the Athenians would then have nothing to do.’

Independently of those passages in which the particle γάρ points to a notion understood, there are several in which, owing to the severe condensation of the Greek, a few explanatory terms are needed to present to the English reader the true connection of the sense. Two instances occur in which sentences commence with the personal pronoun ἡμεῖς, followed by the particle δέ; another, similar in character, and differing only in form, where καὶ stands first and ἡμᾶς follows. They will be found, severally, in bk. i. 121, 1, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀδικούμενοι, κ.τ.λ.· ii. 11, 6, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ’ ἐπί, κ.τ.λ., vi. 85, 1, καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ὠφελεί, κ.τ.λ. The pronoun, of course, is by its position emphatic: and, in each case, the particles are retrospective. Their joint office is to apply the general statement which precedes to the particular case or persons denoted by the pronoun. If the reader will turn to the corresponding passages in the translation at pp. 45, 61, and 233, he will see that, in endeavouring to bring out the logical connection of ideas, I have invoked the aid of a few subsidiary terms.

The omission of a few words, necessary to the sense, before the conditional particle εἰ, is another characteristic of the studied brevity of Thucydides, and is one of the many points on which he has been imitated by the restless vanity of Tacitus.²

¹ See his note (ed. min.) on ἐνδέχεται γάρ, i. 140, 1.

² See Poppo's note on Thucyd. iv. 86, 4.

Instances occur in bk. i. 40, 2, *εἰ σωφρονοῦσι*. iii. 11, 3, *εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν*. iv. 86, 4, *εἰ τὸ πάτριον παρεῖς*. Ample authority for the words supplied in my version, pp. 14, 96, 157, will be found in the notes of Poppo (ed. min.), and Dr. Arnold.

Before quitting this branch of the subject, I would also refer to p. 151, bk. iv. 62, 3, where, as a marginal note explains, some introduction is required to the train of reflections which rather abruptly commence the paragraph; to p. 137, bk. iii. 67, 7 (*ἦν οἱ ἠγεμόνες, κ.τ.λ.*), where I have restored the construction—a curious specimen of confusion—on Dr. Arnold's authority; to p. 226, bk. vi. 79, 2 (*ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ Πηγήνιοι*), where the argumentative force of *ἐπεὶ* requires full expression:¹ and to pp. 235, 236, bk. vi. 87, where, at several points, the ideas seemed to demand a little expansion.

6. In four instances, it has been found needful to transpose clauses, in order to preserve the connection of the sense. In two cases (bk. vi. 11, 4, and 12, 2), the necessity for this expedient is so glaring, that one cannot but suspect the inversion to be due to the error of some early copyist. See pp. 189, note², and 190, note², below: and Poppo's notes (ed. min.) on the passages above referred to. Again, if the reader will turn to bk. iv. 126, 4, and to p. 166, note², of the translation, he will see that the clauses commencing with the words *καὶ γὰρ ὅσα, κ.τ.λ.*, require to be reversed; for, if they are taken in the order of the text, the student, on reaching the next sentence—that beginning with *οὗτοι δέ*—is obliged to revert to the first clause of the preceding sentence, in order to recover the connection. The only other instance occurs in bk. v. 111, 4, where Thucydides, in laying down, with his usual sententiousness, a political maxim, has, with a curious imbecility of arrangement, thrown into the shade, instead of bringing out in clear relief, the term of the proposition which relates to the case under discussion—the position of Melos towards the Athenian empire.² See p. 183, note⁴, below.

¹ As in the similar case of *ἐπεὶ καί*, bk. vi. 16, 4. See p. 194, note¹, below.

² Perhaps it may be thought that the speaker intended covertly to in-

sinuate the policy of obedience to a stronger power, and therefore unobtrusively introduced the principle as the second clause of a general maxim. But the principle in ques-

CHAPTER II.

THE SPEECHES, CONSIDERED IN THEIR LITERARY AND HISTORICAL ASPECTS.

I. 'THE history of Thucydides,' says Sir G. Cornwall Lewis,¹ 'forms by itself a great epoch in politics, both as furnishing a model of accurate, trustworthy, and impartial narrative, and as embodying all the practical sagacity of the ablest statesmen of Greece (including Pericles), who had lived before and during the Peloponnesian war. For close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on practical political questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never been surpassed; and, indeed, they may be considered as having reached the highest excellence of which the human mind is capable in this department.' Earl Chat-ham, says Lord Lytton,² while he 'left to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the classic authors, made it his particular desire that Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen,³ should be the first Greek book which his son read after coming to college;' and Bishop Tomline, in his 'Life of Pitt,' mentions the ease and freedom with which his youthful pupil used to translate the orations which relieve, illustrate, and adorn the narrative of that historian.⁴

tion had been so strongly maintained in the earlier stages of the conference that there could be no reason to shrink from its open assertion at the critical stage of its final enforcement.

¹ *Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, vol. i. p. 61.

² *Miscellaneous Prose Works*, vol. i. p. 214.

³ Probably an undesigned, though an excellent version of the celebrated expression κτήμα ἐς ἀεί (i. 22), which, says Müller (*Literature of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 126), 'opposes the work of Thucydides, which people were to keep by them and read over and over again, to a composition which was designed to gratify an audience

on one occasion only.'

⁴ Whatever may be thought of Lucian's statement that Demosthenes copied the whole history of Thucydides eight times, there seems to be every reason to believe that the historian's work was 'the object of the great orator's peculiar study and imitation.' (Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. xi. p. 379.) Wolf (*ad Demosth. Lep-tin.* p. 51) finds but few traces of direct imitation. Dionysius (*de Thucyd. Jud.* §§ 53, 54, 55) does not agree with this criticism: mentioning several passages from Demosthenes closely modelled, in his opinion, on the historian's style. He however expressly states that the imitation was limited to the finest

2. Göller¹ remarks that the critics of the eighteenth century, writing at an epoch when Parliamentary government and political freedom were rare, were more disposed than they would be now to regard the speeches of Thucydides as a literary anomaly, or, as Col. Mure expresses it, 'a vicious excrescence on the body of a historical work.' In a similar vein Poppo, in contrasting the ancient with the modern style of historical writing, observes that the embodiment of the speculative element of history, the illustration of the play of constitutions, of the working of deliberative assemblies, and of the characters of the chief actors in the national drama, in set speeches by the classic historians, is characteristic of the different political conditions of the two æras. Writing in the year 1821, when, to speak generally, continental affairs were regulated, not, as at Athens in the days of Pericles, by the free pulse of popular government, but by the clockwork machinery of despotism, he says,² in a tone amusingly querulous—'Hodie, dum civitates e cubiculis principum eorumque uxorum, amicorum amicarumve reguntur, atque omnia modo per literas transiguntur, ridiculum esset, si quis de secretis rerum causis in concionibus actum fingeret, quoniam hoc omnino careret verisimilitudine: nam si quæ hodie a principibus eorumque familiaribus orationes publice habentur, hoc non fit, ut vera doceatur populus, sed ut caligo ei offundatur, atque de rebus ita judicare consuescat, ut placet regibus; tales autem fraudulentæ orationes eternæ oblivioni sunt tradendæ (!). Aliter res se habebat apud veteres, in quorum libéris rebus publicis libere ac palam quisque sententiam suam profiteri potuit. Ibi de rebus gravissimis coram populo verba faciebant oratores, nec quicquam erat, quod quidem omnium civium intererat, de quo, si non publice disputatum est, non posset certe disputari.' 'It must be acknowledged,' says Sir G. C. Lewis,³ 'that the practice' of introducing speeches of

qualities of Thucydides; adding, elsewhere (*de Admir. Vi Demosth.* § 8), that the orator disdained allegiance to any one model, but 'wrought out of many a style of composition sublime yet simple, redundant yet concise, refined yet familiar, declamatory yet natural, dignified yet

lively, nervous yet flowing, pleasant yet pungent, sententious yet impassioned; imbued, in short, with all the versatile attributes of Proteus.'

¹ *Thucyd.* Second edition. Vol. i. p. 54.

² Ed. maj. Proleg. p. 47.

³ Loc. cit. p. 241.

the historian's composition 'has been the means of giving us many well-written orations, and of showing in what light the transactions described were viewed by the historian. Thucydides, for example, rarely comments¹ upon the events; and his construction of the facts is principally to be derived from the arguments which he puts into the mouths of his speakers. In antiquity, moreover, when there were no standing embassies, and no diplomatic correspondence between independent states, negotiations were chiefly carried on by envoys, who delivered their message in a public meeting, and argued in its support. Hence, many important transactions were conducted orally,² in an ancient state, which would now be contained in despatches between the ministers of different courts and in collections of state papers. There was, therefore, greater inducement to give, in the form of a speech, arguments which would now be cited from authentic documents. It is further to be borne in mind, that in the ancient republics public affairs were decided in popular assemblies after debate, in which the leading politicians took part; whereas, in all the states of modern Europe, except England, the decisions were generally made by the king or his ministers in private.'³

If, under these conditions, ancient history, in comparison with modern, suffers in the one point of fulness of detail,⁴ it

¹ There are but few exceptions to this statement; for instance, the reflections on the causes of the calamitous catastrophe of the war (bk. ii. 65); on the evils engendered by the prevalence of faction (iii. 82 seqq.); on the personal influence of Brasidas in promoting the fortunes of Sparta (bk. iv. 81); on the reasons which inclined Athens and Lacedæmon to peace (v. 14 seqq.). We may perhaps add the characters of Themistocles (i. 138), of Pericles (ii. 65), and Alcibiades (vi. 15).

² Thus, the Corcyrean and Corinthian envoys address themselves direct to the public assembly at Athens (bk. i. chs. 32 seqq., 37 seqq.), an example followed in every similar case throughout Thucydides,

with the single exception of the Melian negotiation. In all these instances, says Sir G. C. Lewis, 'modern practice would have substituted a written communication between the ministers of the several governments, or between the ambassador of one government and the minister of the other.'—P. 242.

³ To appreciate the naturalness and consistency of the practice of introducing set speeches by the historians of Greece and Rome, we must remember the vast influence of eloquence upon the conduct of public affairs in the classic world. See p. xlv. below.

⁴ See Professor Sellar's *Essay: Oxford Essays*, 1857, p. 310.

indemnifies itself by the clearness of the light it reflects on the motives and causes of political action. The records of diplomacy, such as the archives of Simancas, even in the hands of a Prescott or a Motley, probably afford a less trusty clue to the real history of an epoch, than Thucydides derived from the simplicity and transparency of the agencies which evolved the great events of his day: from the prevalent freedom and publicity of political discussion: and the dependence of action on the will of states instead of on the secret counsels of ministers or the arbitrary rule of princes.

3. It is rarely indeed that we find an ancient critic object, on the ground of principle, to the introduction of speeches of the historian's composition. Even Dionysius, no indulgent censor of Thucydides, pronounces them essential to a true conception of the political evolutions of the ancient world: remarking that they were as often the hinges of great events as battles and sieges.¹ And Diodorus Siculus, who has sometimes been quoted on the opposite side, in discussing the subject in the preface to his twentieth book, admits their value as a relief to the narrative, and as a means of elucidating the motives of the principal actors on the political stage. Lucian, too, in his 'Essay on History,' insists only on the congeniality of the address to the speaker, on the clearness of its style, and its adaptation to the subject. And when Cratippus,² a cotemporary and editor of Thucydides, censures his speeches as an obstacle to the current of the narrative, and as tiresome to the reader, his objections rest on literary, not on historical grounds. Polybius stands alone in denouncing imaginary speeches as foreign to the historian's province, which he limits to the record of what has been actually said and done.³ Modern history, with a few exceptions,⁴ conforms to the rule of the annalist of

¹ *Antiq. Roman.* vii. 66.

² *Dionys. de Thucyd. Judic.* c. 16. Cratippus even pledges Thucydides to the same opinion, which, he says, accounts for the omission of speeches in the eighth book, although negotiations, orally conducted, and public oratory, had been the channels of many of the transactions it records.

³ Blk. ii. 56, 10: δὲ τὸν συγγραφέα οὐ τοὺς ἐνδεχομένους λόγους ζητεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ Guicciardini, for instance, who, in his second book, represents speeches delivered in a consultation of Florentine citizens, upon the comparative advantages of popular and aristocratic government, after the

the Punic wars, and it is now a recognised principle that ‘no speech which was not actually delivered, and of which an authentic cotemporary report has not been preserved, is admissible in a history.’¹

4. Compared, however, with later classic historians, Thucydides maintains, in the composition of his speeches, a jealous adherence to historical truth. Tacitus and Livy, says Sir G. C. Lewis, looked upon ‘a deliberation in a popular body, or a military harangue, as an opportunity for rhetorical display, and composed speeches in prose with as much freedom as a dramatist would use in verse.’² Not content with inserting speeches of their own invention when no record of the address really delivered had been preserved, they sometimes substituted their own harangues when the original speech was extant, and even introduced speeches on occasions where none had been delivered. Thus, Tacitus, instead of reporting the genuine address of the Emperor Claudius—preserved to this day on brazen tablets in the museum at Lyons—invented³ an oration for him; and Livy,⁴ after mentioning a speech of Cato in the Senate, characteristically adds: ‘non inseram simulachrum viri copiosi, quæ dixerit referendo; ipsius oratio scripta exstat, Originum quinto libro inclusa.’ Disdaining to cite, or even to make a faithful abstract of, the real speech, he would readily have composed one of his own invention.⁵

5. Thucydides himself tells us plainly what degree of authenticity his speeches claim. In his preliminary exposition of his method of historical research, he remarks that, finding it difficult to remember the exact terms of the speeches he had

fashion of the debate attributed by Herodotus to the Persian conspirators on the relative advantages of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy. His example has been followed by Botta, who, in his *Storia d'Italia* dal 1780 al 1814, lib. iii., gives his own version of the speeches delivered by two Venetian senators, in 1793, on the questions arising from the French invasion of Italy under Bonaparte. Niebuhr, in the third vol. of his *Roman History*, intro-

duces two fictitious speeches, one of which he attributes to Cineas, the other to Appius Cæcus. See pp. 485-94.

¹ Sir G. C. Lewis, l. c. p. 240.

² Loc. cit. p. 235.

³ *Ann.* xi. 24.

⁴ Lib. xlv. 25.

⁵ As in the case of the fictitious speech he attributes to the mother of that rather apocryphal personage, Coriolanus, lib. ii. 40.

heard, or to collect accurate reports of those at whose delivery he had not been present, he had attributed to each speaker the arguments he considered most suitable to the questions from time to time under discussion, keeping as close as he could to the general tenor of what was actually said.¹ And here, before entering on the considerations suggested by the historian's candid declaration, we must remember that the Athenians had no 'Hansard': that the 'Times' reporter did not attend the debates of their assembly; and that, although speeches on critical political issues were documents of the highest historical value, the Greek historians had no other authority for their accounts of public deliberations than the recollection of persons present on the occasion, save when the orator published his own speech. Such was the practice of Demosthenes, Isocrates, Andocides, Lysias, and others; but Plutarch² expressly declares that Pericles left no written speech; and the orations current in his name, vaguely³ mentioned by Cicero, were either spurious, as Sir G. C. Lewis thinks, or, as Col. Mure suggests, those imputed to him by Thucydides.⁴ Unless we credit the apocryphal statement of Diogenes Laertius that Xenophon used shorthand notes to take down the conversations of Socrates published in his 'Memorabilia,' we must accept Plutarch's⁵ assertion that shorthand writers (*σημειογράφοι*) were employed for the first time by Cicero to report the debate in the Senate on the fate of the Catilinarian conspirators. Towards the close of the Republican era, the reporting of speeches on special occasions came into fashion; thus the original speech in defence of Milo, so different from the oration afterwards composed by Cicero, is said to have been preserved from the reporter's notes;⁶ and, although under the imperial regime no complete series of the Senatorial debates was ever published at Rome, the practice of

¹ Bk. i. 22, 1.

² *Life of Pericles*, ch. 8.

³ 'Periclem, cujus scripta quædam feruntur.'—*Brutus*, 7.

⁴ A supposition materially strengthened by a passage in Cicero's treatise, *De Orat.* ii. 22, where he attributes the same oratorical quali-

ties to Pericles, Alcibiades, and Thucydides. If he identified their styles, it could only have been in the historian's pages.

⁵ *Life of Cato*, ch. 23.

⁶ Merivale's *Roman Emperors*, vol. i. p. 543.

reporting became so prevalent that the word *actuarium*, originally denoting the scribe who registered the *acts* of a public body, gradually acquired the sense of 'reporter';¹ and the art of the shorthand writer is described by the popular authors of the epoch in terms which would aptly characterise the Parliamentary reporters of the present day.²

6. Even had Thucydides made a less explicit revelation of the authorities which served as a basis for his speeches, internal evidence would have led his readers to the conclusion he himself suggests. Aristotle twice cites in his 'Rhetoric'³ an illustration from the Funeral speech of Pericles, in which that orator had compared the damage Athens had sustained from the sacrifice of her youth in the war, to the damage the seasons would suffer from the loss of spring. Of this comparison we find not a vestige in the *Λόγος ἐπιτάφιος* in which Thucydides impersonates the Athenian statesman. It is also observable that the historian, in ushering in his speakers, studiously employs terms⁴ implying that he is only reproducing the substance of what they said. Col. Mure,⁵ however, is certainly not entitled to argue that the fact of 'many of these harangues, though dressed up in all the conventional unities of composition and delivery, as single orations, being described as spoken not by a single orator, but by commissions of diplomatic agents, "Athenian envoys," "Corinthian envoys," in their collective capacity, is itself conclusive proof of their unreality.' They of course were delivered by one or more spokesmen, whose name the historian may not have remembered, or may have thought

¹ Suetonius (*Cæsar*, c. 55) says a speech in defence of Q. Metellus was attributed to Julius Cæsar, but that Augustus thought it had been imperfectly reported, and never revised by the speaker. The words are, 'quam non immerito Augustus existimat magis ab actuariis exceptam, male subsequentibus verba dicentis, quam ab ipso editam.' Similarly, Seneca (*Epist.* 33, § 9) uses the words 'actuarii vice fungitur,' in a sense equivalent to the English 'performs the part of a reporter.' See Lipsius, *Excurs. ad Tacit.*

Ann. v.

² As in Martial's clever epigram, xiv. 208 :

'Currant verba licet, manus est
velocior illis;
Nondum lingua, suum dextra
peregīt opus.'

³ Bk. i. 7, 4; iii. 10, 7.

⁴ The formula is, *ἔλεγον, εἶπον τοιαῦδε, τοιαῦτα*, 'they spoke to the following effect: 'not *ἔλεγον τὰδε, εἶ ταῦτα*.

⁵ *Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 104.

it only worth his while to mention on important occasions, such as the defence of the Plataeans, of whose advocates he has preserved the names. Undue stress, too, has perhaps been laid, in dealing with this branch of the question, on what has been termed the prophetic import of some passages in the earlier speeches; upon the Spartan king's anticipation of the length and obstinacy of the war (bk. i. 80); his conception of the policy of the alliance subsequently formed between Persia and Sparta against Athens (i. 82); and the allusion to the project of occupying a fort in the Attic territory (i. 122, 142): an expedient obvious enough to strike any military eye at the outset of the war. Critics surely cannot seriously insist that passages like these uniformly betray not the foresight of the speaker, but the later experience of the writer. Occasionally, however, we find a significant revelation of the fact, that if the memoranda of a speech were collected near the date of its delivery, its actual composition, as it appears in the pages of Thucydides, was delayed till a much later period. Mr. Grote¹ remarks that it is only on this theory we can explain the allusion in a speech of Hermocrates, B.C. 424 (bk. iv. 60), to the presence of a *small* Athenian squadron in the Sicilian waters. The fleet in question must have consisted of at least fifty sail; and it was only by comparison with the great armament of 415 B.C.—a comparison obvious enough to Thucydides, writing at the close of the war—that any Greek could have called it small.²

7. But these are minor points. Assuming the truth of his own statement that he adhered as closely as he could to the tenor of what was actually said, the question still remains, in what proportion he has blended with the record of the various speeches his own moral and political axioms, sentiments, generalisations, maxims? On the threshold of this enquiry, we are met by the very phenomena the historian's admission would lead us to expect. On the one hand, the advocacy of the various lines of policy is characterised, even in the most elaborate of these orations, by a plainness and simplicity, and the arguments which enforce them by a practical, and sometimes

¹ *History of Greece*, vol. vii. p. 188, note.

² A similar instance will be found in note ⁴, p. 175, below.

businesslike, tone, which does not strike us as transcending the capacity, or as foreign to the genius, of any of the speakers, or those whom they addressed, and which lends probability to the writer's assertion of his fidelity, wherever it was attainable, to the general outline of what was really said. On the other hand, the tissue of ethical and political comment so copiously interwoven with the thread of the main argument, seems to reflect the genius of Thucydides himself. We can hardly attribute to miscellaneous audiences of Spartans, Corinthians, Athenians, Bœotians, Mytileneans, Sicilians, a degree of intellectual culture and refinement of thought scarcely to be realised in the most highly educated assemblies of modern days; and our only alternative lies in accepting the personal authorship, for the most part, of the speculative and didactic element of the speeches; a theory rendered so intrinsically probable by the abstract tone which pervades this part of the work—a tone suggestive of individual rather than aggregate intelligence—by the equability of the intellectual standard maintained throughout: by the general prevalence of a rhetorical mannerism peculiar to the historian's style when he touches the same theme with his own pencil:¹ by the frequency with which certain general views² of human affairs are reproduced: and by the curious coincidences of thought and even expression between sentiments uttered by Thucydides in his narrative and arguments attributed to particular speakers.³ It is this

¹ For instance, in the celebrated passage containing his reflections on the prevalence of faction, and its influence on the social and political morality of Greece.—Bk. iii. chs. 82, 83.

² Such, for instance, as the idea, attributed impartially to characters so dissimilar as those of Hermocrates, Nicias, Archidamus, Pericles, and reminding us, by its frequent recurrence, of the refrain of a Greek Chorus, of the uncertainty of fortune: an element flowing from the limitations imposed upon the power of man, whose will and capacities he still regards as the only known causes

of action. Not that he negatives the influence of supernatural agencies (see note ², p. 179, below): but he builds his theories of life and action on the basis of visible causation and actual experience. Thus, while Herodotus ascribes to Nemesis the abasement of pride and prosperity, Thucydides attributes such reverses to natural causes—the undue elation and the gambling spirit engendered by unexpected success.

³ See note ², p. 29, below, where the reader will observe that Thucydides ascribes to the Athenian speaker the very sentiment he had himself uttered in the nineteenth chapter of

general uniformity of mould and casual variety of feature which has induced a critic to compare his method to 'the practice of modern painters, accustomed to design their principal female figures after some favourite living model, whose original form and features everywhere reappear, under the several attributes of a Minerva or a Madonna, a Herodias or a Lucretia.'¹

8. If we were contending for the absolute authenticity of the speeches, the question of the degree of individuality infused into them would be one of cardinal importance. The historian, however, by discarding all pretensions to a purely literal report of the various harangues, virtually resolves the question into a point of æsthetical rather than historical interest. In relation to Thucydides, it is far less a problem of historic fidelity than of dramatic consistency. To the latter principle he is true, so far as the general law of his work permits. But he does not confound it with a mimic representation of national or personal peculiarities; the same idea of the dignity of history which made it impossible for him to be vulgar even when he personated Cleon, and forbade him to sacrifice the artistic unity² of his work and destroy its harmony of colouring by chequering his page with the motley varieties of dialect, limited his observance of the 'law of propriety' to the portraiture of broad features and salient points, and threw into the shade the minor attributes of style, manner, and degrees of intellectual power.³ We look in vain for any trace of Bœotian stolidity in

the same book. For a similar instance, see note ³, p. 22.

¹ Mure, *Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 148.

² On this point, see Poppo (ed. maj.), *Proleg.* p. 49; Müller, *Literature of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 129.

³ 'There is not indeed much dramatic imitation of manner, or of the lifelike attributes of the orators. In these respects Thucydides is less dramatic than Herodotus or Plato, who bring before us something of the outward man as well as the inward thought. It may seem paradoxical

to say that the speeches in Thucydides are more consistent with the conceptions we form of the characters of the speakers from the acts recorded of them than they might have been if they were a literal account of what was actually spoken. States are not necessarily represented by individuals whose characteristics resemble the national type, nor do men at all times express themselves in conformity with what to lookers-on appears the master-passion of their lives.' — Professor Sellar, *Oxford Essays*, p. 298.

the Theban reply to the Plataean petitioners for mercy; yet the truth of the picture is redeemed by the moral apathy and heartlessness of tone characteristic of the men who had played the traitor to their country's cause in the great struggle of the Persian war. In harmony with nature, we find national traits relieved by personal varieties; Archidamus, for instance, in a speech which is a living embodiment of Spartan pride, and of the circumspect policy and conservative feeling of his countrymen, represents the higher, Sthenclaidas the lower, type of Lacedæmonian character. Satisfied perhaps with a single exhibition of laconic bluntness and coarseness of tone in the person of the Ephor, the historian pointedly disclaims, in the speech of the Spartan deputies at Athens, any affectation of qualities of style or manner which, if they did not baffle the exposition of the case, would have paralysed its effect on an Athenian ear; vindicating, at the same time, his general consistency by bringing out in full relief the systematic mediocrity of aim, the timid, creeping policy, and the cynical disregard of the rightful claims of other powers,¹ which one of his speakers² subsequently describes as an inveterate trait of Spartan diplomacy abroad. The rival addresses of the envoys of Corinth and Corcyra symbolise the spirit of the mercantile communities they represent; they realise our idea of the insular state as a commercial republic of inferior caste, and respond to our conceptions of the higher strain of policy and aim which inspired the counsels of Corinth. The Corcyrean arguments scarcely ascend above the sordid Carthaginian level of mere advantage; the question of expediency is the staple of their address: they appeal, not to Athenian honour, but to Athenian policy; and the question of right is only presented in the shape of a sophistical³ construction of a clause in the Thirty Years' Truce, the hollowness of which the speaker admits by its partial retraction in the thirty-sixth chapter, and by a clumsy attempt to criminate the Corinthians as the first aggressors. Corinth, on the other hand, though far from blind to the instincts of

¹ See note ², p. 141, below.

² See p. 180, below.

³ See note ³, p. 6, and ², p. 14, below. As I have explained in the

notes referred to, I have followed Müller's views on this point in preference to those of Mr. Grote.

policy, appeals warmly to the sentiments of honour and of moral obligation: resting her claim on the impregnable grounds of international law, and a just construction of the clause her opponents had perverted; on the natural instincts of gratitude for her repeated support of the Athenian cause, and on the harmony of true policy with right. The third speech attributed to Pericles paints that statesman in the very colours of the sketch subsequently given of his character. The spirit with which he braves the resentment and bridles the passions of his audience, is a living echo of that dignified contempt of mere popularity which Thucydides, in the sixty-fifth chapter of his second book, imputes to him in pointed contrast with succeeding politicians, whom he describes as more on a level with one another, and forced to redeem the poverty of their personal pretensions to ascendancy by servile adulation of the tyrant people. From the opening chapter of the statesman's last address the poet Ion might have reinforced his censure of that haughty and defiant self-esteem which he so unfavourably compared with the unpretending simplicity of his patron Cimon.¹

9. In speaking of the representative or dramatic element of the speeches, we must not omit to note the historian's management of the principle of contrast. Mr. Grote has remarked the effect with which the bright colours and cheerful tone in which Pericles portrays the social life and political grandeur of Athens, are succeeded by the graphic detail of the ravages of the pestilence, with its attendant train of social horrors, general demoralisation, and political despondency. And we find a true specimen of tragic irony in the contrast between the ruthless abuse of Athenian power at Melos and the overwhelming catastrophe of the Sicilian invasion, to the preparations for which Thucydides, with much dramatic effect, shifts the scene, the moment the curtain drops on the consummation of the island massacre. Turning to the portraiture of individual life and character, we cannot fail to remark the truthfulness to nature with which the rival actors are contrasted. In the historian's pages, the figures of the drama are not opposed in the sharp epigrammatic antithetical style which modern history, to give flagrancy to contrast, has so often

¹ Plutarch, *Pericles*, c. 5.

borrowed from the alien province of the satirist ;¹ they stand out from the canvas—not, however, as personified qualities, but as men. *The versatile but unprincipled energy of Alcibiades*² and the *timid superstitious desponding temperament of Nicias*, are the more effectively contrasted, because the writer never oversteps ‘the modesty of nature’ by artificial elaboration or exaggerated colouring. *The modest genius of Brasidas* and the *braggart arrogance of Cleon* are brought out in clear but natural relief; and we feel the reality with which two very different types of Spartan character are embodied in the intelligence of the dignified Archidamus and the coarseness of the ill-educated Ephor.³ Farther on, amid the opening scenes of the Sicilian war, the grave and decorous tones of the patrician Hermocrates, the tribunician vehemence and the pungent and contentious satire with which Athenagoras declaims against the aristocratic votaries of war, present a lively image of the varieties of character formed by the natural play of life and manners at an epoch when personal idiosyncrasies were intensified by the embittered strife of faction.

10. If, as Müller⁴ thinks, the impartiality with which our historian dramatises the opinions of conflicting parties or statesmen is in some degree due to the sophistical exercises which taught the art of pleading both sides of a question, he has turned the lessons of Gorgias and Antiphon to excellent account. ‘Thucydides,’ says Professor Sellar, ‘appears in every case to throw himself strongly into the situation of the speaker; not, in general at least, to discover palliatives by which he might deceive himself and others as to the true grounds on which he was acting; but to find some intellectual basis—a position consistent with some elements in human nature—on which the real motives of his actions could logically be maintained. In this respect, too, his practice is dramatic, and analogous to that of the Greek tragedians. To the worst

¹ See Lord Macaulay’s *Essays*, vol. i. p. 161.

² Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that the abruptness with which Alcibiades commences his reply to the opposition speech of Nicias, is congenial

enough to the strong provocation which invited the retort.

³ See p. xli. above.

⁴ *Literature of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 130.

cause, and to the speakers with whom he had least sympathy, he lends the aid of all his intellectual power. He allows them to enunciate immoral principles, rather than to sacrifice their self-respect by condescending to the use of argumentative sophistry.¹ None of his speeches are characterised by more ability and thought than that in which Cleon advocates the massacre of the Mytileneans. The insolent strength of the Athenians at Melos is endowed with a terrible force of practical logic and defiant sarcasm.² Mr. Grote³ seems inclined to endorse the perverse commentary of Dionysius,⁴ who stigmatises the grounds upon which the Athenian envoys found their claim to the submission of Melos, as worthy of pirates, and quite out of character with the highly civilised state whose chivalrous patriotism had saved Greece in the struggle with the Mede. A shallow censure, sufficiently rebuked by Poppo's remark, that, if Athens was capable of treating Melos and Scione as she did, the arguments of her representatives were a fair mirror of the national sentiments; and by the calm and dispassionate assertion of 'the right of the strongest,' volunteered by the Athenian representative at Camarina on an occasion when intimidation offered nothing, a conciliatory tone everything. In the Melian debate Thucydides doubtless intended to dramatise the existing phase of political morality

¹ Marcellinus (*Vita Thucyd.*, § 56) notes and accounts for his remarkable abstinence from the use of what he terms Figures of thought as opposed to Figures of speech. He describes him as ποικιλώτατος μὲν ἐν τοῖς τῆς λέξεως σχήμασι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦναντίον ἀσχημάτιστος· οὔτε γὰρ εἰρωνείας οὔτε ἐπιτιμήσεων οὔτε ταῖς ἐκ πλυγίου ῥήσεσιν οὔτε ἄλλαις τισὶ πανουργίαις πρὸς τὸν ἀκροάτην κέχρηται, τοῦ Δημοσθένους μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἐπιεικνιμένου τὴν δεινότητα. Οἶμοι δὲ οὐκ ἀγνοία σχηματισμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ διάνοιαν παρῆναι τὸν Θουκυδίδην τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις πρέποντας καὶ ἀρμόζοντας σιντιβέντα τοὺς λόγους· οὐ γὰρ ἔπρεπε Περικλεῖ καὶ Ἀρχιδάμῳ καὶ Νικίᾳ καὶ Βρασίδᾳ ἀνθρώποις μεγάλῳφροσι καὶ

γενναίους καὶ ἡρωικὴν ἔχουσι δόξαν, λόγους εἰρωνείας καὶ πανουργίας περιτιθέναι τεχνίτου γὰρ ἀνδρὸς φυλάξει τοῖς προσώποις τὴν ἐπιβάλλουσαν δόξαν καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν ἀκόλουθον κόσμον. 'We rarely,' says Col. Mure, 'meet in his speeches with the favourite expedients of later rhetoricians for influencing an audience; e. g. the taunting interrogatory (ἰρώτημα), the sudden breaking off of an argument or statement (ἀπειρώπησις), the affectation of impartiality (εἰρωνεία), or of a fear of overstating one's case, or undervaluing that of an opponent.'—Mure, vol. v. p. 166.

² *Oxford Essays*, 1857: p. 297.

³ *History of Greece*, vol. vii. p. 157.

⁴ *Jud. de Thueyd.* chs. 38, 39.

among his countrymen, and to paint the influence of the atrocities of the war in the deepening profligacy of the times. And he has drawn the picture with inimitable truth and consistency. The maxims so unblushingly propounded in the Melian conference are the legitimate fruit of that utter disorganisation of society so graphically sketched by the historian as the disastrous effect of factious and revolutionary violence, culminating in the overthrow of all the sanctions of religion, morality and natural affection. In that sketch, he redeems himself, ethically, from any suspicion of his own infection with the debased principles which historical truth forces him to impute to his countrymen. Politically, too, he vindicates himself, implicitly, by qualifying any impression we might build on the brilliant panegyric of Athenian democracy so consistently placed on the lips of Pericles, by describing, in marked contrast with his usual reticence, the government of Five Thousand as the best constitution Athens had enjoyed in his time. These casual glimpses of his own sentiments are the more interesting, because, as he does not treat his materials judicially, after the fashion of modern historians, but analytically and dramatically, our impressions of his views on moral and social questions would, apart from such occasional gleams, be purely conjectural.

11. If we look to the principle upon which Thucydides has regulated the introduction of his speeches, we shall find that, so far from resorting to them for mere rhetorical effect, he has availed himself of this machinery for purposes partly æsthetical, chiefly historical; bringing it into play, for instance, when the influence of an eloquent address formed the key to some important decision or critical event: an influence without a parallel, in modern times, even in free countries like our own. With us, public opinion acts on the executive slowly, through Parliament and the press; any sudden political movement is instantly confronted by formidable obstacles; at Athens, public opinion found a rapid and direct expression, without any intermediate organ or check, in the decisions of an assembly composed of the whole people;¹ decisions always influenced by,

¹ Thus, the fate of the Mytileneans an adjournment; and the decision was settled in one day, without even was reversed on the following day,

and sometimes formed under the immediate impulse of oratory, which thus became the chief instrument and prime mover of political action. The same machinery serves, in the hands of Thucydides, to introduce the chief actors on the political arena: to give an impartial and many-sided picture of the springs of action: to bring out, in a vivid representative form, the most critical situations of the war: to relieve the narrative: to contribute, in a classic sense, to the artistic perfection of the work: to represent the various phases of public feeling and opinion: to paint the demoralising influence of long-protracted hostilities in not only violating the recognised standard, but in substituting a new standard, of principle and duty: to serve as a vehicle for the exposition of ethical and political truths, which, though often mere summaries of current experience, aggregates of facts and tendencies, analytical and tentative in form, and sometimes failing to seize the ultimate law—a natural feature of an epoch of early speculative activity, seeking rather to raise than to settle social questions—will yet be found to contain, in many cases, the first germs of conceptions¹ more fully expanded in subsequent times, and to constitute, on the whole, one of the most valuable legacies which the long and calamitous experience of ages has bequeathed to the practical wisdom of our own days.

Dionysius, while he extols several of the speeches, especially the first oration of Pericles, the first address of Nicias, and, above all, the pathetic oratory of the Plataeans, objects to the speeches in the first book, as tediously disproportionate to the importance of the events recorded; complaining, at the same time, of the omission of the debate which resulted in the adoption of Cleon's decree for the massacre of the Mytileneans: and of the Funeral oration of Pericles, as misplaced in point of time and circumstance.² These censures, however, show a curious tendency to recoil upon their author: the points chal-

under the same influence as that which had produced it. See also the passage (bk. i. ch. 85, p. 39, below) in which Archidamus deprecates a decision, within the brief span of an hour, on a question in-

volving the most momentous issues.

¹ Such, for instance, as the recognition of the political truth embodied in the term 'Balance of power,' p. 95, below.

² *Jud. de Thucyd.* §§ 17, 18.

lenged by the critic being found, when considered in their true aspects, to support the theory for which I contend, and to illustrate the historian's economy of the dramatic element of his work. With regard to the first ground of objection, it is clear that, if the representative element of history is to be brought fully into play, its use is very appropriate in the earlier scenes of the drama, if only to introduce the actors, and allow them to speak for themselves. While, so far from the particular speeches in the first book being misplaced, they serve to bring out many interesting features which no other machinery could have developed so effectively. The envoys of Corinth and Corcyra discuss opposite views of international law and colonial relations with a picturesqueness that the historian's formal exposition could never have achieved: the speeches of the Corinthians at Sparta are pregnant revelations of the causes of the jealousy prevalent against Athens, of the attributes of Spartan policy, the relations of Sparta to her allies, and the terror inspired by her foe, terror betrayed by the speaker's vehement insistence on the need of rapid and combined action against the common enemy. The first address of Archidamus, too, serves as an admirable vehicle for the illustration of many of the cardinal issues on which the fortune of the war hinged. He bases his counsel of a defensive policy on a forcible contrast of the vital differences between the Peloponnesian and Athenian power; urging the advantage which a maritime and commercial empire, amply supplied with 'the sinews of war,' supported by tributary allies, so despotically governed as to ensure unity to the central executive, enjoyed over a confederacy constitutionally different—composed of a variety of states, agricultural and inland for the most part, comparatively independent of the direct control of their federal chief, distracted by conflicting interests, enfeebled by diversity of race, mere voluntary contributors to the federal exchequer, and devoid of capitalised wealth. Thucydides, having these points to bring out, had the option of presenting them, in harmony with the general law of his work, in a dramatic form—a form combining many advantages, those especially of animation and contrast, set off by the semblance, and often the substance, of reality: or of descending to what a classic writer would have

thought the inferior office of personal exposition. Had he chosen the latter alternative, his method would have resembled that of Hume, whose celebrated 'Summaries,' mere hypothetical integrations of opinion, for the most part, do not seem, when tried by the light of later research, to rival the claims of our historian's speeches even to authenticity, while they carry a far less lively air.

The second objection urged by Dionysius falls by its own weight; had Thucydides recorded the first debate on the Mytilenean question, he would have traversed the same ground twice: for Cleon's defence of the decree doubtless reiterates the arguments which had led to its adoption. The fallacy of his censure of the Funeral oration attributed to Pericles, as mistimed, considering the trifling numbers of the slain at that early date of the war, and the insignificance of the encounters which had taken place, has been so well exposed by Mr. Grote ('Hist. of Greece,' vol. vi. p. 205), that it is needless here to refute the malignant criticism of a writer who apparently sought to found a reputation on the greatness of the author he attacked, and who, intending murder, has committed suicide.

SPEECHES

FROM

THUCYDIDES.

SPEECH OF THE CORCYREAN ENVOYS,

Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, B.C. 433.
Thucyd. Bk. I. chs. 32-37.

INTRODUCTION.

CORCYRA, one of the Corinthian colonies, was the founder of the city of Epidamnus on the Illyrian coast in the Ionic gulf. This settlement, torn by internal feuds and harassed by the neighbouring Illyrians, joined by the partisans of an oligarchical government which had been overthrown in a recent revolution, sent representatives of the democratic party then in power to petition Corcyra for aid. This was refused, the exiled oligarchs having strong interest, through family connections, with the mother city. The rejected suitors then applied to Corinth, from whom, in compliance with Grecian usage, Corcyra had been obliged to select the founder of Epidamnus. The Corinthians readily promised the required succour, partly from jealousy of Corcyra, partly from a sense of the obligations supposed to be involved in their relationship to the distressed city. On this, the oligarchical exiles appealed to Corcyra, who despatched a fleet of forty ships to blockade Epidamnus. Finding, however, that Corinth was about to attack the place with a much stronger force, she took measures, in conjunction with mediators from Sparta and Sicyon, to settle the dispute by arbitration. (Thucyd. i. 28.) Corinth refused the equitable terms offered, and an engagement ensued, in which Corcyra gained a complete victory, B.C. 435.

The two ensuing years were employed by Corinth in preparing a formidable armament; and as Corcyra thus found that she was exposed to the attack of a more powerful fleet than her own—Corinth having a hundred and fifty, Corcyra only a hundred and twenty ships—she found it needful, contrary to her habitual policy of systematic neutrality, to court the protection of some powerful state; and as her enemy was an influential member of the Lacedæmonian league, Corcyra, though of Dorian race, had no alternative but that of soliciting admission, through an embassy, to the Athenian Confederacy, B.C. 433.

CH. 32. It may fairly be expected, Athenians, that those who have repaired to a foreign¹ state, as we² have at the present crisis, to entreat succour, without any previous claim either on the score of substantial service or of alliance in arms, should first prove,³ if possible, that what they request is really conducive to the interests of the country to which they apply, or, failing this, that at any rate it is not prejudicial; in the second place, they should also show that their gratitude will be a good investment; and in case they succeed in establishing neither of these propositions clearly, they ought not to be indignant at the failure of their suit.

Now the Corcyreans, when they despatched us to solicit your alliance, felt convinced that they could give you satisfactory assurances on these points. Chance, however, has ordained that the same line of policy should at once

¹ See Poppo (ed. min.) on οἱ πέλας.

² "Ὅσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς· καὶ here refers to the general statement, which, in the original, precedes the clause in which it occurs, and which is supposed to be made up independently of the particular case, which, in the clause ὥσπερ, κ.τ.λ., claims to fall exactly within the conditions described.

³ Liddell and Scott regard ἀναδείξαι as equivalent simply to διδάξαι here. So also Göller, 1st ed.: 'Pleonasmus est partis vocabuli, nam

in hoc verbo cum præp. composito præpositio illa vim suam amittit.' The Athenians, perhaps, were not entirely free from the Ciceronian love of copiousness of sound, even where it does not directly emphasise the sense. Poppo, however (ed. min.), contends that ἀνά has an intensive force; and Göller, in his 2nd ed., takes no notice of the question. See, however, Poppo's note (ed. min.) on προσλαμβάνειν κινέουρας, iv. 61.

strike you as inconsistent with our appeal for support, and prove inexpedient for our own interests at the present juncture; inconsistent, since we, who have never hitherto been voluntary confederates of any state, are now come to solicit alliance from others; inexpedient, because, in consequence of this¹ isolation, we had no friends to help us when we entered on our present war with Corinth; and the resolution not to share in the risks of a foreign confederacy at the discretion² of another country, though it formerly gained us credit for prudence, has now turned out palpable impolicy and weakness.

In the recent naval engagement, indeed, we repulsed the Corinthians single-handed; but, as they have embarked against us with a larger armament,³ drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, and we are convinced of our inability to contend successfully against them with our native force alone; as, at the same time, we are threatened with serious danger in the event of our subjugation by them, we are compelled to beg assistance from you and from every other state. And we claim forgiveness for venturing on a course directly opposed to our former neutrality, if, as we contend, we are acting with no sinister views, but because we were disappointed in our hopes.⁴

¹ Here, as in ch. 68, below, and bk. iv. ch. 18, Thucydides uses *αὐτό* where other Attic writers would have used *τοῦτο*. See Col. Mure, *Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 586.

² *τῆ τοῦ πέλας γνώμῃ* Poppo (ed. min.) construes by 'aliorum arbitrato.'

³ 'The Corinthians employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purpose; and, in particular, they sent round not only to the Pello-

ponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen.'—Grote, vol. vi. p. 74.

⁴ That is, in the hopes they had founded upon a systematic isolation from the troubled sea of Grecian politics. I have followed the punctuation as well as the version of Poppo (ed. min.), who thus explains the passage: *ξυγγνώμη εἰ (ὅτι) τῆ πρότερον ἀπραγμοσύνη ἐναντία τολμῶμεν, εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιῶμεν μὴ μετὰ*

33. Now, if you comply, the petition we prefer at this juncture¹ will in many respects prove highly auspicious for you: in the first place, because your aid will be conferred upon the wronged, and not on the aggressors; next, because, by allying yourselves with men whose highest interests are at stake, you will invest² the favour bestowed to the greatest advantage, giving us a proof of good-will that can never fade from our remembrance. Besides, next to yourselves, we are the strongest naval power in Greece. Consider, too, what piece of good fortune is more rare or more disheartening to an enemy than your own, when a power whose accession to your cause you would have valued above much material and moral strength, spontaneously presents itself, volunteering its alliance without danger and without expense; and, moreover, ensuring you a high character in the eyes of the world, gratitude in those whom you aid, and aggrandisement for yourselves; advantages which, in the

κακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἁμαρτίᾳ, which last clause he explains as equivalent to ἀλλ' ὅτι δόξης ἡμαρτήκαμεν. Other versions would require οὐ instead of μὴ μετὰ κακίας: it is clear that μὴ can only be used here either in a conditional or in a deprecativè sense. Δόξης ἁμαρτία has been translated 'an error of policy': had this been the meaning of Thucydides, he would probably have written γνώμης ἁμαρτία. Mr. Bigg's version, 'And it is pardonable if with no sinister intentions, but rather from an error of opinion, we force ourselves to adopt a line of conduct so directly opposed to our former modest isolation,' turns the text into nonsense, by pledging the Coreyreans to an avowal that their appeal for Athenian aid was 'an error of opinion.' Thucyd. i. ii.

¹ Ἡ ξυντυχία τῆς ἡμετέρας χρείας

is surely not merely 'the occurrence of our request,' as Dr. Arnold takes it, but 'the conjuncture of our request' with existing circumstances, as Sheppard and Evans (p. 52) explain it.

² Poppo (ed. min.) reads κατάρθησθε, but prefers καταθήσθε, which Krüger approves and Dr. Arnold adopts. But, as Poppo explains κατάρθησθε by repeating καταθήσθε, the construction being καταθήσθε ὡς ἂν μάλιστα κατάρθησθε, the point is of little consequence to the translator. Mr. Bigg, after ascertaining from Dr. Arnold's note that καταθήσθε contains 'a metaphor taken from laying up money in a bank that it may be drawn out afterwards with interest,' instantly strangles the metaphor by translating the passage, 'you will win a gratitude that is bound up with the most imperishable testimony possible!'

whole lapse of time, have fallen collectively to the lot of few indeed; and few, when suitors for alliance, present themselves rather as bestowing upon those whose aid they invoke, than as destined to receive, security and honour. Then, as to the war—the contingency on which our usefulness to you depends—if any of you think it will not break out, he is mistaken, and is shutting his eyes to the fact that the Lacedæmonians, through their fear of you, are longing for war; that the Corinthians, influential with them and hostile to you, are now trying to demolish us to pave the way for their attack on you, so as to prevent our combining, with the instinct of a common hatred, against them; and to enable them to secure, before they assail you, one of two advantages, either ¹ our ruin, or the consolidation of their own power. To defeat this policy, it devolves upon us, by the offer of alliance on our part, and its acceptance on yours, to get the start of them, and rather to forestall than to have to countermine their schemes against us.

34. Should they, however, deny your right to receive their colonists as allies, it will be time to remind them that every colony, when fairly treated, honours its mother city, but becomes estranged when wronged: for colonists are sent out on the understanding that they shall be, not

¹ Mr. Bigg, who mistranslates *βεβαιώσασθαι*, complains that 'the antithesis is not very clearly cut; that it is not easy to see the distinction between the security of Corinth and the overthrow of her enemies.' Surely the antithesis is clearly cut: Corinth might 'ruin' Corcyra by a sudden attack; or, by gentler methods, she might unite the Corcyrean navy to her own, and thereby 'consolidate her own power.' This view of the meaning is supported by Poppe (ed.

min.), who thus renders the passage: 'Neve duobus excidant, sed alterutrum potius prius [quam in vos impetum faciant] consequantur, ut aut nos malis afficiant, aut se ipsos corroborent.' He adds, as if in solution of Mr. Bigg's doubts, 'alterutrum enim Corcyreis aut perditis, aut sibi adjunctis, effecturi erant.' *δοῖν* depends on *ἀμάρτησιν* *φθάσαι* is interposed, because it applies to either alternative.

the vassals, but the equals of their countrymen at home. Now, that the Corinthians were in the wrong is clear; for when challenged to submit the affair of Epidamnus to arbitration, they determined to prosecute their charges at war rather than at equity. Let their conduct, too, towards us, their kinsmen, be to some extent a warning to you, to save you from being cajoled by their crafty diplomacy, or from becoming their tools when they openly¹ prefer their request; for the man who has the least reason to reproach himself with playing into the hands of his foes stands the best chance of prolonged immunity from danger.

35. Further, your reception of us, allied as we are to neither party, will not involve a breach of the existing treaty² with the Lacedæmonians; for one of the articles declares that any Grecian state which is not enrolled in either confederacy³ is entitled to join whichever side it pleases. And it is monstrous that the Corinthians should be allowed to man their ships from among the members of the Peloponnesian league, as well as from the rest of Greece, especially from your own dependencies, and still exclude us from our proposed alliance, and from every other source of aid; and then declare themselves aggrieved if you comply with our petition. We, on the other hand, shall have far better reason to consider our-

¹ The Scholiast takes *ἐκ τοῦ εὐθείου* with *ὑπουργεῖν*. Poppo (ed. min.) and Gøller construe it, as I have done, with *δεομένοις*.

² The Thirty Years' Truce, concluded B.C. 445. Thucyd. i. 115.

³ Müller (*Dorians*, vol. i. p. 214) controverts this argument of the Coreyean envoy; which, indeed, is met by the Corinthian Speaker in the fortieth chapter, below. Müller says: 'The meaning of the article in the Thirty

Years' Truce (Thucyd. i. 35) can only be this: States not included in the alliance may join whichever side they please, by which means they come within the treaty, and the alliance guarantees their safety. But if a state already at war with another state, a party to the treaty (*ἐνσπονδος*), is assisted, a war of this description is like one undertaken by the confederacy of the assisting state.'

selves aggrieved if you refuse; for, in rejecting us, you will be rejecting suppliants friendly to you, in their hour of peril, while you will not merely fail to check Corinth, your enemy and our assailant, but will even allow her to enlist recruits out of your own dominions. You ought, on the contrary, either to prohibit her, as¹ well as our, enlistment of mercenaries from your empire, or else, by way of compensation,² to send us succour on whatever terms you may consent to grant it. Your true policy, however, is to give us open countenance and support.

The advantages of such a course, as we intimated before, are many; and the foremost among them is the fact that, as we said,³ the power which is our enemy is yours also, and in this you have the strongest guarantee of our good faith: that power, too, far from being weak, is strong enough to chastise defection; besides, as the alliance offered to you is that of a maritime, not of an inland state, to decline it is a greater sacrifice. For it is your interest, above all things, not to allow, if possible, any other state to possess a navy: if, however, you cannot

¹ This use of *καί*, so common in Thucydides, is well explained in the valuable commentary of Klotz on Devarius, vol. ii. p. 636, where he says: 'Si præter eam rem quam ponimus, de aliâ quoque significare volumus, ponimus *καί* particulam, si aut duas personas tacitè contendimus, aut dum de unâ actione dicimus, de aliâ quoque comparationis causâ cogitamus.'

² This seems to be the meaning of the second *καί*, that which precedes *ἡμῖν*. It falls under the same category as the instance illustrated in the preceding note.

³ *Ἦσαν* is one of those pregnant imperfections idiomatically used in Greek, where in English we employ the

present with a few explanatory or retrospective terms; e.g. Plato, *Crit.* p. 47, D.: *ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο*, 'which, according to our view of the matter, is always sure to improve in the good man, and to be destroyed in the wicked man.' The student of Aristotle will remember the frequent retrospective use of the imperfect *ἦν*, by virtue of which the great Ethician assumes a proposition, the grounds of which he has previously worked out. The Corcyrean envoy refers especially to what he had said above in the 33rd chapter: *τοὺς Κορινθίους—ἡμῖν ἐχθροῦς, κ.τ.λ.* See Poppo, ed. min.

prevent it, you should court the friendship of the strongest naval power.

36. Should any of you think these proposals, thus advanced, advantageous, yet fear lest his compliance with them may involve an infringement of the treaty, let him be assured that his alarm, if he be strengthened by an alliance with us, is a feeling which his foes ought to entertain¹ rather than himself; and that the confidence he may repose in his observance of the treaty will, if he rejects our offer, not be likely to alarm them, because it will leave him weak while they are strong. At the same time, he should remember that the subject of his present deliberations is not so much the interests of Corcyra as those of Athens, and that he is not adopting the best policy for his country, when, looking forward to the impending and all but actually prevailing war, he hesitates, after a careful survey of the political horizon, to embrace the alliance of a state whose friendship or enmity confers or withholds the most critical advantages. For it is conveniently situated on the line of the coast navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, enabling its possessors to stop the transit from those countries of naval reinforcements for the Peloponnese, and to convoy squadrons from your own shores to that part of the world, besides being in many other respects a most advantageous station.

The question in all its bearings² may be briefly summed up in one consideration, which alone ought to warn you not to forsake us. Greece possesses three considerable

¹ It is difficult to render this passage into readable English. Thucydides, with his usual predilection for antithesis, has made *φοβήσων* the predicate of *τὸ δεδιός*—a piece of false taste worthy, says Krüger, of the Sophists.

is one of those puerile oppositions for which the nearest English equivalent must be sought, and which, in an idiomatic version, cannot be literally rendered, with Krüger, 'embracing the whole and every particular.'

² *Τοίς τε ξύμπτωσι καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον*

navies—your own, ours, and the Corinthian : now, if you allow two out of the three to be combined, and the Corinthians subjugate us before you help us, you will have to contend at sea with the united fleets of Corcyra and the Peloponnese ; whereas, if you embrace our alliance, you will be enabled to encounter your foes with superior numbers on your own side.

SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIAN ENVOYS,

Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, in reply to the preceding harangue of the ambassadors from Corcyra, B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs. 37-44.

CH. 37. Since the Corcyreans, in addressing this¹ assembly, have not confined themselves to the question of their acceptance as your allies, but have also charged us with wronging them, and declared themselves unjustly attacked; it is essential that we, in our turn,² should notice both these points, before we proceed with the rest of our argument, if only to enable you, before³ you decide, to form a true idea of the justice of our claim, and to save you from rejecting, without full consideration, the petition their distress⁴ compels them to prefer.

They allege that upon grounds of prudence they never yet embraced the alliance of any state: this policy, however, they espoused with evil instead of honest intentions: it did not suit them, considering the iniquities they committed, to have any ally, because he might either⁵ be a witness of their crimes, or a succour they would blush to invoke. At the same time, the geographical independence of their country tends to make them their own

¹ Τῶνδε. See Poppo, ed. min.

² See note ¹, p. 7. On οὕτω καί, see note ⁵, p. 37.

³ This seems to be the force of the proposition in προειδήτε.

⁴ Τὴν τῶνδε χρείαν interpretare 'horum necessitatem,' i.e. preces, ad quas hos necessitas cogit. Poppo, ed. min.

⁵ I have adopted Debree's conjec-

ture, οὔτε μάρτυρα instead of οὐδέ μάρτυρα, which, as Dr. Arnold says, greatly improves the sense. Poppo (ed. min.) retains οὐδέ. His text may be rendered, 'They did not wish, considering the iniquities they committed, to have any confederate, or even a witness of their crimes, or to be put to the blush when they appealed for aid.'

judges when they injure others, instead of allowing¹ arbiters to be appointed by mutual agreement; because, while they very rarely make expeditions to neighbouring states, they are continually receiving foreigners whom stress of weather drives to their ports. Such is the essence of that plausible profession of neutrality which they have put forward as a convenient screen; a policy adopted not to secure them against implication in the crimes of others, but to enable them to be all alone in their criminal career; to play the tyrant whenever they possess the power; to overreach whenever they can escape detection; and to spare their blushes on any fresh acquisition of spoil. If, on the contrary, they really were, as they affect to be, honest men, the less they were exposed to foreign interference, the more clearly might they have proved their good qualities, by granting to others, and accepting for themselves, that equitable mode² of settling disputes which their power enabled them to decline.

38. Such, however, has not been the character of their policy³ either towards others or ourselves; on the contrary, although our colonists, they have all along discarded their connection with us, and are now openly at war, protesting that they did not contemplate ill-treatment in becoming colonists. To this we reply that we did not found the colony to be insulted by the colonists: we hoped to become their political leaders, and to be treated with due respect. The rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and we are very much beloved by

¹ See Poppo's note, ed. min. Krüger gives a different explanation.

² Settlement by arbitration is meant. See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on this text, and on the similar phrase in chs. 140-2, below.

³ The description given by Hero-

dotus (vii. 168) of the duplicity of Corcyra when solicited to aid the cause of Greece against the Persian invaders, lends colour to the unfavourable character given them by the Corinthians here.

them ; and it is clear that, if we are popular with the majority, there can be no good reason why we should be unpopular with the Corcyreans only ; nor are we attacking¹ them unwarrantably,² unprovoked by signal injury. It would have been honourable in them, even supposing we had been in error, to have shown some deference to our feeling, while it would have been disgraceful in us to have outraged their forbearance. Instead of this, however, besides the numerous wrongs which, in their insolent and licentious prosperity, they have heaped upon us, they persist in retaining possession of Epidamnus, our colony, which they carried by storm, as soon as we advanced to its relief, though in its hour of distress they took no notice of it.

39. They pretend, too, that they were anxious that the matter should be decided by arbitration³ at an earlier stage ; but surely it is not the man who challenges arbitration from a vantage ground⁴ and a footing of security who deserves to be listened to, but rather the man who, by his acts as well as his professions, places both parties on terms of equality before he brings the contest to an issue.⁵ Instead of acting thus, they resorted to their plausible proposal of arbitration—not, indeed, previous

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller take the present *ἰπιστρατεῖομεν* to denote the habitual policy of Corinth. But this hardly suits the context.

² Göller's explanation of *ἰκπρεπῶς* by *ἔξω τοῦ πρίποντος* seems the most probable, backed as it is by the similar use of *ἰκπρεπίστερον*, bk. iii. ch. 55.

³ Grote (vol. vi. p. 72) details the circumstances under which this proposal for an arbitration was made by Corcyra.

⁴ The 'vantage ground' is of course the actual possession of Epi-

damnus, which the Corinthian speaker contends should have been delivered over to a neutral power, pending the decision of a court of arbitration.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) interprets *πρὶν διαγωνίζεσθαι*, 'priusquam armis decernat ;' other commentators, 'priusquam iudicio disceptet.' If either of these explanations must be adopted, the context favours the former. But it seems better to take the words in a more general sense. As Göller remarks, 'orator sententiam proponit universalem.'

to their siege of the city—but only when they thought we should not overlook their proceedings; and they now present themselves before you, not content with the criminal part they have enacted there, but actually summoning you to join them, not in confederacy, but in crime, and to accept their alliance while at variance with us. They ought, on the contrary, to have applied to you when they were perfectly safe, and not at a moment when *we* have been wronged, and *they* are in peril; nor when you, to whom they lent no share of their former¹ power, will now have to lend them aid; when you, though no accomplices in their misdeeds, will yet be held equally responsible by us. No! they ought formerly to have shared with you their power, if you are now to share its consequences with them.

40. We have, then, clearly shown that we appear before you with charges amply sufficient to sustain our plea, and that the conduct of the Corcyreans has been marked by rapacity and a selfish usurpation of the rights of others; we have now to convince you that you cannot, consistently with the public law of Greece, receive them as allies. For if it is stipulated in the articles, that any state not enrolled in either confederacy may join whichever side it pleases: that clause² was not inserted for the benefit of communities enlisting in a league to the prejudice of other powers, but of those who, without seceding from another state, need protection, and who will not involve those who receive them in war in

¹ Τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν τότε οὐ μεταλαβόντες. I have followed Poppo, who connects τότε with ὅτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν (ed. maj. p. 283). Göller, however, thinks the Corinthian envoy refers specifically to an epoch of Athenian embarrassment, during the

revolt of Samos in 440 B.C., and the previous struggle with Ægina (see Herod. vi. 89), when Corinth maintained a friendly, Corcyra a neutral, attitude towards Athens.

² See note ³, p. 6, above.

exchange for peace—which, indeed, they will not allow them to do if they know their own interests.¹ Such, however, will be your fate if you do not listen to our remonstrance; for you will not only become their allies, but also our enemies in lieu of being connected with us by treaty;² since, if you espouse their cause, you must needs be involved in our retaliation upon them. Your true policy, indeed, is to maintain neutrality, if possible, towards both parties; if you cannot do this, instead of aiding them, you should march with *us* against them (with Corinth, indeed, you are already in alliance; with Corcyra you have never had so much as a truce); and you should avoid establishing a precedent in favour of welcoming deserters from other leagues. In our case especially, since, on the revolt of Samos, *our* vote did not prejudice your interests when the rest of the Peloponnesians were divided on the question of the policy of aiding them. No! we openly maintained, in opposition to others, that each imperial state had a right to coerce its own dependencies. A principle you dare not infringe, because, if you choose to receive and to aid aggressors, there will be found to be full *as* many of your own allies who will come over to us as of ours who will join you; and the precedent you will sanction will prejudice yourselves rather than Corinth.

41. These then are the pleas, adequate according to the public law of Greece, upon which we found our appeal to you; and we venture to add our counsel, and

¹ Dr. Arnold's explanation of this passage is very felicitous. Comp. Poppo, ed. min.

² Poppo (ed. min.) points out that *ἑσπρονδοὶ* signifies those included in the Thirty Years' Truce. Müller (*Dorians*, vol. i. v. 214) entirely disagrees

with Mr. Grote's view of the right of Athens to contract even a defensive alliance with Corcyra, contending, as the Corinthian envoy does here, that it involved a breach of the truce.

to urge that qualified claim upon your gratitude, which men in our position—neither avowed enemies nor familiar friends—may safely declare to be justly due to them at this conjuncture. At a former period, when you were in want of vessels of war for the prosecution of your contest with Ægina,¹ before the struggle with Persia, you received twenty ships from Corinth; and the service we rendered you then, and again on the defection of Samos²—when we prevented the Peloponnesians from succouring the island—enabled you to overwhelm Ægina and to chastise the Samians. That support, too, was given at one of those critical junctures when men are apt to overlook every consideration but³ success; when they welcome anyone who abets them as a friend, though he was an enemy before, and construe opposition, even if coming from a friendly quarter, as a proof of hostility; nay, they even mismanage their private affairs through their absorbing interest in the strife.

42. These considerations, duly weighed—and the younger members of your assembly may well listen to the experience of age—should induce you to support us as we supported you. Nor should you listen to the fancy, that though our arguments may be just enough, yet policy, should war break out, will dictate a different course. The straightest path is generally found to be the most politic; and the prospect⁴ of war, which the Corcyreans use as a weapon of terror to urge you to a violation of political right, is still uncertain, and it is not worthy of you to elate yourselves with a mere possibility, and to incur thereby from henceforth an overt and no

¹ See Herod. vi. 89.

² See Herod. iii. 48 *seqq.*

³ Dr. Arnold wrongly translates *παρά τὸ νικᾶν*, 'for the sake of con-

quering.' See Poppo's, note ed. min.

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) construes τὸ μέλλον τοῦ πολέμου by 'utrum bellum oriturum sit, necne.'

longer a threatened enmity with Corinth. The wiser course would surely be to mitigate the jealousy which your protection¹ of Megara has raised against you, remembering that an act of kindness at the eleventh hour, though comparatively slight, can, if critically timed, cancel an offence quite disproportionate to itself. Nor ought you to be influenced by the Corcyrean offer of an important naval alliance; abstinence from all injustice towards a rival state is a more reliable source of power than a grasping policy pursued in the midst of danger and stimulated by the prospect of some temporary advantage.²

43. Fortune has brought us within the range of the principle which we avowed with our own lips at Lacedæmon, the principle that each metropolitan state should have the control of its dependencies; and we now claim its recognition in our favour at your hands, instead of receiving injury from your vote—injury in return for assistance from ours. Give us then our equivalent, in the assurance that this is the very crisis when the party who aids is a genuine friend, and the party who withstands a bitter foe. Refuse either to receive these Corcyreans as allies in opposition to us, or to abet their criminal career; for by so doing you will be acting as becomes you, and will be adopting a course the most conducive to your own interests.

¹ See Thucydides, ch. 103, below.

² That of uniting the Corcyrean to the Athenian navy.

SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIAN ENVOYS

Before the general assembly of Spartan citizens, at the Congress of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy held at Sparta, B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs. 68-72.

INTRODUCTION.

ATHENS, having contracted a defensive alliance with Corcyra, sent at first ten, and afterwards twenty, ships to protect her. The arrival of the second squadron prevented the Corinthians from improving a decisive advantage which they had gained over the Corcyreans in a naval action off Chimerium, a promontory opposite Corcyra. This disappointment inspired Corinth with a deadly enmity to Athens. In conjunction with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, she at once took steps to detach Potidæa, one of her colonies, and a tributary ally of Athens, from her enemy's league. Athens lost no time in protecting her interests in the threatened quarter: she sent, B.C. 432, a formal requisition to her suspected ally, one of those continental seaports over which her control was far less secure than over her insular dependencies. This requisition was answered by an evasive embassy from Potidæa to Athens, intended to gain time while another legation, backed by Corinthian deputies, successfully appealed to Sparta for a promise to invade Attica, in case of an Athenian attack on Potidæa. That city then revolted, in concert with the Chalcidians, whose defection had also been instigated by Corinth. Various operations ensued during the same year, B.C. 432, between the Potidæans and their allies—the Corinthian auxiliary force under the command of Aristæus, and the Athenian troops, sent successively under Arcestratus, Callias, and Phormio; the result being the complete investment of Potidæa by the Athenian force.

Corinth, thus foiled, summoned a congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy to discuss the situation of affairs at Sparta. Her complaints were seconded by many other members of the league; especially Megara, who had revolted from Athens fourteen years previously, and whose defection—not to mention two other offences specified by Thucydides, i. 139—had been punished by a prohibition

of commercial intercourse with Athens, or any of her allies. Ægina, though not formally represented on the occasion, complained of Athenian violations of the independence secured her by treaty—a complaint whose justice there seems reason to doubt. See Grote, vol. vi. p. 104.

The Corinthian deputies reserved their harangue to the last, not coming forward till their audience had been sufficiently exasperated by the representatives of other states, when they delivered a speech to the following effect before the general assembly of Spartan citizens.

CH. 68. The good faith, Lacedæmonians, which pervades your internal government and social intercourse is apt to render you rather sceptical when we have complaints to prefer against other powers; it is a quality which, while it gains you a character for moderation, leaves you comparatively ignorant of foreign affairs. Thus,¹ although we were constantly forewarning you of the injuries we were destined to receive from the Athenians, you made no attempt to test the truth of the suspicions we from time to time imparted to you, but rather inferred that in these imputations we had our private interests in view; and, in consequence of this distrust, you convoked this council of allies, not before our interests had suffered, but only when we had already been wronged; a council before whom it especially becomes us to speak, inasmuch as we have very serious grounds of complaint against Athenian outrage and Lacedæmonian neglect.

If, indeed, the encroachments of Athens on the liberties of Greece had been made in the dark, you might have been ignorant of the facts, and they would then require full exposition; as it is, there is no need of a detailed account, when you see with your own eyes that some of us are already enslaved,² and that the Athenians,

¹ Γάρ is here introductory, not argumentative. See Klotz, *Devar.* vol. ii. p. 235.

² Ægina, for instance.

fully provided by long preparation, in case war should be declared against them, are systematically sapping the freedom of others,¹ and, above all, of our allies. That such are their designs is clear, otherwise they would not have detached Corcyra by an intrigue,² and retained it in defiance of us; nor would they have besieged Potidæa, whereof the one is a capital base of operations, enabling you to push your influence in the Chalcidic, and the other would have contributed a powerful navy to the Peloponnesian cause.

69. Now, *you* are responsible for these calamities, because, in the first place, you suffered them to fortify their city after the Persian invasion, and subsequently to erect their long walls; and because you have ever since been continually withholding freedom, not only from those whom Athens has enslaved, but at last even from your own allies. For it is not the state which is the mere instrument of subjugation, but the state which, with the power to rescue, remains passive, that is really the author of their slavery, especially if, as in your own case, it claims an honourable name as the champion of Grecian freedom. It was difficult to convene this meeting; and even at this moment we have no definite issue to solve. Instead³ of debating the general question of our wrongs, we ought to be considering the means of our defence;

¹ Potidæa and Megara are probably meant. By 'our allies,' Poppo (ed. min.) understands the Corinthian colonies along the coast of the Ionian sea.

² Ὑπολαβεῖν, says Poppo, 'est fraudulentâ molitione partibus suis adjungere.'

³ Χρῆν γάρ. I think γάρ here is simply expository, not argumentative. Such a sentence, in English, is often better introduced without any

connecting particle. See note¹, p. 142. Poppo, however (ed. min.), regards γάρ as pointing to a suppressed clause, which he supplies as follows: εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ φανεροῖς ξυνήλομεν, χρῆν, κ.τ.λ. The passage might then be rendered: 'If we had a definite issue before us, we should not be weighing the general question of our wrongs, but considering our means of defence, as we ought (χρῆν) to be doing; for, &c.'

for the aggressors,¹ with their plans fully matured, are already, and without any hesitation, advancing against you, who are still undecided. We are well aware by what insidious paths, and by what gradual usurpations, Athenian encroachment travels: as long as that restless people imagine they escape detection through your dulness of perception, they are not so venturous; but, once assured that you see, but shut your eyes to their career of aggrandisement, they will press more resolutely forward. The fact is,² you, Lacedæmonians, are the only power in Greece which systematically courts neutrality; you repel your enemies not with arms in your hands, but with threatening demonstrations; you alone are for cutting down a hostile power, not in its bud, but in its full bloom. Yet you have generally been held safe men: your reputation, however, turns out³ to have exceeded your merits; for our own recollections remind us that the Mede marched from the world's end to Peloponnese before you were ready to encounter him with an adequate⁴ force; and now you are closing your eyes to the encroachments of Athens, who is not, like the Mede, afar off, but close at hand; and, instead of vigorously attacking her, you prefer simply to stand on the defensive when she attacks you, and to set everything on the cast of a die by deferring the conflict till her power has vastly increased. And this, although you are well aware that the barbarian may in general be said to have split on no other rock than his own folly, and that, in struggling with the Athenians themselves, we have on many occasions

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) takes *οἱ* with *ἐρῶντες*, and Gøller connects *πρὸς οὐδ.* with *ἐπιρχονται*, translating the words, 'incessant nos non confirmatos consilio.'

² Γάρ. See Donaldson's *Greek*

Grammar, p. 605.

³ See Madvig's *Greek Syntax*, p. 257, on the particle *ἄρα*.

⁴ The limitation implied in *ἀξίως* excludes the expedition under Leonidas.

owed our safety rather to their errors than to your support; indeed, the hopes *you*¹ have held out have ere now proved the ruin of states that I could mention,² whose confidence in you had actually induced them to disarm. Do not, however, for a moment imagine that these strictures are the invectives of enmity, when they are only the remonstrances of friendship. Remonstrances we address to the errors of friends, invectives we reserve for the outrages of foes.

70. At the same time, we believe ourselves especially entitled to criticise the policy of other powers, considering the magnitude of the interests we have at stake, in connection with which you do not appear, as far as *we* can see, to understand, nor even to have reflected, against what sort of antagonists—how widely, nay, how utterly different from yourselves—you will have to contend in the Athenians. *They*, for instance, are fond of innovation, clever in forming plans, and in carrying their resolves into execution; you are clever³ only in saving what you have, in scouting every project of reform, and in falling short, in action, of what is absolutely requisite. Again, they are enterprising beyond their strength, adventurous against their better judgment, and sanguine in the midst of perils; your achievements, on the other hand, are unworthy of your power; you distrust⁴ even the surest conclusions of your judgment, and you despair

¹ Γε emphasises *ἑμέτεροι*, and perhaps its force may be given by italics.

² This seems to be the force of *πov*. Reference is probably made to the people of Thasos (Thucyd. i. 101), of Eubœa (i. 114), as well as to the citizens of Potidœa (i. 58).—Sheppard and Evans, p. 81.

³ 'Ad totum alterum membrum ὀξείῃ ita repetendum est, ut cum

sarcasmo quodam dictum sit.'—Poppo, ed. min.

⁴ Livy must have had this passage in his eye when he wrote the following: 'Atheniensium populum fama est celerem et supra vires audacem esse ad conandum; Lacedæmoniorum cunctatorem, et vix in ea, quibus fidit, ingredientem.'—Lib. xlv. 23.

of extrication from your difficulties. Moreover, they are as active as you are dilatory; they are often abroad, you are always at home; for they think they may gain some advantage by their expeditions,¹ you fancy that enterprise abroad may endanger your interests at home. They push to the utmost every success gained over their foes: if they meet with a check, they recoil as little as possible. Their lives, too, they lavish in their country's behalf as if they were the lives of other men: their intellectual powers they husband for her service with as much jealousy as if they had a monopoly of them. When they fail to carry out a scheme, they hold themselves robbed of their own property; when they make an acquisition, they regard it as only a trifling instalment of the triumph that awaits them. They indemnify themselves for the casual miscarriage² of an enterprise by forming fresh hopes; their execution of their plans being so prompt, that with them it is the same thing to hope and to obtain.³ Such are their lifelong toils, all accompanied with hardships and dangers. They have very little leisure for enjoying, because they are always engaged in getting; they look upon a holiday⁴ as simply an opportunity for action, and think indolent repose a greater calamity than laborious occupation. To sum up their character, it may be truly said that they were born neither to enjoy

¹ Dukas, quoted by Poppo (ed. min.), takes ἀπουσία to mean 'absence on foreign military service,' ἐκδημοῦντες εἰς ἑστρατείας. I have used a neutral term.

² Literally, 'should they, after all (ἄρα), chance to fail in an attack on any power.'

³ There is a curious coincidence between this expression of opinion on the part of the Corinthian envoys

and its confirmation by Thucydides himself at an eventful crisis in the history of the war. See bk. viii. ch. 96.

⁴ 'There seems to be some tacit reference to the practice of the Lacedæmonians, who, as on the occasion of Marathon, would not go forth upon even the most necessary expedition during the time of a festival.'—Sheppard and Evans, p. 82.

peace and tranquillity themselves, nor to allow others to enjoy them.

71. Yet, with such a state as this drawn up in battle array against you, you persist in delaying, and have no idea that permanent peace is most likely to be enjoyed by communities which, while they content themselves with reasonable armaments,¹ clearly evince their determination not to brook insult. No! your notion of fair dealing is based on the principle of offering no provocation to others, and of defending your own rights just so far as to prevent loss.² A policy in which you could scarcely have succeeded, even had your neighbours resembled yourselves in character; whereas, as indeed we recently showed, your system is old-fashioned in comparison with theirs. In politics, as in art, modern improvements of necessity carry the day; and, though fixed institutions are all very well for a state at peace with all the world, manifold reforms become essential when many novel exigencies have to be met. Indeed, it is for this reason, owing to her versatile experience, that Athens has far outstripped you in the development of her resources.

¹ Literally, 'who do only what is reasonable in the matter of armaments, but show by their temper that they will not brook insult.' The Greek construction will hardly bear the adversative sense claimed by Poppo (ed. maj.) for τῇ παρασκευῇ nor is the sense of the passage at all improved by it. He thus explains the clause: 'Indicare vult homines, qui, licet satis magnum apparatus bellicum comparaverint, eo non permoveantur ad alios lædendos.' This version he repeats in the ed. min.

² Arnold's version, 'nor allowing yourselves to be harmed by defend-

ing yourselves,' involves a grammatical solecism and a political caricature. Had such been the historian's meaning, he would have written as follows: ἐπὶ τῇ μὴτε λυπεῖν ἄλλους, μὴτε αὐτοὶ ἀμυνόμενοι βλάπτεισθαι. The words intended to be joined by the conjunctions are μὴ λυπεῖν on the one hand, and αὐτοὶ ἀμυνόμενοι on the other. The studious use of τε and καί, where there is a negative in both clauses, shows that those conjunctions are not intended to apply in both cases to the negative parts of the two clauses.

Let this point, then, be the limit of your inaction : succour without delay Potidæa and your other allies, as you undertook, by an immediate invasion of Attica, instead of leaving friends and kinsmen a prey to your bitterest foes, and compelling the rest of us to resort in despair to some other¹ alliance. There could be no injustice in our taking such a step, either in the sight of the Gods who witnessed our oaths, or of intelligent men ; for the real violators of treaties are not those whom desertion drives to other powers, but those who neglect to aid their sworn confederates. If, however, you resolve to exert yourselves zealously, we will stand by you, for we should not be acting religiously in shifting sides, nor should we be likely to find so congenial an ally. Weigh the question, then, deliberately and wisely, and exert yourselves to make your leadership of the Peloponnese as glorious as that of your ancestors who bequeathed it to you.

¹ 'This probably refers to the Argives, who were ever ready to take advantage of any opportunity to establish a counter influence to Sparta

in the Peninsula' (Sheppard and Evans, p. 84). The Scholiast, quoted by Poppo (ed. min.), confirms this notion

SPEECH OF THE ATHENIAN ENVOYS

Before the general assembly of Spartan citizens, delivered on the same occasion as the preceding address of the Corinthians, B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs. ~~68-79~~ 73-79

INTRODUCTION.

AMONG the listeners to the previous speech were some Athenian envoys, staying at Sparta on other business. They begged permission to speak, not in answer to the charges advanced by the Corinthian and other deputies, but on the general question, a comprehensive view of which would show, as they thought, that it was not a matter to be hastily decided, but one that demanded the fullest consideration.

CH. 73. Our embassy was not intended to enter into a controversy with your allies, but to transact the business of our mission. Perceiving, however, that a violent outcry prevailed against us, we came forward, not to answer the charges of the states opposed to us—for neither our nor their arguments can be addressed to you in the capacity of judges—but to save you from coming to a wrong decision, through a ready compliance with your allies, upon questions of vast moment; and at the same time, because we were anxious to prove, in reference to the general charge arrayed against us, that¹ we are not acting unwarrantably in retaining the acquisitions we have made, and that our country deserves high consideration.

In establishing this, we need not ascend to our early national legends, attested as they are rather by tradition than by personal knowledge on the part of my audience.

¹ On the construction of *οὔτε* and *τε*, containing, when there is a verb in both clauses, a negative in the first, an affirmative in the second

clause, see Klotz, *Devar.*, p. 713; Eur. *Hec.* 1199; Xen. *Anab.* iv. 3, 6; Matthiæ, *Gr. Gram.* p. 609.

We must, however, refer to the Persian invasion, and the services you yourselves remember, although it is irksome to us to be constantly bringing them forward ; for in those achievements we risked our safety for real public advantages, in which you had a substantial share : let us not then lose all the credit, if it is of any service to us. Our aim is not so much to deprecate censure as to offer you a convincing proof of the power of that state with which you will have to contend unless you are wise in your decision.

We declare, then, that at Marathon we alone¹ bore the first brunt of the barbarian's attack, and that upon his second invasion, not being sufficiently strong to repel him by land, we embarked in our vessels with our whole population, and fought a naval action at Salamis, which prevented his ravaging Peloponnese by piratical descents upon the several cities—descents he might easily have made, since you would have been unable to protect one another against a large armament. Of this the invader gave a conclusive proof by his own acts ; for when his fleet was defeated, he speedily retired with the greater part of his army, as if aware that his power was no longer what it had been.

74. Such, then, was the issue of this invasion, in which it was clearly proved that the fortunes of Greece depended on her navy. Towards that issue we contributed three elements most conducive to success—the largest contingent of ships, a general of the greatest ability, and an energy that never flagged ; ships, indeed, almost in the proportion of two-thirds to the whole squadron of three hundred, and Themistocles as admiral, to whose influence it was mainly owing that we engaged

¹ The speaker conveniently ignores the aid of Plataea, of whom Herodotus (ix. 27) is equally oblivious.

the enemy in the straits—a stratagem which obviously saved our cause, and for which you yourselves, as you know,¹ heaped upon him the highest honours ever conferred upon a foreigner at Sparta. In daring patriotism, too, we had no rivals. There seemed no prospect² of anyone coming to our relief by land: the other states up to our frontier had already been enslaved; yet we had the courage, after abandoning our city and sacrificing our property, not to desert, even in that emergency, the common cause of our surviving confederates, nor to render ourselves useless to them by dispersion, but to embark in our ships, and encounter the foe, instead of quarrelling with you for not having previously sent us aid. We declare, therefore, that we served you quite as effectually as you served us. You had a stake to fight for; when you marched to our relief, it was from the midst of cities whose homes were still inviolate, and in the hope of enjoying them for the future; besides, your succour was prompted by alarm for your own rather than our safety; at any rate, you never came near us while we had anything to lose. We, on the other hand, sallying forth from a city that was such no more, and staking our lives for a country which had but a slender hope of redemption, zealously³ contributed to your deliverance as well as to our own. Now if, on the other hand, we had made terms with the Mede in an earlier stage of the war, in terror, like some⁴ states, for our territory; or if,

¹ Δή. Poppo, however (ed. min.), construes this particle with the demonstrative τοῦτο. Διὰ τοῦτο δή would then mean ‘for this very reason,’ ‘for this and this only.’ Klotz (*Devar.*, vol. ii. p. 402) similarly explains it: ‘διὰ τοῦτο δή sic dicitur, ut appareat propter eam rem, quum fortasse propter alias res

minus hoc antea factum esset, honoratum esse virum peregrinum.’

² The imperfect ἐβόηθει denotes the repeated frustration of their hopes.—Bigg.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) explains τὸ μέρος by ‘pro parte virili.’

⁴ The Scholiast points the allusion to the Thebans.

at a later period, we had surrendered to despair and lacked courage to embark in our vessels, there would have been no use in your fighting an action at sea, from the want of an adequate¹ fleet; and the invader's fortunes would have peaceably advanced as he desired.

75. Do we deserve, then, Lacedæmonians, considering the public spirit and the statesmanship we then displayed, to be objects of such intense jealousy to Greece, if² that jealousy is founded on the dominion we hold? remembering that we did not gain this very dominion by violence, but because, when you were unwilling to wait³ during the final operations against the Persian, the confederates repaired to us, and spontaneously requested us to become their leaders. It was thus from the very necessity of the case that we were at first constrained to advance our ascendancy to its present pitch, primarily under the influence of fear, afterwards of ambition also, and, subsequently, of self-interest;⁴ and we no longer deemed it prudent, detested as we were by the majority—just after the reduction of several allies who had already revolted—while you, too, were no longer friendly as before, but inspired by jealousy and at variance with us—to hazard a reaction by loosening the reins of power. For, had we done so, deserters from our standards would have joined

¹ At the battle of Artemisium the Lacedæmonians had ten ships (Herod. viii. 1); at the battle of Salamis, sixteen (Herod. viii. 43). The Peloponnesians, including the Lacedæmonians, had, at this period, eighty-nine ships.

² As Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, it suits the speaker's purpose to confound the *ἡγεμονία*, which Athens had received, with the *ἀρχή*, to which she had strictly no right. *γ*ε emphasises the condition.

³ Colonel Mure (*Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 103) remarks that Thucydides (ch. 95, below) gives a different reason for the secession of the Ionian States from the Spartan interest, attributing it to their disgust at the conduct of Pausanias. Perhaps he places on the lips of the Athenian speaker the popular tradition prevalent at Athens.

⁴ That is, when the tribute began to flow in from the subject allies.

yours ; and no man can be blamed for adopting the most politic course when threatened by the greatest perils.

76. But we are not alone in love of power.¹ You, Lacedæmonians, have gained an ascendancy over the Peloponnesian states by systematically modelling their constitutions² to suit your own views ; and, if you, towards the close of the Persian war, had remained at your post throughout the contest, and become, like us, unpopular in the exercise of your power, we are well assured that you would not have been less odious to the allies, and that you would have been compelled either to govern with a tight rein, or to risk the loss of your authority. So that *we*, too, have not done anything extraordinary or alien from human nature, in at once accepting a proffered supremacy, and in now declining to surrender it, from the pressure of those overwhelming motives, ambition, fear, and self-interest. Again, we were not the first to set such an example : it has ever been an established maxim that the weak should be subject to the strong. At the same time, we believed ourselves worthy of power, and were so considered by you, until the present moment, when, after a careful calculation of your own interest, you pretend to appeal to equity—a plea which no man ever yet put forward, when he had an opportunity of gaining his point by force, and abstained from taking the advantage. Nay, praise is due to all who, while indulging their natural propensity to rule mankind, have shown more regard for justice than might have been expected from their power. Others, at any rate, we believe, if they changed places with us, would prove conclusively whether we are moderate

¹ The idea implied in γούν seems to require a little expansion.

² By everywhere favouring the oligarchical party. The key to the meaning is given by Thucydides

himself (i. 19), where he says: οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἠγοῦντο, κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσι αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσῃσι θεραπεύοντες.

or not. Instead, however, of our enjoying this reputation, we have, in consequence of our very leniency, reaped an unnatural harvest of discredit in place of popularity.

77. For instance,¹ because in our contract² suits with our allies we do not stand on our prerogative, but decide cases in our own courts according to impartial laws, we are reproached with litigiousness; and not a man among our censors reflects why this reproach is not levelled against other states that I could mention,³ holding dominion elsewhere, and less equitable than ourselves towards their dependants; the reason being, that those who are able to appeal to might, have no need to appeal to right. Our confederates, on the other hand, having been habituated to associate with us upon equal terms, if they chance to be ever so slightly prejudiced, contrary to their notions of right, either by judicial decisions, or through the power which flows from our supremacy, feel no gratitude for not being deprived of the larger part of their property, but are more indignant at their trivial loss than if we had from the outset discarded all law and openly sought our own advantage; though, had we done so,⁴ not even they could have denied that it is a law of nature that the

¹ See note ¹, p. 57, for a similar instance of this use of γάρ. Comp. Matth. (*Gr. Gram.* vol. ii. § 615) on the equivalence of this particle to the Latin *nempe*. καί, which begins the sentence, does not belong to γάρ, but is used to strengthen the connection between its clause and the following one, καί παρ' ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ. 'Hic,' says Gölter, 'καί non jungendum est cum γάρ, sed refertur ad illa, καί πα' ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ. Particulis καί —καί hic duæ sententiæ junguntur, quarum altera causam continet alterius.'

² These suits, called δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων, were grounded upon contracts

existing between persons who belonged to the several states comprised under the Athenian dominion; and the necessity of trying them at Athens, owing to the expense and delay thereby incurred, was one of the greatest grievances to which her allies were subjected. The orator here tries to gloss it over, by making allusion only to such as Athenian citizens were themselves engaged in. —Sheppard and Evans, pp. 88, 89.

³ Ποῦ is often used by Thucydides in this half definite, half indefinite sense.

⁴ Ἐκείνωσ.

weaker should yield to the stronger. But injustice,¹ as it seems, provokes resentment more than violence; for, in the first case, men feel they are cheated by an equal, in the other, they think they are constrained by a superior. Beneath the Persian sceptre, at any rate, they brooked a harsher rule than ours; yet our dominion is denounced as severe; and no wonder—for it is the present dominion which is always bitter to the conquered. One thing is certain; if you were to found a supremacy of your own on the ruins of ours, you would soon lose that popularity which you only gained through the apprehensions felt of us, if your system of government should now resemble that of which you gave us a specimen during your brief period of command against the Persian. The fact is,² the institutions under which you live at home are not in harmony with those of other states; and, moreover, not a Spartan general³ on a foreign expedition is true either to them or to those in fashion with the rest of Greece.

78. Take time, then, in coming to a decision, for no trivial interests are at stake; and do not, under the influence of foreign opinions and imputations, involve yourselves in trouble; but reflect carefully beforehand how completely war cheats all calculation, before you engage in it; for, when protracted, it in general comes in the end to depend on chances, from which one of us is no more exempt than the other, and we must both run the risk in absolute darkness as to the issue. It is a common error, in going to war, to plunge at once into action, which ought to be the last resort; and it is only in the hour of disaster that men revert to diplomacy. We,

¹ Mr. Crawley, in his version of the First Book, cleverly contrasts *ἀδικοῦμενοι* and *βιάζόμενοι* by the English phrases 'legal wrong' and 'violent wrong.'

² *Γάρ*. See Donaldson's *Greek Grammar*, p. 605.

³ There is probably a covert allusion to Pausanias in *εἰς ἐξιόν*.

however, who are not as yet entangled in any such error, and believe you also to be equally exempt from it, charge you, while true policy is still open to the choice of both parties, not to infringe the truce, nor to traverse your oaths, but to allow the points in dispute to be settled by arbitration, according to agreement. If you refuse, we will endeavour, summoning as witnesses the Gods who heard the oaths, to avenge ourselves upon you for giving the signal for war, whenever you set us the example.

SPEECH OF KING ARCHIDAMUS,

Delivered before the general assembly of Spartan citizens, on the same occasion as the preceding speech of the Athenian Envoys, B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs. 80-86.

INTRODUCTION.

ON the conclusion of the Athenian address, the Spartans, according to their usual custom, caused the representatives of their allies to withdraw, and submitted to their own assembly the question whether Athens had broken the truce, and war should be declared. Had the Spartan assembly negatived these propositions, the votes of the allies would never have been taken, as they subsequently were. For, although the allies had an equal right of suffrage, Sparta voted alone; not as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader; and the only question ever submitted to the members of her league was, whether they would or would not support the previous decision of the Spartans.—Grote, vol. vi. p. 105.

Most of the speakers who addressed this assembly clamoured for immediate war; a decision from which Archidamus endeavours, in the following speech, to dissuade his audience.

CH. 80. I have already, Lacedæmonians, been personally engaged in several wars, and I know that those of my own age among you are also conversant¹ with warfare, so that you are not likely to long for hostilities, like the mass of men, either through inexperience, or from a belief² that they are in themselves desirable and safe.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller follow the Scholiast in understanding *ἐμπείρου πολέμου* after *ὄρω*. In his note Poppo gives an unanswerable reason for so doing.

² Thus Göller and Poppo take the clause *μήτε . . . νομίσαντα*. Poppo (ed. min.) refers to Matthiæ's *Greek*

Grammar, § 397, where the construction is elucidated. As to the sentiment itself, we must remember that, while an aristocracy is always fond of war, Sparta was not only governed by an aristocracy, but was rather a camp than a city; her citizens had scarcely any vocation save

You would find, too, that this war, the subject of our present deliberations, is not likely to be one of trifling moment, were any of you dispassionately to weigh the nature of the struggle. Our forces, indeed, when directed against Peloponnesian communities, especially¹ those in our neighbourhood, are similar² to and a match for theirs, and we can attack them rapidly in detail. But—a struggle with men who are rich in foreign dominion, who are thorough masters of the sea, and have long been admirably provided with all the appliances of war, with wealth, both national and private, with ships, with cavalry, with troops, heavy and light,³ in greater numbers than any which elsewhere exist in any *one* district of Greece; and who, besides all this, have a host of confederates who pay them tribute—how can it be politic rashly to engage in such a struggle, and in what can we trust when we attack them unprepared? Are we to trust in our fleet? No! we are inferior therein, and it will take time to practise and prepare a counter armament. Shall we rely, then, on our wealth? Scarcely! for in this point we are far more deficient still: we have no money in our treasury, nor do we readily contribute from our private resources.

81. Perhaps, however, some of you may feel sanguine

that of soldiers. The younger men would, therefore, naturally prefer war to peace.

¹ I have followed Poppo and Göller in reading *τοὺς Πελοποννησίουσ καὶ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας*. In this reading, *καὶ* must be explained, with Poppo (ed. min.), by 'et maximè.' Poppo thinks the Argives and some of the Arcadian communities especially pointed at in the epithet *ἀστυγείτονας*. Dr. Arnold reads *καὶ ἀστυγείτονας*. If the article *τοὺσ* is dropped, we must translate 'neigh-

bouring Peloponnesian communities;' as *καὶ*, without the article, does not so much introduce a new idea, as it limits and defines the preceding term, *Πελοποννησίουσ*.

² That is, military rather than naval: *πεζομάχοι γὰρ πάντες*, says the Scholiast.

³ *Ὀπλοὺσ καὶ ὄχλοι*. Poppo (ed. maj.) says: "*Ὀπλα* quum inter equites et turbam hominum (*ὄχλοι*), ad velites conseribendos idoneorum, memorentur, ipsi hoplitæ videntur esse, de quibus eodem loco agitur.'

on the ground that we surpass them in our heavy infantry, and in the number of our troops,¹ which would enable us to ravage their land by repeated incursions. But then there are considerable domains, besides² Attica, which own their sway, and their command of the sea will enable them to import whatever they require. If, on the other hand, we were to try to seduce their confederates, we must find ships for their special³ protection, as they are for the most part islanders. What then will be the character of the war we shall be waging? Unless we can either sweep the seas with our fleet, or cut off the supplies that feed the Athenian marine, ours will on the whole be a losing game; and in such a case we can no longer with honour even negotiate for peace, especially should *we*⁴ appear to have provoked the strife. God forbid⁵ that we should encourage ourselves with the utterly delusive hope that the war will speedily be terminated, if we devastate their land! I rather fear we shall even bequeath it to our children; so improbable is it that Athenian spirit will chain itself to the soil it tenants, or suffer Athenians, like men who have never been in arms, to quail before the terrors of war.

82. Not, however, that I advise you tamely to allow

¹ See Poppo's note on *πλήθει*, ed. min.

² ἄλλῃ.

³ This seems to be the force of the particle *καί*, which precedes *τούτοις*, and which Krüger explains, with Poppo's assent (ed. min.), as referring to the whole sentence. Literally it means, 'it will be needful to maintain a squadron to protect them, as well as for other purposes (*καί*).'

⁴ The force of *μᾶλλον* may perhaps be given by italics.

⁵ See Klotz, *Devar.*, on *μή γάρ δή*,

vol. i. p. 133; and Jelf's *Greek Grammar*, § 897, on the use of those particles in dissuasive wishes, where they are equivalent to the Latin 'absit ut.' *Μή* is used in sensu ἀπεικτικῷ, as Grammarians say; γάρ in sensu causali, connecting the sentence, though less closely than the English 'for,' with the preceding sentence, which alludes to the subject of a termination of the war. *Δή* is intensive, and strengthens the two preceding particles.

them to injure our allies, and to refrain from exposing their intrigues. But I *do* advise you not as yet to draw the sword, but to send an embassy and to expostulate, without either too plainly menacing war, or allowing them to think we shall be blind to their ambition. In the interval I recommend you to complete our own preparations, by the acquisition of allies, both in Greece and abroad, in any quarter where we can gain either naval or pecuniary aid; for men who, like ourselves, are the intended victims of Athenian treachery, cannot be blamed for consulting their safety by foreign as well as Greek alliances. Let us, at the same time, develope to the utmost our internal resources: should they then show any inclination to listen to our embassies, all the better; if they refuse, after the lapse of two or three years, we shall be better prepared to attack them, should we resolve to do so. Perhaps, too, by that time, when they observe our armaments, and the warlike tone of our diplomacy, they may be more disposed towards concession, while their territory is still inviolate, and they are able to enjoy, in their full integrity, those great national advantages whose fate depends on their deliberations. Indeed, the only light in which you should regard their domain is that of a hostage; a hostage the more precious, the richer its cultivation. It is, therefore, your interest to spare¹ it as long as possible, instead of rendering its proprietors, by reducing them to desperation, more than ever intractable to terms. If we take the opposite course; if,

¹ Compare Livy, v. 42: 'Ceterum, seu non omnibus delendæ urbis libido erat, seu ita placuerat principibus Gallorum, et ostentari quædam incendia terroris caussâ, si compelli ad deditionem caritate sedium suarum ob-

sessi possent, et non omnia concremari tecta, ut, quodcumque superesset urbis, id pignus ad flectendos hostium animos haberent; nequaquam perinde atque in captâ urbe primâ die aut passim aut late vagatus est ignis.'

hurried on by the complaints of our confederates, we ravage Attica without adequate supplies, beware that we are not adopting a course little to the honour of Peloponnesians, and full of embarrassment. The grievances, indeed, whether of states or of individuals, it is possible to adjust; but it is not easy for a whole confederacy to terminate hostilities on creditable terms, when its members have, each for his own¹ interest, engaged in a war whose issue it is impossible to foresee.

83. Nor let it be supposed that delay on the part of a numerous confederacy to attack a single state is a mark of pusillanimity. Athens, like² ourselves, has allies—allies as numerous as ours: they pay³ her tribute, and the contest hinges not so much on arms as on treasure, the sinews⁴ of war, especially when, as in the present case, an inland is opposed to a maritime power. Let us first, then, fill our treasury, instead of being carried away by the eloquence of our allies; let *us*, who⁵ will be mainly responsible for the results, whether fortunate or adverse, leisurely revolve beforehand the chances of success or defeat.

84. I must warn you, too, not to feel ashamed of that slow and deliberate circumspection, which is their principal reproach against us; for if you hastily take up arms, it will be all the later before you lay them down,

¹ Probably the Corinthians and Megarians are chiefly alluded to.—Haack.

² *καί*. Hoogveen (*On the Particles*) explains this use of *καί* by an ellipse of *οὐ μόνον ἀλλά*. But see note¹, p. 7, above.

³ Bloomfield remarks that the comparative *ἐλάσσους* applies only to *ζήμαχοι*, since the Lacedæmonian allies paid no tribute.

⁴ Comp. Cic. *Philipp.* v. 2: 'Nervi belli, pecunia infinita.'

⁵ The double *καί* is used to strengthen the comparison between the two clauses. Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. p. 635) cites, among other instances of this usage, Xen. *Mem.* i. 6, 3: *εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τοὺς μαθητὰς μιμητὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδεικνύουσιν, οὕτω καὶ σὺ, κ.τ.λ.*

because you will be entering on the conflict without due preparation. The wisdom¹ of our cautious policy reflects itself in our long career of freedom and glory; and the very quality² they ridicule in us is only another name for a wise moderation; a quality which secures us a singular exemption from insolent elation in the hour of triumph, and, compared with others, from despondency in disaster; from yielding to the fascinations of a gratified vanity, when people praise us and cheer us on to hazards which our sober judgment disapproves; or from being piqued into compliance when a Corinthian³ speaker goads us with invective. Our love of order and discipline renders us brave soldiers and wise counsellors; brave soldiers, because sensibility to shame is a powerful element in the love of order, and a chivalrous spirit in sensibility to shame; wise counsellors, because we are trained with too little refinement⁴ to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them. Nor⁵

¹ In the clause commencing with *καὶ ἄμα, κ.τ.λ.*, a fact is stated in an insulated form, without its true connection with the argument, which is left to be inferred. Haack rightly calls it an 'argumentum ab effectu.'

² I agree with Poppo (ed. min.), in referring *τοῦτο* to *τὸ βραῦν καὶ μέλλον*.

³ Lit. 'if, as we have seen' (*ἄρα*). *Ἄρα* points the allusion to the foregoing Corinthian speech. Its force may be given in English by substituting a definite for a general term.

⁴ Compare Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 15: *τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται.*

⁵ Mr. Grote (vol. vi. p. 119) remarks: 'In this part of the speech of Archidamus the great points of

the Spartan character are all brought out: 1. A narrow, strictly defined, and uniform range of ideas. 2. Compression of all other impulses and desires, but an increased sensibility to their own public opinion. 3. Great habits of endurance as well as of submission. The way in which the features of Spartan character are deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship of ignorance and narrowmindedness is not only to be found among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of the Athenian democracy (see Aristoph. *Ran.* 1070; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of Cleon (*Thucyd.* iii. 37).'

are we so overskilled in useless accomplishments as to depreciate our enemies' armaments in plausible speeches, without any corresponding energy in action. No! our education teaches us to believe that, in point of tactics, our neighbours are nearly on a par with ourselves,¹ and that the chances incident to war are far beyond the calculations of debate. We arm² energetically against the foe on the presumption that his plans will be wisely laid; for we have no right to build our hopes on the chance of his mistakes, but on the surer ground of our own foresight. We do not believe in any great natural superiority³ in one man over another: that man we hold the most valuable citizen who has been trained in the severest school.

85. Let us not, then, renounce the principles bequeathed by our fathers to us, and retained by us down to the present moment with uniform advantage; let us not, in the brief space of an hour, pass a hurried resolution, when the lives of many citizens, the fortunes of many families, the fate of many cities, and our own glory are involved; let us take time to consider, as our strength permits us to do more easily than other states. Despatch an embassy to treat on the affairs of Potidæa, and on the alleged wrongs of the allies, especially as Athens is willing to submit the subjects of complaint to arbitration;⁴ for public justice forbids your proceeding,

¹ I have followed Poppo's (ed. min.) construction; but Gøller's explanation suits the Greek quite as well. According to him, the passage must be rendered: 'We are taught to believe that the plans of our neighbours are as indefinable by calculation as the freaks of chance.' Dr. Arnold agrees with Gøller.

² Παρεσκευάζόμεθα, Krüger's read-

ing, has been adopted here.

³ The remark is no doubt levelled at the elaborate contrast drawn by the Corinthian speaker between the intellectual activity of Athens and the intellectual sluggishness of Sparta.

⁴ Poppo (ed. maj.) explains *δικασ* *δοῦναι* by 'rem dijudicandam permittere.'

previous to trial, against a party willing to accept such a decision, as against an avowed criminal. At the same time make every preparation for war. This will be the safest course you can adopt, and the most likely to intimidate your foes.

SPEECH OF THE EPHOR STHENELAIDAS,

Before the same assembly as that immediately before addressed by Archidamus.
Bk. I. ch. 86.

INTRODUCTION.

STHENELAIDAS, one of the five Ephors, whose function it was to put the question to the vote, replies, in the following brief address, to the preceding speech; and, speaking as the organ of the war party at Sparta, closes the debate.

CH. 86. I don't understand the long speeches of the Athenians; they have lavished praises on themselves, but they have never answered our charge—that of wronging our allies and Peloponnese. Besides, if they formerly proved themselves honest men in the struggle with the Medes, and have now proved themselves villains in their conduct towards us, they are deserving of double punishment, for having turned rogues in place of honest men. *We*, on the contrary, are just the same now that we were then; and, as long as we have a particle of sense, we shall not allow our allies to be oppressed; nor will we postpone our aid, as they cannot postpone their sufferings. Other states may be richer in money, in fleets, in cavalry. *We* have staunch allies, whom we will not abandon to Athens; nor will we decide our claims either in courts of arbitration or by diplomacy—for it is not by diplomacy that we¹ are being wronged. No! we will succour them at once, and with all our might. Let no

¹ Καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους. Καὶ is used to compare the two ideas embodied in the terms λόγοις διακριτῆα and λόγῳ βλαπτομένους. The idiom is illustrated by Klotz, *Devar.* vol. ii.

p. 636, where he cites Thueyd. ii. 93, ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐχώρουν ἐν' ἑνί, where καὶ compares the decision with the action taken upon it.

man presume to tell us that we can with honour deliberate longer, outraged as we are : protracted deliberations are rather for those who design to outrage others. Vote, then, Lacedæmonians, for war, as befits the dignity of Sparta ; suffer not Athens to increase her power, nor leave our allies at her mercy ; but march, with the favour of the gods, against the aggressors.

SPEECH OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CORINTH,

Delivered at the Second Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Sparta,
B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs. 120-125.

INTRODUCTION.

ON the close of the preceding speech, the Ephor Sthenelaidas took the sense of the Spartan assembly, when a large majority declared the truce broken, and voted for a declaration of war against Athens. The Spartans then dismissed the representatives of their allies, consulted the Delphic oracle, and, encouraged by the answer, convoked a general congress of their confederates, to take their vote on the question of war. The Corinthian Envoys wound up the discussion in the following harangue.

CH. 120. We have no longer,¹ confederates, any reason to reproach the Lacedæmonians for not having themselves voted for war, or for omitting to convene us for that purpose, though, had they done so, we should have held them justly censurable; for² it is the duty of the head of a confederacy, while, in private affairs,³ it deals with its allies on terms of equality, to be foremost in providing for the general welfare, just as upon public occasions it is foremost in the honours conferred.

Those among us who have been engaged in political transactions with the Athenians, require no warning to

¹ Probably the speaker refers to a former complaint on the part of the Corinthians, of the obstacles opposed to the meeting of a congress of allies at Sparta. See chap. 69, above.

² *ἴσις* points, as Poppo (ed. min.), Güller, and Bauer show, to a suppressed clause, which I have attempted to supply. See Hartung,

De Partic. vol. i. p. 465.

³ That is, makes no difference between Lacedæmonians, on the one hand, and Argives or Corinthians, on the other. So Classen, quoted by Poppo (ed. min.), understands *τὰ ἴσια*, which he explains to mean 'quum ipsorum Lacedæmoniorum, tum singulorum federatorum res.'

put them on their guard against Athenian ambition; but it is desirable that those who occupy an inland site, not on the highway of commercial traffic, should be made aware that, if they refuse aid to the maritime cities, they will find it less easy to carry their corn to the coast, and to import the produce which the sea contributes to the mainland. They ought not, therefore, to listen to our arguments with the indifference¹ of unconcerned critics; remembering that, should they abandon the cities on the coast, the danger will in time reach their own doors, and that their present deliberations affect their own interests fully as much as ours.

For this very reason they ought not to feel reluctant to exchange peace for war; for if wise² men cherish peace, while they are not wronged, brave men, when they are wronged, abandon peace and resort to war, though disposed to accept honourable terms of accommodation; their eyes being open alike to the folly of undue elation with military success, and to the danger of submitting to outrage for the sake of the charming tranquillity of peace. They know that the man whom love of ease seduces from war will, if he clings to a dishonourable peace, very soon be robbed of the luxurious repose which makes a coward of him; and that the man who presumes on the victories which have crowned his arms, forgets that there is no sure warrant for the sanguine confidence which intoxicates him. For if ill-concerted movements have often succeeded through the deplorable infatuation of an enemy's tactics, yet more frequently have operations, apparently well-devised, con-

¹ *Κακοὶ κριταί*, says Göller, 'sunt *indiligentes, socordes*, quia opinantur suà nunc non referre, quid judicent.'

² Col. Mure (vol v. p. 583) censures this passage as truistical. In

a certain epoch of intellectual culture, the maxims it contains may seem trite; but they could not have been stale in the infancy of Athenian political and social experience.

trary to all presumption, resulted in defeat. The fact is, men do not carry their schemes into effect in the confident spirit¹ which conceives them; we lay our plans in the midst of security, but diffidence and fear mar their execution.

121. Thus, in our own case, if we are kindling² the flame of war, it is because we have wrongs to resent, and are armed with adequate grounds of complaint; and, as soon as we have wreaked our vengeance upon Athens, we shall in season sheathe our swords. There is every presumption that *we* shall be the conquerors; since, besides having the advantage in numbers and in military skill, we all execute the commands of our officers with the prompt and uniform obedience of a common cause.³ We can build ourselves a fleet—that mainspring of Athenian power—with the resources supplied by the several members of our league, and the treasure⁴ in reserve at Olympia and Delphi; for, by contracting a loan, we shall be able, the Athenian forces being mercenary rather than national, to seduce their foreign seamen by the offer of more liberal pay—a danger to which *we* should be less exposed, our military power depending far more on native than on mercenary⁵ troops. One victory at sea—

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller read *ὁμοία*, which gives a better sense, and relieves the false antithesis which *ὁμοία*—Dr. Arnold's reading—would create between *πίστει* and *ἔργῳ*. According to the latter reading, the sense would be: 'it is one thing to form our expectations, another to give them practical effect.'

² *Πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν* a poetical expression, drawn from Homer, ever on the lips of the Athenians, and imitated by later prose writers.

³ See Grote's note at p. 124, vol. vi. of his *History of Greece*, where he

says: 'I conceive that the word *ὁμοίως* here alludes to the equal interest of all the confederates in the quarrel, as opposed to the Athenian power, composed partly of constrained subjects, partly of hired mercenaries; to both of which points, as weaknesses in the enemy, the Corinthian orator goes on to allude.'

⁴ 'The temples were the banks and capitalists of antiquity.'—Shepard and Evans, p. 127.

⁵ The paraphrase of Dukas, quoted by Göller, is my authority for thus rendering *χιρίμασι*, a literal version

and, in all probability, all is over with them: should they, however, still hold out, *we* shall have all the more time to practise naval evolutions; and when our science rivals theirs, we shall, I presume, be rather more than their rivals in point of courage. No discipline can give them the qualities nature has given us; and by training we can cancel their superiority in science. The ways and means we shall find by subscription; for it would be monstrous that, while their allies are contributing without a murmur towards their own enslavement, *we*, as seems to be thought,¹ should be unable to find funds for the combined objects of vengeance on our foes and salvation for ourselves, as well as to prevent those very funds²

of which makes nonsense. It runs as follows: ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων στρατιωτῶν τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ συνισταμένη, καὶ οὐχὶ ξενικοῦ χρήμασι ὠνητοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἀφαιρεθείη ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ πλείω διδόντων. As Thucydides often puts the effect for the cause, so here, in *χοήμασι*, he puts the cause for the effect, the agent for the patient. In other words, *χρήμασι* means, literally, 'money to hire mercenaries;'³ really it means 'mercenaries hired by money.' There is, too, as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, an equivocal in *δύναμις*: which, applied to the Athenians, means 'forces'; applied to the Peloponnesians, 'power.' Previous translators, including even Mr. Crawley, have, by a literal rendering, lost the meaning. He translates as follows: 'A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay, for the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be so liable to this, as its strength lies more in men than in money.' But surely this affords no reason for the Peloponnesian force being less open than the Athenian to

the seductions of higher pay. The contrast lies between national and mercenary troops; the latter being of course more likely than the former to transfer their services to the highest bidder.

¹ Ἄρα seems to point the allusion to a passage in the preceding speech of Archidamus, ch. 80. Poppo, however (ed. min.), takes ἄρα in the sense which it undoubtedly bears in many passages, especially Plato, *Apol.* p. 34, B, where Stallbaum explains it as giving flagrancy to the contrast between two propositions, and where ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω is construed by Riddell, 'and then finds that I mean to do nothing of the kind.'

² Αὐτά, before ἀφαιρεθέντες, refers to χρήματα, and is repeated in αὐτοῖς τούτοις, as the Scholiast, quoted by Poppo (ed. maj.), shows in the following paraphrase: φειδόμενοι αὐτῶν (i. e. τῶν χρημάτων), ἀπολούμεθα ὑπ' αὐτῶν τούτων. Sheppard and Evans take the same view of the meaning, objecting to Dr. Arnold's version.

from becoming, through Athenian spoliation, the instruments of our ruin.

122. But we have other means, besides these, of carrying on the war, such as the seduction of their allies—the best mode of cutting off the revenues which are the sinews of Athenian power—and the occupation of a fortified post in Attica; not to mention other expedients that we cannot at this moment foresee. For war is the last thing in the world to turn out according to programme:¹ it draws chiefly on its own resources for the means of meeting emergencies; it is a field² of action in which the man who mingles in the fray with coolness and presence of mind is likely to succeed, while the man who loses his temper as he fights gets many a fall.³

We should also remember that, though our whole confederacy need not have interfered⁴ if we had been individually engaged in mere frontier squabbles with rival states, the case is very different now, embarked as we are in a struggle with Athens, who is a match for our whole collective strength, and far more than a match for any single member of our league. So that, unless we

¹ Mr. Bigg, by construing ἐπι ῥητοῖς, 'by fixed laws,' commits Thucydides to a very unphilosophical remark.

² Sheppard and Evans understand πολέμῳ with ἐν ψ̄. but πολέμῳ would then be repeated in ἀντψ̄. The Scholiast explains it as equivalent to εἶός. but Poppo (ed. maj.) justly remarks that Haack's version, 'quā in re,' is nearer the Greek.

³ Dr. Arnold remarks: 'The connection of the argument is rather obscure. Perhaps the speaker wishes to disclaim being influenced by passion in urging war against Athens so vehemently. He had disclaimed

it indeed before, at the end of the 120th chapter, but here again he repeats his protest against the admission of anger into their deliberations: let them not begin the war under the influence of passion, but coolly and resolutely; for they have causes of hostility sufficient to prevail on them, even when considered with the coolest temper.'—Vol. i. p. 142.

⁴ Οἰστὸν ἀν ἡν means literally, 'we (i. e. the several members of the league) could have taken the burden on our own shoulders,' without invoking the collective action of the confederacy.

unanimously assail her with our united force, with the force of every province and of every city, she will easily conquer us, divided as we shall be. Let every man be well assured that conquest, terrible as it is to hear the truth, implies nothing short of absolute slavery, the very mention of which as a possibility is disgraceful to Peloponnese; and it is disgraceful that so many states should be bullied by a single city. Were such a fate to befall us, we should either seem to be suffering only what we deserved, or to brook our degradation through cowardice, and to declare ourselves unworthy of our fathers, who gave freedom to Greece—freedom which, in our degeneracy, we are failing to secure even for our own homes! since, while we plume ourselves on suppressing despots in single cities, we allow a despotic city to rear its head among us. Indeed, we know not upon what grounds your policy can be acquitted of one or another¹ of three most deadly errors, either want of sense, or want of courage, or want of care; for you need not imagine that you escape them by imputing your disastrous apathy to that most fatal² contempt of a foe, which, from the widespread ruin it has caused, has been justly described by an epithet similar in sound but opposite in sense—not as contemptuous but contemptible.

123. However, it is idle to censure the policy of the past, save as a lesson of wisdom for the present. But, for the sake of our future hopes, we must toil with increased zeal in improving present opportunities. Toil,

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) points out that *καί*, not *ἦ*, would have been used before *μαλακίας* and *ἀμελείας*, had it been meant that their policy was chargeable with all the three errors here mentioned.

² Krüger wishes to read *πλείστον*

πλείστα instead of *πλείστον* *δή*. But, as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, *δή* is quite in place, intensifying the superlative. Arnold, Göller, and Poppo agree as to the meaning of this passage.

indeed,¹ has been to us, from time immemorial, the source of honour; and we must not abandon a time-honoured principle, merely because we have now, perhaps, a trifling advantage in wealth and political power. For it is not right that the earnings of poverty should be the waste of affluence. No! we ought to embark with a well-founded confidence in the war, for such are the commands of the Delphian God, who himself has promised us his aid, and the whole of Greece is about to plunge into the conflict with us, partly from apprehension, partly from policy. Nor will you be the first to infringe the² treaty, since the God, by summoning you to go to war, declares it to have been broken by your foes; you will rather be avenging its violation, for treaties are broken, not by retaliation, but by aggression.

124. Since, then, your political position, from every point of view, and the general³ sanction of our congress, summon you to arms; since the⁴ course we advise is firmly guaranteed by its consonance with private as well as national interests, do not hesitate a moment to succour the Dorians of Potidæa, besieged as they are by Ionians—a total inversion of the old order of things!—and to vindicate the freedom of our other allies; for it is no

¹ It is a mistake to treat the clause *πάτριον γάρ, κ.τ.λ.*, as a parenthesis. The two sentences are logically connected by the unity of ideas expressed by *ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν* in the one, and *πόνων* in the other.

² Mr. Bigg sagaciously observes that *σπονδᾶς* cannot mean 'the treaty,' because the article is not prefixed. I recommend him to consult Poppo's note (ed. min.) on ch. 67, 1, above, where that editor shows that *σπονδᾶς* is used there, and elsewhere, definitely of the Thirty Years' Truce,

without the article; and Jelf's *Gr. Gram.* § 447, *Obs.*, on similar omissions of the article. That *σπονδᾶς* is used definitely here is proved by the relative *ἕς γε*, as well as by the directness of the allusion to the Thirty Years' Truce.

³ Krüger denies that *κοινῇ* can mean 'for the common good,' as some construe it.

⁴ Göller, who had followed Reiske in preferring *ταῦτά*, afterwards admitted *ταῦτα* to be right. Poppo, however (ed. min.), reads *ταῦτά*.

longer tolerable that some members of our league should be sacrificed on the spot while they are awaiting aid from you, and that others, if it should be known that we have met in congress and yet dare not avenge their wrongs, should shortly afterwards be involved in the same fate. In the conviction, then, confederates, that the crisis of action has arrived, and that our counsels are your true policy, vote for war, undaunted by the immediate danger, fascinated by the charm of the more lasting peace that will ensue. For peace¹ is never so stable as when it is the fruit of hostilities, and to flinch from them for the sake of repose is more dangerous than² to elicit peace from war. Let us, then, in the belief that the tyrant state which has planted her rule in Greece aims at our common subjugation—some of us, indeed, she already rules, while she threatens others—let us march and pull her down; and let us live in independence and safety for the future, while we restore to freedom the Grecian communities now enslaved.³

¹ Compare Cic. *Philipp.* vii. 6: 'Si pace frui volumus, bellum gerendum est; si bellum omittimus, pace nunquam fruemur.'

² Haack, quoted by Poppo (ed. min.), translates *ὁμοίως* 'ac si quis ex bello pacem pepigerit.'

³ On the conclusion of this speech, the Spartans took the votes of the deputies of all the allied states present, great and small alike, when the majority declared for war. This happened at the close of the year 432 B.C., or early in January B.C. 431.

SPEECH OF PERICLES,

Addressed to the Athenian popular assembly, B.C. 431. Bk. I. chs. 140-145.

INTRODUCTION.

As soon as the Congress had broken up, Sparta prepared for war. With the view, however, of gaining time for effective preparation, and also of establishing a better *casus belli*, she addressed several vexatious requisitions to Athens, the first of which was aimed directly at Pericles, and was rejected by the Athenians: the second demanded (1) the withdrawal of the force investing Potidæa; (2) the recognition of the independence of Ægina; (3) the repeal of the edict against the Megarians. The chief stress was laid upon the third point, not because it was so important to Sparta as the termination of the blockade of Potidæa, but because it afforded the anti-Periclean and philo-Laconian party at Athens a better chance of defeating the policy of Pericles. The Athenian Assembly, however, refused to revoke the edict, on the ground that the Megarians had been guilty of harbouring their runaway slaves, and of encroachments on consecrated ground. Sparta, foiled at all points, at last sent an ultimatum calling on Athens to recognise the independence of all Greece, or, in other words, to break up her empire. This proposal was brought before the Athenian Assembly, which resolved to deliberate once for all on all the demands addressed to them, and to give them a peremptory answer. After this assembly had been variously swayed by several speakers of opposite views, Pericles declared his opinion and defended his policy in the following speech, ranked by Dionysius of Halicarnassus among the best in Thucydides.

CH. 140. I still adhere, Athenians, to my former conviction that we ought to make no concessions to the Peloponnesians, although I am aware that men consent to a declaration of war in one mood, and carry on its operations in another—their views changing with the tide

of events. Still I feel that I have nearly the same counsel to offer you as before; and I call upon those among you who follow my advice to support our common resolves, in the event of our meeting with partial reverses; or—to make no pretensions to sagacity in the event of our success. And we *may* meet with reverses; for affairs¹ are apt to take a course as eccentric as human counsels; a truth we acknowledge by familiarly imputing to Fortune whatever contradicts our expectations.

The Lacedæmonians have, on former occasions, but more especially on this, clearly betrayed their hostility to us. For though it was stipulated in the Thirty Years' Truce that we should grant and accept an amicable adjustment of our differences,² and that both parties should retain what they possessed, they have never up to this moment sought a friendly arbitration, and they repudiate it when offered by us, preferring war to argument as a means of settling their grievances; and their ambassadors are now here to dictate, and no longer to expostulate. For they call on us to raise the siege of Potidæa, to grant independence to Ægina, and to rescind the Megarian decree; nay, their last embassy, that now before you, publicly summons us to acknowledge the independence of all Greece. I trust none of you will imagine we shall be going to war about a trifle if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree, the repeal of which they put prominently forward as certain to avert hostilities; and that you will not allow a particle of self-

¹ The Scholiast interprets *ξυμφορὰς* by *ἀποβάσεις*, explaining one difficulty by another. Probably *αἱ ξυμφοραὶ τῶν πραγμάτων* is only a periphrasis for *τὰ πράγματα*. Mr. Grote construes the phrase 'the con-

tingencies of events,' an expression which betrays the translator.

² Compare Livy's 'commercium juris præbendi repetendique.'—Bk. xli. 29.

reproach to linger in your thoughts, as if you had appealed to war on trivial grounds. For this one point, slight¹ as it seems, comprehends all that can fortify or test your resolution. Surrender it²—and some heavier exaction will shortly be laid upon you, on the assumption that even this concession was dictated by fear; sternly refuse—and you will give them a significant hint to treat you as equals, and not to command³ you as subjects.

141. Make up your minds, then, once for all, either to submit to a state of dependency, before you have suffered from resistance; or, in the event of our going to war, which I believe will be our best policy, not to yield upon any consideration, whether trivial or important, and to hold with no timorous grasp our present possessions. For any demand, whether small or great, when levied on a foreign state by a rival power, before any decision has been given by a court of arbitration, equally implies subjection.

As to the requirements of the war, and the resources of both parties, assure yourselves, by listening to the following statement of details, that the advantage will be on our side. The Peloponnesians farm their own lands, and they have no accumulated wealth, either national or private; nor are they experienced in protracted and transmarine wars, because their poverty restricts them to short expeditions against each other, and denies them mercenary aid.⁴ Powers of this description cannot often send out well-manned squadrons or expeditions by land, because their subjects would be exiled from their estates, which must, nevertheless, defray⁵ their expenses, and also

¹ Compare Livy, bk. xxxv. 17: 'Initium semper a parvis injuste imperandi fuit.'

² Literally, 'for, if you give way to them:' οἷς, as Poppo (ed. min.) shows, refers to οἱ τελευταῖοι ἡκοντες,

and is equivalent to τούτοις γάρ.

³ See Poppo's note on προσφέρεισθαι, ed. min.

⁴ This seems to be the meaning of αὐτοί.

⁵ Göller remarks that the Athenian

because—thanks to our maritime supremacy—they cannot keep the seas.¹ For it is not by forced contributions, but by surplus funds, that war is fed. Men, too, who farm their own lands are more ready to serve in person than in purse, trusting that the former may still escape the danger, but feeling no assurance that the latter will survive² the war; especially if, as is likely enough, they should find hostilities outlast their expectations. In a single engagement, indeed, the Peloponnesians and their allies are capable of resisting all Greece; but they are not capable of carrying on a war against a power constitutionally different³ from their own; since the want of a single council-chamber disables them from executing their measures with promptitude and despatch; and, as they all have equal votes, and are not of the same race,⁴ every man presses his special interest; and, in effect, helps the rest to do nothing. The anxiety of some is for the utmost vengeance on a foe, the anxiety of others for the utmost saving of expense. On assembling, after many delays, a fraction of their time is given to a little public business, but the greater part of it is devoted to their private affairs. Not a man among them believes that any mischief will arise from his own negligence: he thinks

troops received pay from the time of Pericles, but not the Lacedæmonian; nor, says Poppo (ed. min.), their Peloponnesian allies. He refers especially to Thucyd. ii. 10.

¹ Mr. Crawley translates τῆς θαλάσσης εἰργόμενοι, 'having no sea-board;' but this can hardly be said of Peloponnesians, which was all but an island. Poppo (ed. min.) refers it to their comparative want of maritime skill, illustrating the expression from Thucyd. ii. 85, iii. 115, viii. 24.

² Literally, 'that they shall not

exhaust the latter before the war is over.'

³ Thucydides himself remarks, at a later crisis of the war, that the Lacedæmonians, whose national habits were so different from those of the Athenians, were the most convenient foes Athens could have; while the Syracusans, on the contrary, so similar in character to their Athenian antagonists, managed the war with Athens capitally.—Bk. viii. 96.

⁴ See Poppo, ed. min.

some one else will, in his own stead, interest himself for the public welfare; which is thus imperceptibly but systematically undermined by this very notion, privately cherished alike by every member of the league.

142. Their chief embarrassment, however, will be the want of money: delays will be caused by their difficulty in raising funds; and the opportunities of war will wait for no man. Then—as to their plan¹ of establishing a fortified post—not even that,² nor yet their navy ought to inspire fear. On the one hand,³ it would be difficult, even in peace, to erect a fortified post in the shape of a town that can rival Athens; far more difficult in an enemy's territory, when we have fortifications quite as strong to check them. On the other hand, if they were to build a fort, they might injure some portion of our territory by making incursions and inviting deserters;⁴ but it would not prevent us from sending a fleet to their shores, from fortifying⁵ ourselves there, and retaliating upon them with our naval forces, in which we are so strong; and⁶ we shall find it easy to make descents. Our naval skill gives us more knowledge of service on land than their military skill gives them of service at sea. And they will find naval tactics no easy acquisition. Even you, though you

¹ See the speech of the Corinthian deputy, ch. 122, above.

² See Lidd. & Scott's *Lex. οὐδέ*, iv.

³ 'Thucydides,' says Arnold, 'is here distinguishing between two sorts of *ἐπιτείχιαι*, the one by founding a city (*ἐποικίζειν*, vii. 27) in the neighbourhood of Athens, strong enough to be a check upon her power (iii. 9), the other by erecting forts in Attica as strongholds.' Of the former, Megara, founded by the Dorians as a check on Athens, is an instance; as also is Heracleia (iii. 92). The latter

scheme was carried out by the fortification of Decelea.—Sheppard and Evans, p. 149.

⁴ See Thucyd. vii. 27.

⁵ On the construction, see Poppo, ed. min. He remarks: 'Ejusmodi *ἐπιτείχισεις* in Peloponneso postea Pylus (iv. 3) et Methone (iv. 45) fuerunt.'

⁶ *Γάρ*, in the clause commencing *πλέον γάρ*, seems to refer to a suppressed idea, a connecting link between the two sentences. See note², p. 43.

began practising directly after the Persian invasion, are not adepts even now: how then can a nation of farmers, who are no seamen, and whom your powerful blockading fleets will allow no opportunity of training, how can they achieve anything of consequence? Encouraging their ignorance by their numbers, they might be tempted to run the gauntlet¹ of a small blockading squadron; but, if their ports are closed by a strong force, they will not move; and, owing to the want of practice, their skill and courage will alike decline. Seamanship is as much a question of art as anything else; you cannot treat it as a secondary object, and pick it up on chance opportunities; on the contrary, it is jealous of anything being even secondary to it.

143. If, on the other hand, they seize a part of the treasures at Olympia or Delphi, and endeavour, by the offer of higher pay, to seduce our foreign seamen, we should still have nothing to fear, unless our fleets, when manned by a combined force of Athenian citizens and resident aliens, failed to prove a match for them. In point of fact, however, we *are* a match for them; and, what is most important, we have citizens for coxswains, and our fleets have better crews than those of any other Grecian power. Besides, none of our foreign seamen, with the danger² before his eyes, would think, for the sake of a few days' higher wages, of joining them in the contest, at the price of expatriation, especially when their prospects of success are less than ours.

This, I believe is a tolerably fair statement of the

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) instances the attempt mentioned by Thucyd. bk. ii. ch. 83.

² Poppo (ed. min.) says we may either take *ἐπι τῷ κινδύνῳ*, with Krüger, to mean 'ob impendens

periculum;' or, as he suggests, as equivalent to 'ut periculum adeat,' i.e. 'for pure love of danger.' The latter sense seems alien from the context.

Peloponnesian resources. Our position, on the other hand, is, I think, free from the defects I have pointed out in theirs, while it possesses advantages they do not share. Should their land forces invade our territory, our fleets can retaliate upon their shores; and the devastation of a part of the Peloponnese will be a greater loss to them than the devastation of all Attica to us. To compensate themselves with other domains, they must fight for them, whereas we have ample territories, both insular and continental; for it is a great thing to command the sea. Consider: suppose, for argument's sake,¹ we were islanders—can you imagine a position more impregnable? Well, you must act as nearly as possible on that conception. Give up all thought of your estates and country-houses; guard the sea and your capital; and do not, from vexation at your losses, risk a general action with the Peloponnesians, who greatly outnumber you. A victory could only be followed by another battle with foes as numerous; a defeat would involve the loss of our allies, the sinews of our power; they will never remain quiet, if we are unable to march against them. If you mourn, let it be for the loss of fellow-citizens, not for houses and lands: men command them, not they men. Indeed, if I had imagined I could prevail upon you, I would have advised you to sally forth and destroy them with your own hands, and to show the Peloponnesians that regret for *them* will never induce you to submit.

144. Many other considerations inspire me with hopes of success, provided you steadily refrain from territorial aggrandisement in the course of the war, and do not court gratuitous perils; for I am more afraid of our own

¹ See Klotz, *Devar.* vol. ii. p. 235, where this passage is cited as an instance of the use of γάρ, serving,

in a sense equivalent to that of γοῦν, to introduce a demonstration or example, or to give an instance.

mistakes than of our enemies' tactics. These, however, are points which must be reserved for future discussion, in the train of events, as they arise. Let us now dismiss the embassy with the answer, that we will allow the Megarians access to our markets and harbours, if the Lacedæmonians, on their side, forbear to persecute us and our allies with alien acts, there being nothing in the treaty to prevent¹ either of these concessions; that we will recognise the independence of our allies, if they were independent when we signed the Thirty Years' Truce; and if Lacedæmon, on her part, will grant her confederates an independence which satisfies them severally, not an independence convenient only to herself. We must add that we are perfectly ready to submit disputed points to arbitration, according to the treaty; that we will not commence the war, but will retaliate on those who do commence it. Such a reply will meet the justice of the case, and sustain the dignity of our country.

One thing, however, must be clearly understood—war is inevitable: its ready acceptance by us will lessen the pressure of our foes; and it is from the greatest dangers that communities as well as individuals reap their chief glory. It was in this spirit that our forefathers resisted the Mede: they had not our resources to start with; they even abandoned all they possessed; yet, aided by judgment rather than fortune, armed with courage rather than power, they repulsed the barbarian, and raised our fortunes to their present pitch. We must not allow our-

¹ Dionys. Hal. (p. 797, *περὶ τῶν Θουκυδίδου ἰδιωμάτων*) notices the use of *κωλύει* for *κωλύεται*. The meaning of course is, that the Thirty Years' Truce did not interdict either the Spartan Xenelasy or the Athenian prohibition of Megarian access to the

ports and markets of Attica. Pericles, in fact, treats the latter interdict as merely the Athenian form of Xenelasy. It closely resembled the celebrated Berlin decrees of the First Napoleon, levelled against British commerce.

selves to be eclipsed by them ; every effort must be made to defeat the foe, and to bequeath our power unimpaired to our successors.¹

¹ On the termination of this speech, the assembly agreed to give the envoys the answer recommended by Pericles, on the specific points raised by them. On the general question of peace and war, they declared their

willingness to submit the complaints which had been made to arbitration, according to the articles of the Thirty Years' Truce ; expressing, at the same time, their resolution not to submit to dictation.

SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS,

Addressed to the officers of the Peloponnesian army. Bk. II. ch. 11.

INTRODUCTION.

THE declaration of war having been sanctioned by the vote of the allies, the Lacedæmonians, upon whom, as the federal chiefs, all executive measures devolved, issued, immediately after the attempted surprise of Plataea, circular orders for the concentration of the various federal contingents at the Isthmus of Corinth, with a view to the invasion of Attica. When they had assembled, Archidamus addressed the following speech to the commanders and principal officers of the collective force, B.C. 431.

CH. 11. Peloponnesians and allies! Our fathers, it is true, made many expeditions, both within and without the bounds of Peloponnese; and the elderly men among us have seen something of war; but we never took the field with a larger armament than this; and,¹ on the present occasion, we have not only a numerous and highly disciplined force, but we are marching against a very powerful state. We are called upon, therefore, to prove ourselves equal to our fathers, and to maintain the lustre of our own renown. All Greece rises in arms in sympathy with our movement; her eyes are fixed upon us, and, inspired by the general hatred of Athens, she heartily wishes our success.

We must not, however, even if² some of us think that

¹ Poppo takes ἀλλά as equivalent to *at*, which, says Professor Key, signifies addition rather than opposition; and the particle *καί* as equivalent to *etiam*.

² Surely εἴ τῳ καί here is simply *εἰ καὶ τῳ*. The adversative particles are separated, for euphony and emphasis. Mr. Riddell (*Apology of Plato*, p. 168) fancifully takes *καί* by

the superior strength of our invading force makes it almost certain that the enemy will shrink from meeting us in the field—we must not, upon that ground, neglect one single precaution on our march. On the contrary, every officer and every soldier in the several contingents ought to be constantly anticipating some danger for his own department. The fact is, the casualties of war beggar all foresight; and attacks are generally made suddenly and impulsively.¹ It often happens, too, that an inferior force, cautious² through fear, defeats a force whose superior numbers have inspired a contempt of caution. Indeed, in an enemy's country, while we ought always to march in a spirit of confidence, it is quite as essential to prepare for action in a spirit of cautious apprehension: thus we combine the highest courage in attacking with the greatest safety when attacked. In the present case, especially, every precaution is required: we are marching against a state which, so far from being incapable of defence, as³ some will tell you, is so richly provided with all the munitions of war, that we must confidently expect she will meet us in the field. Perhaps, indeed, the Athenians have already left their gates before our arrival; at any rate, they will sally out when they see us on their soil, ravaging and laying waste their property. For when men are exposed to any unusual indignity, its actual infliction before their own eyes causes great exasperation; and, in such cases, the less men think of the consequences, the more passionately they

itself, and construes the clause as follows: 'if anyone considers that we are a numerous force, *as we are.*' The italics are supposed to give the force of *καί*. *Εἰ καί* is a favourite adversative with Thucydides; and *πληθός* is constantly used by him in the relative sense of superiority of

force.

¹ See Poppo (ed. min.) on the sense of *ἀργή* here.

² Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, in reference to the participle *δειδός*, 'Ut Latino "timidus," simul notio "cauens, sibi prospiciens," continetur.'

³ *ὄυτω*. See Poppo, ed. min.

rush into action. The Athenians, above all men, are likely to act on the impulse of such feelings, as they pride themselves on their imperial rule, and boast that it is their province to inflict instead of suffer the havoc of invasion.

Marching then, as you are, against so powerful a state, and destined, according to the issue, to reflect the highest credit ¹ or the deepest shame on your ancestors and yourselves, follow wherever your officers lead, prizing discipline and watchfulness above all things, with a quick ear for the word of command; for it is a point both of honour and safety, to combine unity of discipline with variety of force.

¹ Δόξαν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ εὐκλείας καὶ δυσκλείας.—Scholiast.

FUNERAL ORATION DELIVERED BY PERICLES,

In honour of the Athenian citizens who had fallen on the field of battle in the first summer of the war, B.C. 431. Bk. II. chs. 35-47.

'THE law of Athens,' says Mr. Grote (vol. vi. p. 190), 'not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age.'

CH. 35. Most of the previous speakers on these occasions have commended the statesman who made an oration a part of the funeral ceremony, considering its delivery a fitting tribute to the brave men who have fallen in battle, and are brought here for sepulture.¹ In my opinion, however, it would have been well that the honours due to men who have proved their valour by their deeds in arms should be paid² in deeds rather than in words; such, for instance, as the public celebration of this funeral, instead of staking the reputation of many on one man, so as to make it depend on his speaking well or³ ill. It is⁴ a hard task to hit the mean, when there is a special⁵ difficulty in impressing the audience with a conviction of

¹ As Poppo (ed. maj.) remarks, *ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θαστρομένοις* is a pregnant construction.

² *Καὶ δηλοῦσθαι* (see note ¹, p. 41). *καὶ* is used to compare the two ideas expressed by *ἔργῳ γινομένων, κ.τ.λ.*, and *ἔργῳ δηλοῦσθαι*.

³ Authority for this rendering will be found in Göller's note. Both he and Poppo (ed. min.) take *τε* and *καὶ* in a different sense.

⁴ The connection of the sense is

perhaps best preserved here by omitting the connecting particle *γάρ*, which seems to point to something understood, a link between the two sentences, e.g. 'And the chances are against the speaker.' See note ², p. 43.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) says *καὶ* may refer either to *ἐν ᾧ* or to *μόλις*. I have taken it with the adverb. See note ⁴, p. 75.

the truth of what is told them. An audience favorably disposed and familiar with the subject, naturally thinks the picture feebly drawn, compared with its own wishes and convictions; while persons unacquainted with the facts even suspect exaggeration, their jealousy being aroused, when they hear anything that transcends their own capacity. The fact is, eulogies¹ of other men are tolerable only when² the individuals addressed believe themselves able to achieve some of the feats attributed to others; the moment they are surpassed, they begin to be jealous, and then they disbelieve. However, as this branch of the solemnity has been deliberately approved by our forefathers, I must endeavour, in conforming, like³ my predecessors, to the ordinance, to meet the wishes and sentiments of each of you as nearly as I can.

36. Our ancestors claim my earliest praise; for it is only just, and it is quite in harmony with the present occasion, that a tribute of honourable remembrance should be offered them, whose virtues maintained and handed

¹ Col. Mure (vol. v. p. 170) thus comments on this sentiment: 'Even were this maxim true, it is one with which an orator of so fine a tact as Pericles would surely never have insulted the ears of his fellow-citizens. When reduced to plain language, it amounts to telling them that, so narrow were their minds and envious their tempers, as to disqualify them for appreciating virtue of the highest order. But the doctrine is as untrue as it is invidious. There may, no doubt, be minds so morbidly constituted as to be susceptible of the imputed influence. But of the mass of mankind it may confidently be said that the reverse holds good; that while the public admiration for truly great characters is enhanced by the reflection that they

are placed by their very excellence beyond the reach of envy, few things are more likely to offend a popular assembly than the bestowal of undue praise on ordinary merit.' Sallust does not quite agree with the learned colonel: he thinks the sentiment worth reproducing in his *Bell. Cat.* cap. 3.

² 'Ες ὅσον ἔν και, *lit.* 'just so far as.' Wolf (on *Leptin.* p. 230) and Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. pp. 636-37) show that και serves in relative clauses to emphasise the notion and to connect the ideas more closely. Klotz quotes Thucyd. iv. 1: ἢ μᾶλλον και ἐπετίθειτο, 'and for this very reason they were the more determined to attack them.'

³ Και ἐμέ. See note¹, p. 7.

down to our own days, through a long line of successors, the purity of their race and the integrity of their freedom. But, worthy of eulogy as they are, our fathers are still more so. Not content with maintaining the territory they inherited, they acquired and bequeathed to us of this generation our existing dominion, the fruit of many struggles. That dominion, however, has been largely¹ aggrandised by our own efforts: by the efforts of the men now before you, still, for the most part, in the prime of life: and our country has been richly endowed with all the appliances of perfect independence whether for war or peace. The military achievements of these heroes, whereby the several accessions of territory were won, and the threatened invasions, foreign or Greek, which our fathers or ourselves have bravely repulsed from our shores, I will not now detail, as I have no desire to be prolix before an audience so familiar with our history. I must, however, dwell for a moment on the training which gained us² empire, on the form of government,³ the habits and the principles which raised that empire to greatness, before I proceed with my panegyric, believing the topic at once congenial to the occasion, and suited

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) construes τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοῖ—ἐπηνεξήσαμεν, 'magis vero nos eam eveximus.' He shows that τὰ πλείω in this text, as in bk. i. 13, 5, answers to the Latin 'magis.' See his note (ed. min.) on the apparent contradiction implied by τὰ πλείω and ὅσην ἔχομεν ἀρχήν.

² Poppo (ed. min.) acknowledges ἡλθομεν to be the best reading, though he retains ἡλθον in his text.

³ Col. Mure (*Literature of Ancient Greece*, vol. v. p. 62) remarks that, though Thucydides, 'like every other

great writer of antiquity, was opposed to pure democratic government, yet any charge of partisanship that might be founded on his expressions of favour to the aristocratic principle' (alluding to the well-known passage, bk. viii. 97), 'is effectually neutralised by his unqualified admiration for the character and policy of Pericles, the most distinguished promoter of democratic privileges, and by the elaborate panegyric on the Athenian republic which he places in the mouth of that orator.'

to the whole of my audience, whether Athenians or strangers.

37. The constitution we enjoy is not copied¹ from a foreign code: we are rather a pattern to, than imitators of, other states. It goes by the name of a democracy, because it is administered for the benefit of the many, not of the few. It is so constituted, that, if we look to the laws,² we shall find all Athenians on a footing of perfect equality as to the decision of their private suits; if we look to the popular estimate of political capacity, distinction in the public service will be found to depend on merit, weighed by a man's eminence in his own calling, not on caste.³ Nor again is poverty any exclusion, when a man, however humble his rank, is able to serve his country. A spirit of freedom regulates alike our public and our private life: we tolerate, without a particle of jealousy, varieties in each other's daily pursuits: we are not angry with our neighbour for following the bent of his humour; nor do our faces wear censorious⁴ looks, harmless, perhaps, but odious. In private society, our politeness ensures harmony: in public life, fear is our principal check on illegal acts: we obey the magis-

¹ 'Pericles tacitly contrasts the Athenian with the Spartan polity, which had borrowed so much from Crete, and perhaps other Dorian sources.'—Sheppard and Evans, p. 186.

² In this passage, the opposition lies between *νόμους* and *ἀξίωσιν*, between the legal standard, according to which all Athenians were equal before the law, and the social standard, which was regulated by personal excellence, readily admitting inequalities of rank, when created by inequalities of character and capacity. To an Athenian, of course, social

position implied, to a great extent, political capacity: and the context shows that this is what is meant.

³ Sheppard rightly refers *ἀπὸ μίμωνος* to 'distinctions of birth, such as that assigned to the old Dorian or Heracleid blood at Sparta, to which belonged the *Ὀμοῖοι* or peers.'—*Notes on Thucydides*, p. 187.

⁴ Göller, followed by Arnold, thus interprets *λυπηρὰς ἀχθηρόνας*: 'Puto intelligendas esse has voces de severâ Spartanorum inter se censurâ, quam præcipue seniores in juniores exercebant, quin etiam inter se seniores.'

trates who are from time to time in authority, and the laws, especially those enacted to protect the oppressed, and that unwritten code, whose sanction is a common sense of shame.

38. Abundant recreation, too, to recruit our spirits, when jaded by the cares of business, is supplied by the very¹ festivals which the Dorians ridicule, and the customary solemnities of sacrifice throughout² the year, as well as by the splendour of our private establishments, our daily enjoyment of which scares melancholy away. Owing to the magnitude of our capital, the luxuries of every clime pour themselves into our hands, and it is our good fortune to enjoy the products of other realms as familiarly as the fruits of our own soil.

39. Another remarkable contrast between ourselves and our rivals lies in the difference of our methods of training for war. The following are the salient points. We throw open our gates to all the world; no alien acts³ exclude any of our foes from learning or seeing anything, the revelation⁴ of which may be of any service to them: for we do not trust so much to preconcerted⁵ stratagems as to that courage in action which springs from our own

¹ This allusion is covertly implied by γε, which is often the equivalent of the ironical *scilicet*. Reiske, says Poppo (ed. maj.), is good enough to dispense with this particle, so clearly relevant to the sense.

² Poppo (ed. min.) rejects the alternative rendering of διετησίαι, as meaning 'anniversary,' on the plea that such festivals were by no means peculiar to Athens.

³ See Müller's *Dorians*, vol. ii. p. 4, note; Herm.'s *Pol. Antiq. of Greece*, § 28, 1.

⁴ Bloomfield translates ὁ μὴ κρυφθῆναι 'which, as it is never concealed.' But

this would be ὁ οὐ κρυφθῆναι. In μὴ κρυφθῆναι, μὴ marks conditionality: as Poppo (ed. min.) shows, when he resolves the two words into the equivalent, εἰ μὴ κρυφθῆναι. On the feature of the Lacedæmonian policy here alluded to, see Müller's *Dorians*, vol. ii. p. 240.

⁵ Though I have not followed Mr. Bigg in rendering περισκευαίε και ἀπάται by 'juggling precautions,' I have treated it as a Hendiadys. 'Fraudes bellicæ,' says Poppo (ed. min.), 'a Lacedæmoniis maximi æstimabantur.' He refers to Thucydides (bk. v. 9) in illustration of this.

nature. Again, in education, our rivals set out in pursuit of manly qualities by a laborious course of training commenced in childhood: yet we, though living at our ease, are perfectly ready to encounter dangers quite as great as theirs.¹ An assertion I can prove by facts; when the Lacedæmonians invade our realm, it is never with mere detachments,² but at the head of their collective force. In *our* case, when we march against their territory, it is with Athenian troops only, with whom, though struggling on a foreign soil against men who are fighting for their own hearths, we generally gain an easy victory. In fact, not one of our enemies has ever yet encountered our united force, because we have to provide for our navy as well as our army, and are constantly despatching our native troops on so many expeditions by land. If ever they engage a fraction of our troops, and get the better of a few of us, they pretend to have defeated us all: while, if repulsed, they say they have been defeated by all. And yet³—to revert to what I was just now saying—if we, who live under a luxurious system instead of a toilsome training,⁴ if we, whose courage is the gift of nature, rather than the fruit of discipline, are,⁵ as I hope, just as ready to brave danger: a

¹ Cicero, perhaps, had this passage in view when he wrote the following: 'Neque tamen Lacedæmonii, auctores istius vitæ atque orationis, qui quotidianis epulis in robore accumbunt, neque vero Cretes, quorum nemo gustavit unquam cubans, melius quam Romani homines, qui tempora voluptatis laborisque dispertunt, republicas suas retinuerunt.'—*Pro Mur.* ch. 33.

² Poppo (ed. min.) reads καθ' ἑκάστου, but suspects καθ' ἑαυτούς to be the true reading. Arnold's support of καθ' ἑκάστου seems con-

clusive.

³ The speaker here refers to what he had said above. The intermediate sentences, commencing with the words, 'I can prove the truth of this,' are parenthetical. Quanquam is used by Tacitus (*Germ.* ch. 18), as καίτοι is here, to usher in a reference to a foregoing statement.

⁴ Gölle, Arnold, and Sheppard see in πόνων μελέτη an allusion to the severity of the Spartan training.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) characterises ἰθέλομεν as a modest indicative. It is clear it was the reading of Diony-

double advantage is gained; we do not suffer from the anticipation of impending perils: and, when we meet them, we do not yield in courage to the slaves of a life-long drill.

40. On other grounds, too, I claim admiration for our country. Our fondness for art is free from extravagance, nor do our literary tastes make us effeminate;¹ wealth we use as an opportunity for action, not for ostentatious talk: poverty we think it no disgrace to (avow, though we *do* think it a disgrace² not to try to avoid it by (industry.) Among our countrymen political and social duties are combined in the same men: even our labouring classes³ have a competent knowledge of politics; indeed, we are the only Greeks who regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as one who only minds his own business,⁴ but as a man unfit for any business at all. If we, the people at large, cannot originate measures of policy, we can, at any rate,⁵ judge of

sius, for he criticises it as an incorrect mood. Dr. Arnold follows Bekker in reading *ἰθέλωμεν*, thus cutting a knot he cannot untie.

¹ Throughout this chapter there runs a thread of covert allusion to the habits and institutions of the Spartans, who rejected literary and artistic culture as inconsistent with the training of a nation of soldiers. For Sparta was a camp, not a city. See Manso's *Sparta*, ii. p. 167.

² Poppo (ed. min.) points to bk. viii. ch. 27, where a similar use of the comparative *αἰσχίον* for the English positive occurs. He says the old grammarians ranked this use of *αἰσχίον* for *αἰσχρόν* among the peculiarities of Thucydides. Buettn. (in his *History of the Athenian Clubs*, 'Ἐταιρίαι', p. 46) does not agree with Thucydides that poverty implied no

disparagement at Athens.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) thinks the *θηῆτες*, the lowest class of the Athenian population, meant. On their political influence, see Becker's *Charicles*, p. 155. To the genuine Spartans commerce and mechanical toil, and even agriculture, were interdicted.

⁴ Pericles, says Krüger, here refers to the stock charge of *πολυπραγμοσύνη* brought against the Athenians.

⁵ Γ., as Dr. Arnold shows, emphasises its clause. He compares Aristot. *Eth.* i. 8: *ἐν γέ τι ἢ τὰ πλείοστα κατορθοῖν*, 'to be right at any rate on one point, if not on most.' Mr. Grote forgot this, when he translated the passage, 'we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasonings about them!'

them when proposed: we do not think discussion¹ a prejudice to action, but we do think it a prejudice not to be foretaught by discussion, before entering on the field of action. This leads me to mention another characteristic of ours—the combination of chivalrous daring with the most careful calculation of our plans: whereas, with the rest of the world, daring is but the offspring of ignorance, while reflection leads to hesitation. And surely the palm of magnanimity may well be awarded to those, whom the liveliest appreciation of the hardships of war and the pleasures of peace fails to lure from the perilous path of honour to the charms of ease. Again, in point of beneficence and liberality, we act on principles different from those of the world at large; we gain our friends not by receiving but by conferring benefits. Now benefactors are more constant in their friendship than those whom they oblige: they like to keep the sense of obligation alive by acting kindly to the recipients of their favours; the friendship of the debtor, on the other hand, is clouded by the remembrance that his acknowledgment of the service will be the payment of a debt, not the bestowal of a favour. We, too, are the only people who, without a particle of distrust, aid the distressed, from no sordid calculations of advantage, but in all the confidence of genuine liberality.²

41. In one word, I declare that our capital, at large, is the school of Greece: while, if we look to the citizens, individually, I believe every man among us could prove himself personally qualified, without aid from others, to meet exigencies the most varied, with a versatility the

¹ See Mill, on *Representative Government*, ch. 5. ad fin.

² Sheppard and Evans authorise this version of *ἰλευερίαις*. The usual

translation 'in the open and confiding spirit of conscious freedom,' mars the antithesis between 'liberality' and 'advantage.' See Poppo, ed. min.

most graceful.) That this is no mere rhetorical vaunt of the moment, but the real truth, our political power, the offspring of our national character and the tastes I have described, is itself a sufficient proof. Of all existing states, Athens alone eclipses her prestige, when tested by trial: she alone inspires no mortification in the invading foe, when he thinks by whom he is repulsed: no self-reproach in the subject for submitting to a degrading rule. So far from our supremacy needing attestation, it is written in the clearest characters: it will command the admiration of future ages, as it already does of our own; we want no Homer to sing our praises, nor any other poet whose verse may charm for the moment, while history will mar the conception he raises of our deeds. No! we shall be admired for having forced every sea and every shore to yield access to our courage, and for the imperishable monuments of the evils heaped on foes and the blessings conferred on friends, which we have, by common effort, reared on every soil. Such, then, is the state for which these men, determined not to be robbed¹ of their country, bravely died on the battle-field: and every one of their survivors will be ready, I am sure, to suffer in the same cause.

42. I have dwelt at some length on our national advantages, partly from a wish to convince you that we have a higher stake in the contest than those who cannot rival those advantages, partly to enforce, by the palpable evidence of facts, the justice of the panegyric it is my commission to deliver over our fallen patriots. That commission, indeed, is nearly ful-

¹ Mr. Grote, when he translated these words, 'vindicated her just title to unimpaired rights,' naïvely remarking that 'neither Poppo, Göller,

nor Arnold notice the difficulty,' perhaps forgot the ordinary passive construction of verbs which take a double accusative in the active voice.

filled; for if our country has been the theme of my encomium, it is because she has been graced by the virtues of these heroes and others who resembled them; nor are there many among the Greeks whose reputation can be shown to be so evenly balanced by their actions. But I may still appeal to the closing scene of their lives, as either offering the first indication, or giving the crowning proof, of their manly¹ worth. In the former case, men may fairly be allowed to veil their defects beneath the courage they have shown in their country's cause: they cancel evil by good: their public services outweigh the mischief of their private life. Yet among these men there was not one whom the prospect of a prolonged enjoyment of wealth lured to play the coward: not one whom the hope whispered by poverty, the hope of some day exchanging penury for affluence, tempted to quail before the hour of peril. Considering vengeance on their foes more precious than such prospects, they willingly, in what they thought the noblest of causes, risked² their lives to make sure of their revenge, holding their chances of future enjoyment in reserve. They left hope to provide for the uncertainty of success: but, when engaged in action, face to face with danger, they scorned to trust aught but themselves:³ and, on the field of battle, they chose to fall in resisting the enemy rather than save their lives by surrender. If, indeed, they fled,⁴

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) remarks on the seeming contradiction between *ἀνδρός* and *τῶνδε*. He suspects that *ἀνδρός* is a corruption, but it may, he adds, be taken as equivalent to an epithet—an usage chiefly poetical.

² Μετ' αὐτοῦ· i. e. τοῦ κινδύνου.

³ Σφίσιον αὐτοῖς is generally taken with *πεποιθέναι*, as in my version. Meyer, however, takes the pronouns with *ὀρμμένον*. He construes thus:

'factis autem confidendum esse contentes de eo, quod jam in conspectu ipsis esset.'

⁴ There seems to be a latent sense in *ἔφυγον*, which I have endeavoured to bring out. Col. Mure, however, in his version (vol. v. p. 172) has taken the clause word for word. Surely the passage hardly justifies his assertion that it represents 'the chief happiness of an Athenian citi-

it was only from disgrace to their name: far from flying from the battle field, they bore the brunt of the conflict with their bodies, and, in a moment, at the very crisis of victory, were carried away from a scene, not of terror, but of glory.

43. Such, then, were the principles of these men: principles worthy of their country. You, their surviving countrymen, may perhaps *hope* that your patriotism¹ may be more compatible with personal safety, but you must disclaim to harbour a spirit a whit less daring towards our enemies: looking not to the mere policy of so doing, with the eye of a rhetorician² haranguing you, as familiar with the subject as himself, on the advantages to be reaped by a brave repulse of the foe: but looking to the practical side of the picture, the palpable proofs, daily revealed, of our political greatness—which may well inspire you with a lover's enthusiasm for your country. And when you are impressed with its greatness, remember that it was gained by brave men, by men who were shrewd in counsel, and, in action, sensibly alive to honour: and who, if ever foiled in an attack, never thought of saving themselves, but paid their country the full tribute of their valour,³ nobly lavishing their lives

zen, instead of being centred, as we were just before told, in his love and pride of country, as suddenly found to consist in the possession of riches.' Dionys. Hal. (*περι τῶν Θουκυδίδου ἰδιωμάτων*, § xvi.) complains of the obscurity arising from the excessive condensation of this passage.

¹ It is difficult to render in one word the double sense of *διάνοιαν*, which Thucydides applies to both clauses to strengthen his antithesis. Gottl., cited by Poppo (ed. min.), paraphrases the passage thus: 'Reliquos oportet meliorem fortunam op-

tare.' The sense would be improved by rendering *διάνοιαν* by 'career' in the first clause: but this does violence to the Greek.

² This seems to be the latent meaning, so imperfectly expressed by the bald opposition of *λόγῳ* to *ἔργῳ* here. Thucydides apparently refers in the expression *λόγῳ* to the rhetorical commonplaces on courage, patriotism, &c., which so frequently assailed the Athenian ear.

³ The highly wrought antithetical structure of the original renders the meaning somewhat obscure. Lite-

as a joint-offering to her. Yes, they jointly offered their lives, and were repaid, individually,¹ by that glory that can never die, and by the most honourable of tombs, not that wherein they lie, but that wherein their fame is treasured in everlasting honour, refreshed by every incident, either of action or debate, that stirs its remembrance. For the whole world is the tomb of illustrious men: it is not the mere monumental inscription in their native land that records their valour: no! even in climes that knew them not, an unwritten memorial of them finds a home, not in monuments,² but in the hearts of the brave. Emulate, then, their heroic deeds: and, believing happiness to depend on freedom, and freedom on valour, shrink not, to your own prejudice,³ from the perils of

rally, the passage would construe: 'whenever they chanced to fail in an attempt upon any position, they thought it no reason for robbing their *country* of their valour:' γε emphasises πόλις, and contrasts it with the idea of personal failure.

¹ The metaphor, like that of Demosthenes (*Meidias*, § 27), is founded on the friendly societies, ἱερωνίαι, common at Athens. The members paid their contributions to the general fund: this entitled them to relief in time of poverty: and they repaid the society when they could. Thucydides here regards the state as a friendly society on a large scale, in whose favour the fallen patriots had contributed their lives as a joint-offering [ἱερωνίαι], in common [κοινῆ] with those who had not fallen (see Krüger), though equally exposed to danger. There was, however, a feature of the comparison which suggested one of his favourite antitheses, that of ἰδίαι, as opposed to κοινῆ. He remembered that each individual who fell in battle, had his name and

tribe recorded on the column erected in honour of the fallen (see Dr. Arnold's note). This enabled him to describe the offering of their lives as common to those who did not fall, the reward as personal (ἰδίαι) to those who did fall.

² Col. Mure, in his version of this passage (*Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 172), rather conceitedly justifies his omission of τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου, on the ground that it is only another instance of 'the perpetually recurring contrast between words and deeds.' But surely the contrast lies between the memory of the heart and the memorials of the tomb. He translates it thus: 'For the tomb of illustrious men is the whole earth; nor is the record of their acts to be sought on the graven monuments of their native soil alone, but in the un-inscribed memorials of their fame, spread abroad into distant lands.'

³ Krüger extracts this reflexive significance from the middle περιουρήσθε.

war: for it is not men of broken fortunes,¹ men hopeless of prosperity, of whom we can so fairly expect a generous prodigality of life, as of those who still risk the change from wealth to poverty, and who have most at stake, in the event of a reverse. And surely² disaster, coupled with the stigma of cowardice, is far more grievous to a man of high spirit, than the sudden and painless death that surprises the soldier in the bloom of his strength and patriotic hope.

44. For these reasons, I have to offer consolation rather than condolence to those among the parents of the dead, who are now present. They know that their lot from childhood has been chequered with calamity: and that those may be called fortunate, whose fate, whether in affliction, as theirs, or in death, as their relatives', has been most brilliant: and whose term of life has not been prolonged beyond the term of their happiness.³ Still, I feel how difficult it is to console you: for the successes of others—successes in which you, too, used to rejoice—will constantly⁴ remind you of those whom you have lost; and grief is naturally felt not for blessings of which a man is robbed before he can appreciate them,⁵ but for those which he loses after long habi-

¹ The Scholiast treats this sentiment as a paradox, citing the common opinion which pronounced *τοὺς πένητας καὶ ἀθλίους ῥησικινεῖνους*. A Scholiast (on Eur. *Phœn.* 600) agrees with him in thinking *τοὺς πλουσίους δειλοὺς πρὸς θάνατον, ὡς μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν στερουμένοις*.

² *Γάρ* is not argumentative, but exegetic. Poppo [ed. min.] translates *ἢ μετὰ τοῦ μαλακισθῆναι κάκωσις* 'miseria cum mollitie juncta, seu quam quis ignaviâ contraxerit.' So also Dr. Arnold and Mr. Jowett.

³ Göller compares Soph. *Æd. Col.* 1227, and Herod. i. 30 seqq. More literally, the clause might be rendered, 'whose life has been measured out on a scale commensurate only with their happiness.'

⁴ *Καὶ πολλάκις*. On the use of *καὶ* to emphasise adverbs of intensity, see Riddell's *Apology of Plato*, p. 169.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) gives a very poor reason for adopting Krüger's reading, *πειρισόμενος*, for *πειρισάμενος*.

tuation to them. Those, however, among you, whose age allows them offspring, must comfort themselves with the hope of children yet to come.¹ In private life they will lull their parents into forgetfulness of those who are no more, and our country will reap a twofold advantage: she will not suffer from depopulation, and she will be more secure: for it is impossible to expect fair and just legislation from men who do not share their neighbours' risks by having children as well as property² at stake. Those, on the other hand, who are past their prime, must consider the longer period of their life during which they have been fortunate, as clear gain: the remainder, they must expect, will be short: and they ought to cheer themselves with the fame of their heroic sons. For the love of honours is the only sentiment that is always young:³ and, when men are past the age of active service, it is not gain, as cynics say, but rather respect, which pleases them.

45. As for you, the children or the brothers of the fallen, you will, I am sure, find the task of emulation difficult. Everyone is ready to praise those who are no more: and, even with extraordinary merit, you will find it hard to be pronounced, I will not say equal, but only slightly inferior to them: for envy⁴ will attack a rival's fame, while life remains: and it is only when competition is barred by death that affection will applaud

¹ *Καὶ ἄλλων* literally means 'others besides those they have had.' See note ¹, p. 7.

² *Καὶ παίδας*. *Καί* tacitly compares *παίδας* with another term, not expressed but understood. See the passage quoted from Klotz, note ¹, p. 7.

³ Col. Mure (vol. v. p. 585) censures this sentiment as 'unmeaning.'

The qualification 'only' is of course rhetorical: but surely it is true that generous sentiments, such as 'the love of honour,' opposed as it here is to avarice, ever retain their native purity and freshness.

⁴ Göller gives the meaning of this clause in the following terms: 'invidia est inter vivos erga æmulos.'

without alloy. Perhaps, in deference to those among you who have been plunged into widowhood, I ought to say a word on woman's excellence. A brief recommendation will suffice: it is your glory not to overstep 'the modesty of nature,'¹ and to be in the least possible degree the subject of discussion, either for praise or blame, among men.

46. Honours may be rendered both in words and acts. As to the former, the tribute has been paid in the address which I, like my predecessors,² have delivered, according to the law, to the best of my ability: as to the latter, this public funeral has tendered to our patriots a portion of the honour due to them, and the rest their country will pay, by rearing their children at the public expense from this day till they are of age: thus presenting, in a spirit of the soundest policy, to our fallen³ countrymen and their survivors, an honourable reward for their courage on the battle-field. In a spirit of policy,⁴ I say: for the states that institute the highest prizes for valour, have the bravest men for their citizens. And now, having concluded⁵ the mourning rites due to your several relations, you may go home.

¹ Dr. Arnold's note might have warned Mr. Bigg against construing this passage—'great is the glory for you not to prove worse than the nature of your sex!' Too much stress has been laid upon the words *τῆς ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.*, which no more imply an imputation of unworthiness than the phrase *τῶν πατέρων μὴ χείρους φανῆναι* (ii. 62) does in relation to the other sex. Still, the following clause is an odd sentiment on the lips of Pericles, considering his relation to Aspasia, the character of which is happily sketched by Col. Mure, vol. iv. p. 44.

² *Καὶ ἐμοί.* Krüger thinks that *καὶ* must be explained in the same way as in the phrase *καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπόμεινον* (ch. 35, above). See note ³, p. 64.

³ *Τούσδε*, his, i. e. mortuis, *τοῖς λειπομένοις*, superstitibus.—Dobree.

⁴ Compare Livy (bk. iv. 35): 'Nihil non aggressuros homines, si magna conatibus magna præmia proponuntur.'

⁵ Such, says Sheppard, is the force of *ἀπὸ* in composition: as in Herod. (ii. 40), *ἐπιὰν ἀποτύψονται*, 'when they have finished beating their breasts.'

SPEECH OF PERICLES,

Delivered B.C. 430, before the Athenian popular Assembly. Bk. II. chs. 60-65.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the interval which elapsed between the delivery of the Funeral Oration and this speech, the Athenians had suffered much, from the havoc wrought by the Peloponnesians in their second invasion of Attica, as well as from the pestilence. They had also been irritated by the failure of the expedition under Agnon to reduce Potidæa, and by the rejection of the negotiations for peace which they had opened at Sparta. The philo-Laconian party at Athens had thus been encouraged to denounce the policy of Pericles, who, in the following speech, vindicates his administration of public affairs, and endeavours to reassure the failing resolution of his audience. See Grote, vol. vi. p. 221.

CH. 60. I am not at all surprised at the symptoms of anger you have shown towards me, for I am aware of its cause: and it was for that reason that I convened the assembly, to recall some things to your remembrance, and to remonstrate with you, in case, perhaps, there should be no very good reason either for your displeasure with me, or your capitulation to misfortune. Now, it is my belief that the general¹ prosperity of a country is more beneficial to individuals than private affluence amid political decline. A man whose personal interests are flourishing, is involved, nevertheless, in the ruin of his country: but a failing member of an opulent community has every chance of re-establishing himself. Since, then, a state can retrieve the disasters of her citizens, while

¹ Compare Livy, xxvi. 36: 'Res publica incolumis et privatæ res facile salvas præbet; publica pro-
dendo tua nequicquam serves.'

those citizens cannot retrieve her fall, how can it fail to be the duty of all to support her, instead of abandoning the care of the public welfare, in the panic of domestic misfortune, as is now the case with you, whose censure of my policy in advising war involves yourselves as consentients to it? You voted for war; yet you are angry with me, a man who hold myself second to none in judging of the course to be pursued, and in clearly stating my views: ¹ a lover, too, of my country, and proof against corruption. Qualities all indispensable in a statesman: for a man who knows what measures to adopt, but cannot elucidate his policy, is as useless as if he had never conceived it: while, if he combines these requisites with disloyalty to his country, the counsel he offers is not likely to be very congenial to her interests. Again, if he is well-affected, but is accessible to bribes, all his other qualifications would be cancelled ² by this single failing. If, therefore, you agreed to go to war, on the supposition that I had a larger share of these qualities than other men, though only to a moderate extent, it cannot be fair that I should now be saddled with an imputation—at any rate, not with the imputation of wronging you.

61. When ³ the option of peace or war is offered to a people, satisfied with their lot in every point but the one at issue, it is, I admit, pure folly to choose war: but, supposing there is no alternative between either giving way at once and submitting to a foreign power, or saving

¹ Thucydides (viii. 86) attributes the same combination of wisdom and eloquence to Antiphon. Poppo (ed. min.) cites several other passages of classic authors, in which the union of these qualities is specially eulogised; e.g. Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 52; Horace, *Epist.* i. 4, 9; Lysias, *Epit.* p. 105.

² Literally, 'would be bartered

for this one consideration.'

³ 'The connection' [represented by the particles *καὶ γάρ*] 'is, I am innocent, for circumstances forced us into war' (Krüger). In English, the connection may sometimes be best expressed by omitting the connecting particle. On this use of *γάρ*, see note ⁴, p. 63.

freedom by battle and danger, censure then belongs rather to those who shirk than those who face the danger. *My* views are unchanged, and I do not swerve from my opinion; but *yours* are changed: for, as it has chanced, you agreed with me when scathless and now repent when damaged: and thus my counsel, owing to your weakness of resolution, fails to approve itself, because present annoyances come home to the feelings of all of you, while the advantages of my policy are as yet too distant to be realised by any of you. A great reverse, and that on a sudden, has fallen upon you, and your spirits are too depressed to persevere in the course you decreed. Sudden and unlooked-for calamity—everything, in fact, that completely defeats expectation—has a tendency to enslave the mind; and it has been your fate to encounter many such disasters, especially in the case of the pestilence. Still, you are bound in honour, as members of a powerful state, educated in tastes worthy of her, to make a gallant stand against even the most trying reverses, instead of suffering your glory to fade: for society claims as good a title to censure the man whom despondency¹ robs of half the credit he has won, as to hate the man whose impudence arrogates a reputation not his own. Yes! you must cease to mourn for personal losses, and cling to the defence of the common weal.

62. As to the hardships incidental to the war, I might, to prevent your thinking them likely to prove very severe, and, after all, to lead to no happy issue, simply² content myself with the proofs I have on other

¹ *Μαλακία* can hardly mean 'cowardice' here: Pericles only reproaches his countrymen with yielding to dejection.

² *Καὶ ἐκεῖνα*. *Καὶ* emphasises *ἐκεῖνα*, and calls attention to it, as in the passages cited by Klotz, *Devar.* vol. ii. pp. 634, 636.

occasions, ere now,¹ often enough given you, that you have no right to look forward to them with anxious distrust. I will, however, mention another point, a powerful instrument of empire, your possession of which seems never to have crossed your thoughts: in my previous speeches I never referred to it, nor should I have done so now, as it has rather a pretentious air,² had I not seen that you were stricken by an unreasonable panic. The fact is,³ you think your empire limited to your allies: but I assure you that, of the two elements⁴ of the world that are open fields for action, land and sea, you are the absolute masters of the whole of one, to the utmost verge of your present dominions, and as far beyond as you choose to sail.⁵ With your naval armament, no earthly power can check you at sea: neither

¹ Δῆ is often coupled with πολλάκις, in the sense of ἤδη, as Klotz (vol. ii. p. 398) shows; e. g. Xen. (*Cyrop.* ii. 4, 16), where for πολλάκις δῆ Muretus wrongly proposes πολλάκις ἤδη.

² A most ridiculous version of this expression, κομπωδιστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποιήσιν, has been given by Dean Smith in his translation of Thucydides. He construes thus: 'Nor should I meddle even now with a point, pompous beyond poetic visions, did I not see you beyond measure fearful and dejected.' In a note he assures us that his first attempts at rendering this 'stupendous' phrase 'were very faint and imperfect,' as he was convinced by showing them to Lord Chatham, his allusion to whom may perhaps have originated the silly statement in Mr. Rogers' *Table Talk*, that Lord C. was the writer of the version of the Funeral Speech in Dr. Smith's translation.

³ Γάρ. See Dr. Donaldson's *Greek Grammar*, p. 605.

⁴ Similarly Virgil calls the sea 'pars altera rerum' (*Æn.* ix. 131). In the phrase δύο μερῶν the article τῶν is omitted, because τὰ δύο μέρη is used idiomatically in another sense, as equivalent to the English 'two-thirds' (Poppo, ed. min.).

⁵ Müller (*Literature of Greece*, p. 484), speaking of this recommendation to the Athenians to rest their hopes on their maritime supremacy, says: 'This reasoning is obviously correct in reference to the policy of a state which, like Athens, was desirous of founding its power on the sovereignty of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but states which, like Macedon and Rome, strengthened themselves by a conquest of inland nations and great masses of the continent before they proceeded to contest the sovereignty of the coasts of the Mediterranean, had γῆ καὶ σώματα for the basis of their power, and the χεῖματα καὶ ναυτικὸν afterwards accrued to them naturally.'

the king of Persia, nor, apart from him, any nation that exists. Your maritime strength, therefore, is far from being simply on a level with the benefits accruing from house and land, the loss of which you think a great hardship, nor is it reasonable that you should mourn for them: you should regard them as mere ornaments and embellishments, the natural appanage of wealth, holding them cheap in comparison with your naval supremacy. And you may rest assured that, if by vigorous effort we can through all perils save our freedom, she will easily retrieve our losses: but—once bow to foreign dictation, and even our oldest¹ possessions will be prone to wane. Prove, then, that you have not degenerated, either in gaining or bequeathing empire, from your fathers, who, instead of inheriting from their sires the dominion which, in its full integrity, they handed down to us, acquired it amid the toils of war; and remember that it is more disgraceful to lose what one has than to fail in acquisition. We ought at once to close with the enemy in a spirit not merely of pride but of disdain: mere pride may be found in any coward, when it is simply the offspring of prosperous ignorance: but a dignified disdain belongs to those who rely not merely² on fortune but on their intellectual pre-eminence over their foes: a quality you may fairly claim. Enterprise,³ too, when fortune is impartial, gains a surer warrant from the self-confidence of intellect: which, placing little reliance on hope, that crutch of helplessness, trusts chiefly to a judgment

¹ Krüger's reading, *προκεκτημένα*, affords the best sense.

² *Καὶ γνώμη*. On *καὶ* see note¹, p. 7. *Καὶ* tacitly refers to another ground of reliance, besides *γνώμη*, present to the speaker's mind, but not expressed. So in *καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας*, above, *καὶ* silently refers to other

sources of pride, and gives prominence to this one.

³ Krüger thus translates this passage: 'Atque audaciam in pari fortunâ firmiorem reddit prudentia, si subest elatus animus (i. e. illa, de quâ dictum est, hostium contemptio).'

based on the conditions of each case: a faculty which has surer grounds for prescience.

63. You are called upon to maintain the imperial dignity of your country, in which you all take pride, and to accept the troubles on pain of resigning the glory of dominion. Nor must you think yourselves contending for the single stake of independence instead of vassalage: you have more to apprehend—the loss of your empire, and the dangers arising from the hatred you have provoked by your system of government. That empire you have no longer even the option of renouncing: and this I say lest any one,¹ in his present alarm, should think to sit at home and play the honest man by² abdicating our supremacy: for you have long been holding your dominion as an usurpation: a tenure which may shock one's notions of justice, but which it is highly dangerous to resign. Politicians such as I allude to, advocates of peace at any price, whether³ members of a state where they can influence others, or living independently, as in colonies, under their own auspices, would soon be the ruin of their country. The truth is, men of peace are not safe unless flanked⁴ by men of action: their principles do not suit imperial states, but only dependencies, where they tend to make subjection safe.

64. But I trust you will not be led away by the views of these politicians, nor—especially after willingly seconding my vote for war—persist⁵ in your anger with me, even

¹ Pericles here alludes to the Philo-Laconian party, opposed to his policy: the representatives of those who wished for peace at any price.

² Literally, 'by such renunciation:' for, as Krüger shows, *τόδε*, if genuine, must be a cognate accusative depending on *ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι*.

³ *Ἐρέρους τε πείσαντες*, the common reading, received by Poppo (ed.

min.), seems far preferable to Göller's *ἐρέρους ποτὶ πείσαντες*, quoted from a single MS.

⁴ The term *τεταγμένον μετὰ* contains a military metaphor. Col. Mure points out the curious use, in *τὸ ἀπραγμον* and *τὸ δραστήριον*, of the abstract for the concrete.

⁵ Such, perhaps, is the force of the present *ἔχετε*.

if the enemy's invasion has done all the mischief that was to be expected on your refusal to abate your pretensions: if, too, beyond what we looked for, we have had a crowning disaster in the recent pestilence, literally the only incident that has cheated all expectation. It has, I know, essentially¹ contributed to increase the dislike still felt for me, and which is not quite just, unless, by way of compensation,² you agree to give me the credit of any unexpected success. We must bear calamities that come from above with resignation,³ calamities that come from the enemy with courage: and your conduct should form no exception to that enduring fortitude of temper which has ever been a characteristic trait of your countrymen. Be assured that your country enjoys the highest credit throughout the world for the impregnable front she presents to disaster, and for her generous expenditure of life and labour in war; and that she is the mistress of, confessedly, the greatest empire Greece has yet seen, the memory of which will remain⁴ an imperishable legacy to our posterity, even should we now at last give way a little—and, if we do, it is only in Nature's course, wherein all things wane as⁵ well as flourish. Yes, we shall be remembered as the Greeks who ruled by far the greatest number of Greeks, who in the most important wars held out against the collective force of Greece as well as against her several states, and whose capital was a grand and populous⁶ city, richly provided with every resource. Distinctions like these, if disparaged by the

¹ Compare the sense of *μέρει τινί*, 'a considerable portion,' in Thucyd. i. 1, 2.

² *Καί*.

³ Literally, 'as unavoidable.'

⁴ See Matthiæ's *Greek Grammar*, § 498.

⁵ On this idiomatic use of *καί*, see note ¹, p. 7.

⁶ Poppo (ed. min.) says, in explanation of *μεγίστην* 'Non solum ad ambitum et domorum multitudinem, sed etiam ad incolarum frequentiam respicitur.'

man of peace, will yet¹ excite the zealous² emulation of the man of action, and the envy of communities who have no pretensions to them. Unpopularity and dislike are the proverbial³ fate, for the time, of all who presume to rule over kindred states; still there is no impolicy in seizing, for the most exalted⁴ objects, that invidious supremacy: for unpopularity is not longlived, while the splendour of actual power, and its legacy of glory are treasured in unfading remembrance. It is for you, by coming to a decision honourable in its future, creditable in its present, issues, to command both these advantages, by prompt and zealous exertion. Make no further overtures to the Lacedæmonians, and do not let them see that you are weighed down by present afflictions: for, whether in states or among private citizens, power is the heritage of those who confront disaster with the least depression of spirit, and the most vigorous resistance in action.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) ingeniously remarks that the adversative force of *καίτοι* belongs to the second clause, *ὁ δὲ δρᾶν τι βουλόμενος, κ.τ.λ.*

² *Αὐτός.* Others explain *καὶ αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.*, to mean—‘will emulate them as much as I do.’

³ *Δίη.* See Madvig’s *Greek Syntax*, § 234.

⁴ Dr. Arnold compares the well-known lines of Euripides (*Phæn.* 524), said to have been ever on the lips of the first Cæsar:

Εἶπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χροί, τυραννίδοι
 πέρι
 Κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τᾶλλα δ’ εὐσεβεῖν
 χρεών.

SPEECH ADDRESSED BY THE PELOPONNESIAN
COMMANDERS

To the soldiers and sailors on board the Peloponnesian fleet in the gulf of Corinth,
B.C. 429. · Bk. II. ch. 87.

INTRODUCTION.

A PELOPONNESIAN fleet, sailing from Corinth to assist the military operations going on in Acarnania, and consisting of forty-seven triremes, with a body of troops on board, and accompanied by store vessels, had been completely defeated by a small Athenian squadron of twenty ships under the command of Phormio, B.C. 429.

The Lacedæmonians, upon this, reinforced their fleet till it amounted to seventy-seven sail; Phormio, meanwhile, urged the Athenians to increase his force: they despatched twenty ships, which, instead of steering direct for the Corinthian gulf, made an ill-fated diversion against a coast town of Crete, where they were detained by adverse winds, and reached the scene of action too late for the battle. The Lacedæmonian Admiral, Cnemus, manœuvred to bring on the engagement near the shore (upon which a body of troops had been drawn up to support his operations), with the view of neutralising the advantage which the Athenians derived from their superior nautical skill. Phormio, on the other hand, endeavoured to lure the enemy into the open water: and to delay the battle till the arrival of his reinforcements. The Peloponnesians, however, succeeded in forcing the Athenian fleet to action: when the Lacedæmonian Admirals, conscious that great discouragement prevailed among their men, who were as much afraid of their opponents at sea as the French sailors were of the English in the wars of the First Napoleon, hastened to reassure them in the following address, in which they remind their troops and seamen of the great advantage with which they are entering upon the action, pointing out that the loss of the late battle had been due solely to mismanagement and imprudence not likely to be repeated in the impending conflict

CH. 87. It is possible, Peloponnesians, that the recent naval engagement may lead you to fear the impending action: but it affords no just grounds for real alarm. Our preparations, as you know, were insufficient: and we were sailing to convoy a land force rather than to fight an action at sea. Besides, not a few of the accidents of fortune conspired to oppose us: perhaps, too, inexperience contributed a little to mar our first naval battle. It was therefore no cowardice of ours that robbed¹ us of victory: nor is it reasonable that our courage, which has not been crushed by a decisive defeat, but still breathes a tone of defiance,² should be blunted by the result of a mere³ accident. We should reflect that, though we are all liable to overthrow from casualties, those only whose spirit is ever the same, have a right to the title of brave men: nor can we believe⁴ that they, while their courage remains, will ever make inexperience a plausible excuse for misconduct on any occasion. You, however, are not so inferior to the enemy even in experience as you are superior to him in daring. Athenian science, your chief cause of alarm, will, no doubt, it seconded by courage, command the presence of mind needful to accomplish in the midst of danger the manœuvres it has learnt: but, without gallantry,⁵ no degree

¹ I have followed Göller and Arnold in retaining the old reading, *προσιγένετο*.

² *Ἀντιλογία* may be taken in a forensic sense: it will then mean 'which has still some plea to offer,' i. e. some explanation of the late defeat. So Poppo (ed. min.) takes it.

³ *Τῆς γε ξυμφορᾶς* is the reading of Bekker and Poppo (ed. min.). Göller omits the significant *γε*, without giving any reason.

⁴ We must, with Poppo (ed. min.)

and Göller, repeat *νομίσαι* after *καί μί*.

⁵ The speaker cunningly assumes the absence of courage in the Athenians. Mr. Sheppard remarks: 'This is a sort of fallacy not uncommon in practice, though not noticed in rhetorical treatises, where the speaker covertly implies the incompatibility of two qualities, and argues from the presence of the one the absence of the other.'—*Notes on Thucydides*, p. 253.

of skill avails when face to face with peril: for terror scares away presence of mind, and science apart from prowess is useless. Set then your superior daring against their superior skill, and your want of preparation in the recent conflict against the alarm inspired by your defeat. You have the advantage in the greater number of your ships, and in fighting close to the shore,¹ and that a friendly one, with heavy infantry at hand: Victory, too, generally declares for the more numerous and better equipped force. So that there is literally not a single ground upon which we can build the probability of our failure: in fact, the very errors of our recent seafight will add² to our stock of experience, and teach us a valuable lesson. Let all of you, then, each in his own sphere, whether steersmen or sailors, obey your admiral, and do not, without³ orders, leave the posts severally assigned to you. We shall certainly *not* prepare the attack in a style *inferior* to that of your late commanders, and we will allow no one any excuse for showing the white feather. If, however, any one *should* choose to do so, he shall be visited with the punishment⁴ he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with the rewards that are the meed of valour.

¹ This was a great object with the Peloponnesians, owing to their inferiority in nautical tactics. In the ensuing conflict, we find they manœuvred so as to pin Phormio's fleet as close to the opposite shore as possible, giving the Athenians no room for naval evolutions.

² I cannot help thinking that *προσγεγόμενα* would yield a better sense, if taken as follows: 'our very errors, etc., will prove our best friends by the lesson they will teach us.' But none of the commentators

authorise this sense of *προσγεγόμενα*.

³ Such, I suppose, is the force of *πρό* in *προλείποντας*.

⁴ Mr. Grote (vol. vi. p. 275) remarks that 'this topic was rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and conspicuously demonstrates the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to the fight again chiefly by the ascendancy and strenuous commands of Sparta.'

SPEECH OF PHORMIO,

The Athenian Admiral, to his men, delivered on the same occasion as the preceding address. Bk. II. ch. 89.

CH. 89. Soldiers! I called you together because I saw that you were terrified by the superior numbers of the enemy, and I could not brook that you should be scared by imaginary dangers. I say imaginary, because,¹ in the first place, if the Peloponnesians, instead of meeting us on equal terms, have provided themselves with a fleet largely outnumbering ours, it is simply owing to the panic of their recent defeat, and to their consciousness of inferior skill. In the next place, their chief ground of reliance in attacking us—the assumption that courage is their special prerogative—is built solely on the career of success which has rewarded their long experience in land service, which² they think will yield them the same fruits in naval warfare as on shore.³ Even admitting, however, that they have a better title to expect success on land, we have a better right to expect success at sea: for in natural courage they have certainly no advantage over us: and, whether in their case or ours, daring rises or

¹ Γάρ refers to a clause conceived in the speaker's mind, intended to be mentally supplied by the quick apprehension of his audience. See Hartung, *Partic.* vol. i. p. 465.

² I have followed Gail, Sheppard and Evans, and others, in making ἡ ἐν τῷ πεζῷ ἐμπειρία the subject of ποιήσειν. Arnold and Göller make ἡ μάλιστα πιστ. προσέρχονται, the subject of this infinitive. Poppo (ed.

min.) leaves the question open. The next clause, taken literally, would construe thus: 'But this,' i.e. success, 'will, we have a right to expect, be more likely to redound to us now,' i.e. on our own element, the sea: 'admitting that it might be as likely to belong to them on land.' Μᾶλλον belongs to both clauses.

³ Καί. See note ¹, p. 7.

falls in proportion to experience. Besides,¹ they are fighting under compulsion: for most of the allies of whose confederacy Lacedæmon is the chief, are dragged into danger by her against their inclination, to maintain² her military glory: otherwise they would never have ventured,³ after a crushing defeat, to fight another battle at sea. Fear not, therefore,⁴ any extraordinary valour on their part. *You*, at this moment, are causing *them* an infinitely greater and a better-founded alarm, both on the score of your recent victory, and because they do not believe we should fight them unless determined to achieve something worthy of the signal triumph we lately gained. For, while an enemy,⁵ when superior in numbers, as the Peloponnesians now are, generally relies more upon his material than his moral resources on going into action; those, on the other hand, whose forces are numerically very inferior, and who are not fighting under compulsion, must have a very sure pledge in their own courage

¹ Τε ushers in the third reason: the first is introduced by *ἐπεὶ*, above.

² Δεῖ, says Poppo (ed. min.), is equivalent to *ἐνεκα*, as in Thucyd. iv. 102.

³ See note ⁴, p. 88.

⁴ Δὴ refers to the three reasons previously adduced. See Klotz, *De var.* vol. ii. pp. 396-97.

⁵ Arnold's strange misconstruction of this passage entirely vitiates the opposition, which lies between *πλείους* and *ἐκ πολλῶν ὑποδεστέρων*, not between *ἀντίπαλοι* and *ἐκ π. ὑπ.* Poppo (ed. min.) has disproved Krüger's assertion that *ἀντίπαλοι* never means 'adversaries' in Thucydides; the Scholiast and Hesychius are both in favour of that sense; and it is astonishing that Dr. Arnold should not have seen that *ἀντίπαλοι*, in the sense he ascribes to it, that of 'fairly

matched,' cannot apply to the Peloponnesians, who had a vast superiority of force. It may possibly be said that the sense adopted in this translation would have required *ἀντίπαλοι μὲν γάρ, πλείους, ἢ πλείους ὄντες*. Thucydides, however, is not to be judged by the canons applicable to the finished Greek of Demosthenes or Plato. He began the sentence with the word *ἀντίπαλοι*, and then remembered that it required a limiting epithet, whereupon he appended *οἱ πλείους*. 'Adversaries—I mean, when they have a numerical superiority of force' (*οἱ πλείους*). Mr. Bigg's translation is a decided improvement on Arnold's: but it forces us to take *ὅτι περ οὗτοι* after *πίσυννοι*, instead of, in the natural order of the words, after *οἱ πλείους*.

when they dare to encounter the foe. The Peloponnesians are sensible of this, and are more alarmed by our unexpected audacity than they would have been by an armament proportioned to their own. Remember, too, that many armies have ere now fallen before inferior forces from ignorance of war, sometimes even from want of courage: defects in which we¹ have at present no share.

If I can help it, I shall not bring on the action inside the Gulf, nor shall I even enter it: being aware that want of sea-room is a disadvantage to a small squadron of fast sailers, manned by able seamen, when they have to contend against a large fleet manned by inexperienced hands. Unless the enemy can be seen some way off, a ship cannot bear down with sufficient impulse for a charge, nor can she so easily retire at the crisis of distress: besides, there is no room to break the enemy's line and wheel back²—and these are just the capabilities of the faster sailers. Under such conditions, a naval engagement would of necessity degenerate into a land-fight: and then victory would fall to the larger squadron.

On these points, you may be sure, I will take every precaution in my power; it is for you to await the conflict in perfect order near³ your ships: listening with quick ears for the word of command, especially as the enemy's post of observation is so near. During the engagement, remember that discipline and silence, points conducive to success in all the operations of war, but

¹ Ἡμεῖς is emphatic; it insinuates against the Peloponnesians the charge it disclaims for the Athenians.

² The terms *δέκπλους* and *ἀναστροπή* describe the manœuvre common to Athenian naval tactics: that of sailing through the enemy's line, and then wheeling back, so as to

break off the oars of the opposing vessels. See Thucyd. i. 49: vii. 36, 70.

³ 'While the ships lay at anchor, the greater part of the crews would be on shore to cook their food, etc.'—Bigg, p. 293.

especially in actions at sea—are of the utmost moment : and repel the enemy with a spirit worthy of your former triumphs. The struggle is a critical one for you, as its issue must either ruin all the hopes the Peloponnesians found on their fleet, or bring closer home to the Athenians the anxiety they feel for the command of the sea. Again, I remind you, that you have already vanquished most of these men : and I need not tell you that troops who have once been defeated are not likely¹ to face the same dangers with equal courage.

¹ Col. Mure (*Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 588) quotes this passage as 'a quaint kind of prosopopœia,' adding that, 'had Thucydides described "the minds of men who have lately suffered defeat as less bold in again facing the same danger," his language would have been within the

limits of familiar usage.' Surely he might have learnt from Poppo's note that *ἰθὺλοῦσιν* need not be construed 'are willing,' as he has rendered it; that commentator remarks, '*ἰθὺλοῦσιν* valet *solent*, ut apud alios.' He might have compared the parallel use of 'amo' by Horace.

SPEECH OF THE ENVOYS OF MYTILENE,

Addressed to the Spartans, and other members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, at the Olympic festival, in June, B.C. 428. Bk. III. chs. 9-15.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS speech was delivered on the occasion of the revolt of Mytilene, one of the most powerful members of the Athenian league, in the summer of the year B.C. 428. She took the opportunity of a period of depression at Athens, to throw off her connection with that city as the head of the confederacy. The Athenians, on receipt of the news, despatched a squadron too small to blockade both the harbours of Mytilene, which was thus enabled to send an embassy to Sparta to implore aid. The Spartans requested the envoys to attend the Olympic festival, then on the point of celebration, where they would have an opportunity of laying their case before the various members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, whom they addressed in the following speech.

CH. 9. Lacedæmonians and allies, we are all familiar with the political feeling prevalent in Greece. States which receive seceders, who, in time of war, desert their former alliance, are kindly disposed towards them in proportion to the advantages they reap, but think less favourably of them if they believe them to be traitors to their former friends. Such an estimate is not unfair, supposing the seceders and those from whom they secede to entertain the same political views,¹ to be kindly affected to one another, and fairly matched in material resources and power : supposing, also, that no reasonable ground can be shown for the secession. Such, however, was not the character of our relation to the Athenians.

¹ At this period of the Peloponnesian war, identity of political opinions was a surer ground of alliance between states than identity of race.

And no one should think the worse of us, if, after being treated with honour by them in time of peace, we revolt from them in the hour of danger.

10. We have spoken thus, because it was needful for us, especially as suitors for alliance, to base our arguments, on the threshold of our address, on the justice of our cause and the honesty of our intentions: convinced, as we are, that there can be no stability either in private friendships or in international leagues, unless the connection is formed in the belief of mutual honesty of purpose, and is strengthened by a general congeniality of tastes. For differences of action are grounded on differences of opinion.

The alliance¹ between ourselves and the Athenians was originally formed, when, after the Persian invasion, you retired from the scene, and they stayed with us to carry out the remaining operations of the war. That alliance, we must remind you, was not made with a view to the enslavement of Greece by the Athenians,² but to emancipate her from the Mede. Well: as long as they led the confederacy on terms of equality, we heartily followed them; but when we perceived that they were relaxing their hostility to the Mede, and urging³ on the enslavement of their allies, we were no longer free from apprehension. The allies, disabled, by the want of unanimity, from combining together for mutual defence, were reduced to submission, with the exception of ourselves and the Chians; and we, professedly independent⁴

¹ See Poppo, ed. min.

² This construction of Ἀθηναίοις and Ἕλλησι suits the sense better than that adopted by Arnold and Poppo: the latter of whom (ed. min.) writes as if unaware that these two datives may be *dativī commodī* after *καταδούλωσις* and *ἰλευθήρωσις*.

³ Bekker's conjecture, *ἑπειγομένους*, approved by Poppo (ed. min.), gives a better sense than *ἑπαγομένους*. Ἐπείγομαι is used transitively by Thucydides in the 2nd chapter of this book.

⁴ 'Lesbos, like Chios, was the ally of Athens upon an equal footing, still

and nominally free, marched under the banner of Athens. Judging, however, by the events going on before our eyes, we no longer felt confidence in the Athenians as leaders: for it was not reasonable to expect that, after they had subjugated those whom they had enrolled as allies with ourselves, they would refrain from applying the same process to their remaining confederates, if ever they chanced to have the power to do so.

11. If, indeed, we were still all of us independent, we should have felt more confidence that they meditated no change towards us; but now that they hold the majority in subjection, and are on terms of equality with us, it is natural they should feel impatient: especially¹ when they contrast our solitary attitude of equality with the achieved reduction of most of their allies: and, still more, when they find their own dominion as steadily increasing as our isolation. The truth is, the balance² of power is the only thing you can rely upon to maintain a confederacy: for the party who meditates a violation of the covenant, is deterred by his inability to command a vantage ground of attack.

To resume: we were allowed to remain independent, simply because the Athenian schemes of aggrandisement seemed more likely to be realised by plausible diplomacy, and by the stealthy approaches of policy than by the

remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mytilene paid no tribute to Athens; it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without reference to Athens.—Grote, vol. vi. p. 300. He adds that its chief obligation was

that of furnishing a certain quota of armed ships in case of war.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) remarks on *καὶ πρὸς τὸ, κ.τ.λ.*, 'Molestum καὶ Göll. interpretatur *insuper*; quod reprehendens Krohl. (*Quæst. Thuc. i. p. 3*), vult esse *adeo*, Dobr. expungi jubet.' The sense assigned by Göller seems relevant to the context.

² Comp. Tacitus, *Germ. cap. i.*: 'Germania a Sarmatis Dacisque multo metu separatur.'

open approaches of force. On the one hand,¹ our position testified in their favour, that *we*, whose votes in federal councils weighed evenly with theirs, would not be likely to join their expeditions against our consent, which we should not give,² unless the parties they attacked were in the wrong. Policy also taught them to commence operations by gathering under their banners their strongest³ confederates, and using them to pull down the weaker ones: with the view of rendering the former, if reserved for their last victims, comparatively helpless, like trees stripped of their branches, when they came to deal with them. Had they, on the contrary, begun by attacking us, while all the allies still retained their own strength as well as a rallying point, they would not have found it so easy to subdue them. They were also rather alarmed at the prospect of eventual danger to themselves, in the contingency of our fleets either uniting together, or joining your or some other flag. We also partially owed our safety to the court we paid their popular assembly, and the political chiefs of the day. However, judging by their conduct towards the rest of their allies, we did not believe we could have preserved our independence, at any rate for any length of time, had not this war broken out.

12. Was this, then, a friendship,⁴ or an independence,

¹ The speaker here proceeds to assign four reasons why it was the policy of Athens to mask her intended attack on the independence of Mytilene, and to reserve her for a last victim. Poppo (ed. min.) regards the statement that the Mytileneans were *ισόψηφοι*, as a rhetorical hyperbole. See Thucyd. i. 97.

² The sense requires the insertion of a clause after *ἀκούσας*, as Poppo (ed. min.) shows. See Arnold's note:

and compare the similar passage in bk. i. ch. 40, *εἰ σωφρονούσι, κ.τ.λ.* The meaning, of course, is, that the Athenians tried to derive a moral sanction of their encroachments on their allies from the complicity of Mytilene.

³ Such as the Chians, Samians, and Mytileneans.—Haack.

⁴ I have adopted the version preferred by Dindorf, Poppo (ed. min.), and Göller—*ἡ γιλία ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστή.*

on which we could rely? a state of things in which we were receiving each other with affected regard: in which they, from fear, paid us court in time of war, and we, from fear, paid them court in time of peace: and, while in other cases confidence is secured by love, in our case confidence was secured by fear. Our alliance, indeed, was cemented by terror rather than by amity: and, whichever party was first encouraged by a sense of security, was also sure to be the first to violate his engagements. So that if anyone, on the ground that they only *threatened* the calamities apprehended by us, thinks us in the wrong for commencing the separation ourselves, instead of waiting to see with our own eyes whether we should actually suffer any of those calamities: he has no just grounds for his censure. For, if we had been as able to wait our time in our plots against them as they in nursing their designs against us, how could we then be at their mercy as we are? And as they had at all times the option of attacking us, we had a corresponding¹ right to forestall their attack.

13. Such, then, Lacedæmonians and allies, were the grounds and reasons for our revolt: reasons clear enough to satisfy all who hear them that we were justified in seceding: and sufficient to fill us with alarm, and induce us to turn to some alliance for our shelter: a step we were anxious to take long ago, when, still at peace, we sent envoys to sound you on the subject of our defection from Athens, but were checked by your rejection of our overtures. The moment, however, that Bœotia invited our revolt, we at once obeyed: and we thought that in withdrawing our allegiance, we should be withdrawing from two evils:² from joining Athens in the oppression

¹ *Kai*.

² A literal translation of this passage would be a mere pun. Bloomfield translates it: 'Conceiving that

of Greece, instead of aiding you to emancipate her; and from the danger of our being eventually ruined by the Athenians, instead of our ruining them, as we mean to do. However, our revolt was precipitate and unprepared: and for that very reason it is the more incumbent upon you to accept our alliance and speedily send us aid: and you will then stand forth to the world as, in one and the same act, the champions of a righteous cause, and the agents of disaster to your foes. Besides, you never had such an opportunity before. The Athenians have been pulled down by the pestilence, and by heavy expenditure: their ships are engaged partly in cruising off your coasts, partly in blockading us: it is therefore improbable they will have any naval reserve for defence, if, during this summer, you make a second and simultaneous attack upon them by sea and land; on the contrary, they will either offer no resistance when your fleet approaches, or else they must recall their squadrons from your coasts as well as ours.

None of you should fancy he will be encountering a home danger for a foreign land; for if Lesbos strikes anyone as locally remote, the service she can render him, politically, will be very near: since the war will not be decided in Attica, as some may think, but in the country which supports the strength of Attica. The Athenians derive their revenue from their allies; large as it is, it will be increased, if they succeed in reducing us: no other confederate will then revolt, and all our resources will be added to theirs; and we shall probably suffer a harder fate than those who were slaves before they¹

thereby we made a double secession, one from the Greeks, not to maltreat them with the Athenians, but to assist in freeing them; the other

from the Athenians, so as not to be ourselves at last destroyed by them, but to be beforehand with them.'

¹ Because the Mytileneans had

revolted. If, on the other hand, you heartily succour us, you will at once be rewarded by the accession of a state possessed of a powerful navy, your principal want: and you will find it easier to pull down the Athenians by withdrawing their allies from them: for our example will encourage them all to come over to you, and you will no longer suffer from the imputation of neglecting to aid those who secede. Besides, by standing forth as the champions of Grecian freedom, you will strengthen your vantage¹ ground in the war.

14. Respect, then, the hopes that Greece reposes in you, and that Olympian Jupiter, in whose temple we stand in the character of suppliants: grant succour and alliance to the Mytileneans, instead of abandoning us, who, in hazarding our lives, are exposing no one to danger but ourselves: but to whose resistance, if successful, all Greece will be indebted: and whose ruin, should it ensue from your rejection of our alliance, will in time involve you all. Prove yourselves then to be the men whom Greece presumes, and our fears wish, you to be.

less provocation. This is Arnold's interpretation. Poppo (ed. min.) construes it 'quam qui ante nos serviebant.' Arnold's opinion is defended by Cleon's demand for the severe punishment of the rebels, on the ground of want of provocation on the part of Athens.

¹ Perhaps Thucydides mentally refers to his former statement that the Lacedæmonians, at the outset of

the war, had the goodwill of Greece for this very reason: ἡ δὲ εὐνοία παρά πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν (ii. 8). Poppo, however (ed. maj.), construed the passage: 'victoriam in bello certius sperare poteritis:' 'you will have surer grounds for expecting success in the war.'

SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS,

An Elean officer in the Peloponnesian fleet, delivered at a council of war held at Embatum, B.C. 427. Bk. III. ch. 30.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Mytileneans were admitted, in compliance with the petition urged by them in the preceding speech, into the Lacedæmonian confederacy: but before the Peloponnesian fleet could relieve them, the Athenians enabled Paches, by strong reinforcements, to convert the siege of Mytilene into a complete blockade by land and sea. At last the commonalty, during the summer of 427 B.C., alarmed at the prospect of famine, compelled the ruling oligarchical faction to surrender the town at discretion to the Athenian commander, the only condition being that the fate of the Mytileneans should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian assembly, and that, pending such decision, none of the citizens should be slain, sold, or imprisoned. Seven days after the fall of the city, the Peloponnesian fleet under the command of Alcidas, reached Embatum, a place on the Asiatic coast, opposite Chios: where the chief officers held a council of war, at which Teutiaplus of Elis recommended in the following speech an attempt to recover Mytilene by a sudden attack.

CH. 30. Alcidas, and you, officers of the Peloponnesian fleet, here present! my opinion is that we should sail at once for Mytilene, just as we are, before our approach is discovered. In all probability we shall find a general want of precaution, so natural to men¹ who have just taken a city: and no watch at all at sea, an element

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) thinks the genitive *ἀνδρῶν* depends on *ἀφ' ἡλακτον*, because the article is omitted; and, in this construction, he refers *ἀνδρῶν* definitely to the Athenians. Göller doubts whether it can be taken

definitely without the article: and proposes the following version, which I have followed; 'magnam in custodiis negligentiam inveniēmus, qualis est hominum, qui recens urbem aliquam occupaverunt.'

whereon the Athenians think no enemy would venture to assail them, and on which our main¹ force happens now to be embarked. It is likely, too, that their soldiery may be scattered about from house to house with the careless confidence of victory. I think, therefore, that a sudden assault by night, seconded by partisans within the city, should it turn out still to contain friends of ours, might make us masters of the situation. The risk we must not shrink from : remembering that an enterprise of this kind is just one of those 'surprises of war,' in which the successful general, watchful to foil a surprise of his own post, seizes the critical moment to steal upon the foe.

¹ See Poppo, ed. min.

SPEECH OF CLEON,

Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, B.C. 427, against the repeal of the decree for the massacre of the male population of Mytilene. Bk. III. chs. 37-41.

INTRODUCTION.

ALCIDAS, the Spartan commander, having declined to sanction the attempt to recover Mytilene, recommended by Teutiaplus in the preceding speech, retired with his fleet to the Peloponnese. Paches, who had chased him as far as Patmos, afterwards returned to Lesbos, whence he despatched the Mytileneans most concerned in the late revolt, as prisoners to Athens. On their arrival, an assembly was held: when Cleon carried a decree for the summary execution, not only of the prisoners, but of the whole male population of the rebellious city; and orders were at once despatched to Paches to carry the sentence into effect. On the following day, however, a feeling of remorse ensued: of which the friends of the condemned capital eagerly availed themselves to persuade the authorities to convoke an assembly for the reconsideration of the question: a proposal strongly opposed by Cleon in the following speech.

CH. 37. For my part, I have frequently, ere now, and at various times, felt convinced of the incapacity of a popular government to rule dependencies: but never so decidedly as on the present occasion of your change of purpose respecting the Mytileneans. The fact is, the fearless and openhanded sincerity of your daily intercourse with one another, colours your sentiments towards your allies: and you forget that, in every mistake you make through yielding to their petitions, every time you give way to compassion, you betray a weakness most dangerous to yourselves, and which fails to conciliate their favour. You do not reflect that the dominion you hold

is a tyrannical usurpation of the rights of men who are intriguing to overthrow your supremacy, and who reluctantly submit to your rule; men whose obedience is not due to any kindnesses that, to your own prejudice, you may show them, but to the ascendancy which your strength, rather than their good-will, enables you to maintain. It will, however, be an infinitely greater evil, if none of the measures we have decreed is to stand fast:¹ if we shut our eyes to the truth that a country ruled by an inferior code, the laws of which are not capriciously changed, is in a better position than a country governed by a well-framed code, when the laws are not steadily enforced: that sober dulness is a better servant than licentious talent: and that, on the whole, mediocrities succeed better as ministers of state than fine intellects. The truth is, clever men want to prove themselves more philosophical than the laws, and to refine² upon every measure proposed for the public good, as if they could find no wider field for the display of their abilities: a tendency too often the bane of their country. Ordinary men, on the other hand, distrustful of their own talents, are content with being less enlightened than the laws, and not critical enough to carp at the arguments of able speakers: and, as they play the part of impartial judges rather than of rival debaters, their decisions are

¹ Poppo (ed. maj.) aptly compares the complaint of Aristophanes (*Eccles.* 797):

Ἐγῶδα τούτους χειροτονοῦντας μὲν
ταχεῖς,
"Ἄττ' ἂν δὲ δόξῃ, ταῦτα πάλιν ἀρνού-
μένους.

Cleon sophistically confounds νόμοι, the constitutional laws of a state, with ψηφίσματα, the decrees of the people on particular questions. See

Aristot. *N. Ethic.* v. 10, 6; *Pol. iv.* 4, 25; Demosth. *c. Aristocr.* 649, 21; Schoom. *De Com. Athen.* p. 248. See Dr. Arnold's note.

² Arnold compares the character Tacitus gives to Cornelius Laco, the commander of the Prætorian guards under Galba: 'Consilii quamvis egregii, quod non ipse adferret, inimicus, et adversus peritos pervicax.'—*Hist.* i. 26.

generally right. And surely, we politicians ought to follow their example, instead of allowing ourselves, under the influence of eloquent speeches and intellectual rivalry, to recommend to your assembly a policy which our sober judgment disapproves.

38. *My* opinion, at any rate, remains the same, and I am surprised at those who have allowed a reconsideration of the Mytilenean question, thereby interposing a delay favourable to the criminals at the expense of their judges, as it blunts the anger with which the sufferer prosecutes the offender: for it is generally when vengeance treads close upon the heels of wrong that it balances it, and gains thereby full satisfaction. I wonder also who will be the man to gainsay our decree, to dare to assert that the iniquities of the Mytileneans are all for our good: and that our calamities involve losses to our allies. It is clear that he must either rely upon his eloquence, and endeavour to show that the resolution so decisively affirmed,¹ was not formally sanctioned: or else, swayed by mercenary motives, he will try to mislead you by an elaborate and plausible defence of his clients. In these contests of the champions of debate, equity and custom are reversed: the state, while she awards the prizes to others, has to bear all the risk herself. An evil for which you are responsible, because you conduct them on a false principle: habituating yourselves to regard political discussions as a theatrical spectacle, and public business as a thing to listen to: weighing the feasibility of your projects for the future by the statements of clever rhetoricians: and, as to transactions already past, testing² the credibility of actual facts not

¹ Gøller cleverly remarks on τὸ πᾶν δοκοῦν, 'expectes τὸ πᾶν δόξαν. Verum Cleoni ita loqui licuit, quasi *² Literally, 'not taking the actual
populus nondum sententiam mutaverit.'

so much by the reports of eye-witnesses, as by the pungent invectives you hear from public speakers. You are adepts in being gulled by novelties of argument, and in refusing your assent to approved truths: the slaves of every extravagance in turn, scorers of all that is established: all of you anxious, if possible, to be able to make your own speeches, or, failing that, entering into rivalry with your favourite¹ orators to avoid the semblance of taking their views at secondhand: applauding strokes of wit almost before they are uttered: quick in seizing, before others, the speaker's drift, but slow to foresee the tendency of his measures; seeking—to speak boldly—a world different from that wherein we live, and without even the common sense to judge of things before your eyes; in one word, victims of the charms of eloquence, and more like idle gazers at the Sophists than councillors discussing state affairs.

39. I am anxious to shield you from these mischievous fascinations, and I tell you plainly that the Mytileneans have done you the greatest possible injury that one city can inflict. I can, indeed, make allowance for those who revolt from inability to bear our rule, or under compulsion from your foes. But these men—the inhabitants of an island,² a fortified island, free from all apprehension of our enemies except at sea—and even on that element protected by a fleet of triremes—living under their own laws, and treated with the greatest consideration by us: when men so favoured have acted like

fact as more credible because it has been seen, than that which you have heard,' etc.

¹ *Τοιαῦτα*, says Poppo (ed. min.), is rather obscure: it may mean *καλῶς*, or *καίνα*. The latter seems the more probable solution.

² As Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, stress is laid upon the word 'island,' which, for that reason, commences the sentence. In a war with the Peloponnesian league, an insular position was a great security.

this, are they not guilty of treason and insurrection rather than defection—for surely defection is the act of sufferers from outrage—and of treacherously compassing our ruin in concert with our bitterest foes? Indeed, their conduct is more monstrous than if they had gone to war with us in the pursuit of an independent dominion. The calamities which had overtaken other¹ members of the league, whose previous secession from our flag had been coerced, had no warning voice for them: nor did the happiness they enjoyed indispose them to enter on the path of danger. On the contrary, sanguine in their anticipations for the future, and cherishing hopes, if below their ambition, yet beyond their power, they took up arms, deliberately preferring might to right; and then, the moment they thought they could get the better of us, they attacked us without the slightest provocation. Wanton insolence is a common trait of communities favoured in the highest degree by very sudden and unexpected good fortune: men usually have a firmer hold on the prosperity they may reasonably look for, than on that which surpasses all expectation: and, generally, find it easier to repel adversity than to maintain unbroken prosperity.

The fact is, we ought not, from the very outset of our alliance, to have shown the Mytileneans more consideration than the other members of our league; and then their insolence would never have reached its present pitch: for it is a common tendency of our nature to disdain those who pay us court, and to respect those who refuse to stoop. Let them, however, even now receive the punishment their crime deserves: and do not throw the blame on the aristocracy,² while you acquit the

¹ See Poppo's note (ed. min., bk. i. Thucydides.
32, 1) on the sense of *οἱ πλείους*, in

² Mytilene, for some time before

commons : for all alike attacked us ; even the commons,¹ who, had they sided with us, might at this moment have been reinstated in their city. Instead, however, of so doing, they thought it a surer game to join their aristocracy in revolting from us.

Consider, too, whether, if you inflict the same punishment on voluntary deserters among your allies as on those whose defection is constrained by your foes, you can expect there will be one who will not secede on any trivial pretext, when independence rewards success, and no ruinous penalty awaits failure? And all the while our money and our lives will be perilled to the utmost in a contest with their several cities. A contest wherein, if you succeed, you will only recover a state which, ruined by war, will cheat you of its future tribute, the sinews of our strength : if we fail, we shall add fresh enemies to our former foes : and, at the very time when we ought to be making a stand against our declared enemies, we shall be fighting with our own allies.

40. We must not then hold out a hope, either for eloquence² to assure or bribery to purchase, that we can allow them any excuse for having erred through human infirmity. Theirs was no involuntary wrong : their treason was deliberate. Had they acted under constraint, they might have been forgiven. I, for one, then, true to my former conviction, still contend that you must not reverse your decree, nor commit a political blunder, by yielding to three influences highly prejudicial to the

her revolt, had been governed by an oligarchy, which had made secret overtures to Sparta before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, with all the privacy which is one of the natural advantages of that form of government.

¹ Οἷς γε. 'Ante hæc colo distin-

guendum esse etiam Bloomf. docet, pronomén relativum pro demonstrativo et conjunctione aliquâ copulativâ positum esse addens.'—Poppo.

² Poppo (ed. min.) refers this antithesis to the parallel passage in ch. 38, above: ἡ τῶν λέγειν πιστεύσας —ἡ κέρδει ἐπιαιρούμενος.

maintenance of power—compassion, the fascinations of eloquence, and clemency. It is right, indeed, to return the compassion of the compassionate, but not to pity those who, far from being likely to reciprocate our pity, are doomed to be our enemies for ever. Then, as to the orators, whose rhetoric charms you, they will find subjects of less moment a fitter arena for their displays, than one which, while it rewards their good speeches with pleasant things,¹ involves their country in a heavy penalty for the short-lived pleasures of their eloquence. Clemency, again, it is more reasonable to show towards those who are likely to prove tractable allies now² and for the future, than towards men whom all your lenity will leave just as inveterate as they were before.

I will now sum up with one consideration: follow my advice, and you will reconcile justice to the Mytileneans with your own interests: by an opposite decision, you will fail to conciliate them: and—you will condemn yourselves. For if they were right in revolting, you cannot be right in ruling. If, however, without any just title, you are still determined to rule, policy will then compel you to violate equity and punish Mytilene:³ or—you must resign your sceptre, and play the honest man in peace and safety. Make up your minds, then, in chastising their revolt, to visit them with the very⁴ penalty [they would have inflicted on you], instead of proclaiming yourselves, now that you have⁵ escaped, more dead and

¹ Τὸ εὖ παθεῖν· which is of course an euphemism for the receipt of a bribe.

² Καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν· lit. 'for the future as well as now' (καί).

³ Καὶ τοῦσδε· lit. 'these men as well as (καί) others on the same principle.'

⁴ So the Scholiast explains τῇ αὐτῇ. But it may mean 'the penalty already decreed.'

⁵ Poppo (ed. maj. vol. i. Proleg. p. 152) refuses to follow Gøller in reading διαφυγόντες, because 'participium instar substantivi est. Cf. ii. 2, τοῖς ἐπαγομένοις οὐκ ἐπέιθοντο. ii. 5, πρὸς ὃν ἔπραξαν οἱ προδιδόντες. Ne commemoremus φεύγοντας, quo nomine sæpissime eos denotari qui in exilium ejecti sunt, satis constat.'

callous to all sense of honour than those who have plotted your ruin : remembering what they would probably have done, had they mastered you, especially as they were the aggressors. Indeed, those who illtreat others without provocation are always the bitterest persecutors : they are ready to die¹ when they glance at the danger of leaving an enemy at large ; well knowing that any one who has suffered undeservedly,² proves a more formidable foe after his escape than an enemy who has suffered only as much as he inflicted. Let me implore you, then, not to act as traitors to your own cause : but, recalling³ as vividly as possible your first poignant resentment of the wrong, and remembering that you would have given anything to have got these rebels into your power, requite them now, instead of giving way to compassion for the doom that awaits them, or forgetting the peril that so recently hung like a cloud over you. Yes, chastise this people as they deserve, and let your other confederates read in their fate a significant warning that revolt shall in every case be punished with death. Once convince them of this, and you will not so often have to drop your arms against your foes, to take them up against your allies.

¹ Hermann, Göller, and Poppo (ed. min. : see, however, the fuller statement in ed. maj.) agree in attaching this sense to *διόλλυνται*. Arnold takes it actively : e.g. 'they hunt their victims to death, having a keen eye to the danger of leaving an enemy at large.'

² Poppo (ed. min.) adopts Haack's explanation of *μη ξὺν ἀνάγκῃ*, 'præter necessitatem,' i.e. 'quum non lacesierit alterum,' ergo 'immerito atque

injuriâ.'

³ The Scholiast explains these words by the following paraphrase, *εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔλθοντες ὧν ἐμέλλετε πάσχειν ὑπὸ Λεσβίων*· 'realising, in imagination, what you would have suffered from them.' Poppo (ed. min.) seems to lean to this interpretation : but (in ed. maj.) he translates the passage much as I have rendered it : 'quam maximè animo revocantes sensus ejus momenti, quum patiebamini.'

SPEECH ADDRESSED BY DIODOTUS

To the Athenian popular assembly, on the same occasion as, and in reply to, the preceding oration of Cleon. Bk. III. chs. 42-49.¹

CH. 42. I neither blame the magistrates who sanctioned a reconsideration of the Mytilenean question, nor agree with those who object to frequent consultations on measures of the greatest moment; on the contrary, I believe that, if there are two influences especially hostile to good counsel, they are precipitancy and passion: one of which is the wonted companion of folly, the other of vulgarity and narrowness of mind. A man who contends that debate² is not the expositor of action, is either an idiot, or is self-interested: an idiot, if he thinks he can by any other means throw light on a subject which belongs to the future and has not been cleared up: self-interested, if, when anxious to carry some dishonourable measure, and despairing of speaking effectively in a bad cause, he thinks that by plausible calumnies³ he may take both his opponents and his audience by storm. The most offensive of all, however, are those who accuse others not only of speaking for effect,⁴ but of having

¹ See Mr. Grote's remarks on the line of argument adopted by this speaker (vol. vi. p. 341). There are obvious points of comparison between this harangue, and that ascribed to Cæsar by Sallust, *B. C.* 51.

² Col. Mure (vol. v. p. 584) censures this remark as a mere truism: but his censure is founded upon a mistranslation of the passage, which he renders thus: 'He is unreasonable,

who denies that *words* are the expositors of *deeds*.' He forgets, too, that the maxim is aimed at Cleon's depreciation of debate (ch. 38, above).

³ A passage of Aristophanes (*Equit.* 45) illustrates this allusion to Cleon. He thus describes the demagogue: *βυρσοδέψην Παφλαγόνα, Πανουργότατον και διαβολώτατον τινα.*

⁴ He apparently alludes to Cleon's remarks in ch. 38, above.

pecuniary motives for their rhetorical displays. For if they only imputed want of intelligence, the advocate who failed to persuade, would come off with the repute of dulness rather than dishonesty; whereas, when corruption is the charge, the speaker, if he convinces, becomes an object of suspicion: if he fails, he is thought a fool as well as a knave. The country, certainly, does not gain by these manœuvres: she is robbed of her counsellors by fear. She might be prosperous enough, if this class¹ of her citizens were destitute of eloquence: for then the public would very seldom be seduced into error. A true statesman ought to prove the wisdom of his policy, not by intimidating opposition, but by meeting it on equal terms: and a well-regulated state ought to be as far from conferring additional² distinctions on the politician whose counsels are generally sound, (avoiding, of course, any disparagement³ of the credit he has already won) as from discrediting, far less fining, the politician whose measures do not command approval. Were such the case, no hope of enhancing his personal honours would induce the successful speaker to advocate, for the sake of popularity, measures which his conscience disapproved: nor would the unsuccessful speaker try to win public favour by descending, like his rival,⁴ to a similar complaisance.

43. Our conduct, however, reverses this principle: and, moreover, should any statesman, though advocating the most politic measures, incur the faintest suspicion of interested motives, we rob the country of the clear gain

¹ Scil: Οἱ ἐπὶ χρήμασι προσκατηγ - ροῦντες ἐπίδειξιν. Poppo, ed. min. He refers πεισείησαν τοῖς πόλις, a collective term.

² Poppo (ed. maj.) justly protests against Bloomfield's version of this

passage, which offends the sense as much as the grammar.

³ See Dr. Arnold's note on τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν.

⁴ Καὶ αὐτός.

of his services by yielding to a prejudice founded on a shadowy presumption of venality. The result is, that good counsel straightforwardly tendered is just as much distrusted as bad: and thus the advocate of statesman-like measures lies under the same necessity of employing artifice to gain confidence,¹ as the advocate of the most outrageous measures does of resorting to cajolery to win over the multitude. Owing to these hallucinations, Athens is the only state which no one can serve with openhanded sincerity, and without humbug; the frank offer of a public service being always met with the suspicion of some sly prospective gain. Still,² notwithstanding your estimate of our motives, a regard for our own safety compels us, in dealing with questions of the greatest moment, to base our counsels on a wider forecast than your offhand deliberations allow: because, among other reasons, we are responsible advisers, while you are irresponsible listeners. If, indeed, your counsellors and their political clients were liable to suffer alike, there would be more sobriety in your legislation: but, as things are, whenever you meet with a disaster, you let the penalty fall, in the excitement of the moment,³ on the

¹ Heilmann remarks the oxymoron contained in the words *ψευδόμενον πιστόν γενέσθαι* 'to get believed by telling lies.' Thucydides shows, by commencing the second clause with *καί*, its title to precedence over that which is introduced by *τε*.

² In my version, I have followed the old reading *ἐν τῷ τοιῶδε ἀξιοῦντι*, supported by Göller, Dr. Arnold, and others. Poppo, however (ed. min.), has received into his text Krüger's ingenious emendation, *ἀξιοῦντι* for *αξιοῦντι*. *Ἐν τῷ τοιῶδε* will then mean, 'on such an occasion as the present,' a sense which, as Poppo

remarks, it bears in ch. 36, 1, above. The clause, as emended by Krüger, might then be rendered: 'Still, a regard for our own safety compels (*χρὶ*) us, in dealing with questions of the greatest moment, as on the present occasion, to try (*ἀξιοῦν*) to base our counsels,' etc. In my translation I have taken *καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῶδε ἀξιοῦντι* in an adversative sense, as the context requires.

³ Some participle must be understood after *τύχητε* but it seems much less harsh to supply *ζημιουῦντες* with Poppo (ed. min.) than *σφαλέντες* with Dr. Arnold.

solitary vote of your counsellor, and not on your own multitudinous suffrages, which were equally in fault.

44. My object in coming forward was neither to defend the Mytileneans by answering Cleon's speech, nor to impeach them: for, if we are wise, the question for us to consider is not their iniquity but our policy.¹ If, on the one hand, I could prove them ever so guilty, I would not on that plea recommend you to put them to death, unless it was for our interest: on the other hand, should they seem to have any claim to our forgiveness, I would not advise their pardon, unless it should appear advantageous to the state. But I feel that our deliberations concern the future rather than the present. I join issue, then, with Cleon on the very point whereon he lays most stress: that we shall consult our future welfare, with a view to prevent rebellion, by holding out death as its penalty: and, in the interest of our future prosperity, I emphatically assert the contrary: protesting against your rejecting the sound policy of my argument for the mere plausibility of his. His argument, indeed, based rather on what the Mytileneans deserve than on what your interests demand, may very possibly, in² your present exasperation against them, win your assent. We, however, are not at law³ with them, we are not

¹ See Col. Mure's remarks on the line of argument here adopted.—*Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 70.

² Poppo (ed. min.) renders *πρός* by 'propter.'

³ Grote (vol. vi. p. 342) cites a remarkable parallel from Mr. Burke's Speech on Conciliation with America, where he disclaims all idea of prosecuting the acts of the refractory colonies in a criminal court, professing that he 'does not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people.' See Burke's Works,

vol. iii. p. 69 seqq. The Spanish Inquisition, however, laboured under no such embarrassment as to the formalities of their procedure, when, in the days of Philip the Second, they sentenced the whole population of the Netherlands to death for the crime of heresy. 'Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum!' The decree was issued on the 16th of February, 1568, and confirmed by the king ten days afterwards. See Motley's *Dutch Republic*, vol. ii. p. 155.

suitors for strict justice ; the question before us, is—how does policy require us to deal with them ?

45. In ¹ the civilised world death is the appointed penalty of many crimes : and, among them, of crimes less heinous than the treason of Mytilene. Nevertheless, men, buoyed up by hope, venture their commission : and perhaps no criminal ever condemned his chance of success as hopeless, when entering on a dangerous project. Nor did any state, when bent on revolt, ever hazard the enterprise in the belief that her armament—whether a national force, or a force supported by a foreign league—did not warrant the attempt. Besides, all men, in private and public capacities alike, are naturally prone to err ; no law in existence can restrain them from so doing : at any rate, society ² has gone through the whole catalogue of penalties, gradually ³ increasing them, in the hope of finding some means of checking the outrages of wrongdoers. It is probable that, originally, the penalties ordained for the gravest crimes were milder than they are now : and, as they were disregarded, they were generally, as time went on, stretched to capital punishment ; yet even this is slighted. We must, therefore, either discover some penalty that strikes more terror than death—which is impossible—or admit the failure ⁴

¹ Ἐν μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ. Οὖν is resumptive: it marks the commencement of the ensuing general exposition as the first stage of the answer to the question with which the last paragraph concluded. See Klotz, *Devar.* vol. ii. p. 718.

² Grote (vol. vi. p. 343) describes this passage as containing 'views which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the last century.'

³ Bloomfield (*Thucyd.* vol. ii. p. 78)

quotes the following illustration of this statement from Mitford, the Tory historian of Greece: 'In early times in Greece, as throughout Western Europe, public justice proceeded no further against the most atrocious criminals, than by the exaction of a fine. The court of Areopagus first adjudged the punishment of death.'

⁴ Τοῦτου refers to θανάτου, τότῃ το δέος. Mr. Dale, connecting both these demonstratives with the same

of all punishments to prevent crime; for poverty,¹ lending courage to necessity: wealth and power, inspiring wantonness and pride with inordinate desires: and the other conditions of life—each influencing the mind of man—each enslaved by some fatal tyrant passion—all these agencies lure men from the path of safety to the path of danger. Hope, too, and ambition, everywhere dominant, the one leading, the other following—the one devising the enterprise, the other whispering the facility of success—are active agents of ruin: and, though their influence is invisible, it is more than a match for all the terrors² of the outward world. Fortune crowns their efforts by conspiring quite as successfully to urge men on: for at times she comes unexpectedly to their side, and tempts them to run risks with inadequate resources: states, indeed, still more than men, because they play for the highest stakes, such as national freedom, or foreign dominion: subjects³ on which each citizen, when backed by his countrymen, is apt to give too free a rein to his imagination. In one word, it is sheer simplicity to believe it possible, when human nature is passionately bent on

subject, turns the passage into nonsense. He construes thus: 'Either, then, some fear more dreadful than *this* must be discovered, or *this*, at any rate, does not restrain men.' Hobbes and Bloomfield make the same mistake.

¹ Col. Mure (*Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 588) thus renders this passage: 'Poverty, bringing Audacity to the aid of Necessity, and Power, uniting Avarice to Insolence and Arrogance, with the other affections (?) to which the will of man is subject, acting on its morbid incapacity to resist such influences, seduce into hazardous enterprises; while Hope and Desire, everywhere present, the one leading, the other

following, the one conceiving the design, the other suggesting the facility of success, are the most injurious of all, and being invisible are more dangerous than other, visible evils.'

² Poppo (ed. maj.) leaves it an open question, whether *δεινῶν* means 'terrores' or 'pericula.' It would suit the spirit of the passage to understand by it, the preventive terrors of the law. Neither Poppo nor Göller mention the possibility of taking the passage in Col. Mure's sense, which, though it does not suit the context so well, is surely capable of defence.

³ *ἄνθρωπῶν*, not *αὐτόν*, is the reading of the best MSS.

accomplishing any purpose, that it can be deterred either by the influence of law, or by any other means of intimidation.

46. We must not, therefore, in reliance on any security that capital punishment can afford, come to a decision we may regret;¹ nor lead seceders to think it hopeless for them to retrace their steps, and on the first opportunity efface their crime. Just consider that, as things now are, if a state which has actually² revolted feels that she cannot succeed, she may come to terms while still able to refund all your expenses, and to pay you her future tribute; whereas, if you adopt Cleon's system, what city, do you suppose, will not make more complete preparations for a revolt, and hold out against a siege to the last extremity, if a tardy and a quick surrender comes to the same thing? And then—as to us—how can *we* fail to be damaged by the long and expensive blockade which an obstinate defence involves? by the ruinous condition in which we shall receive a city, when reduced, and by the loss, for the future, of the revenue³ derivable from it? Yet that revenue is the backbone of our strength against our foes. We are not therefore called upon to prejudice ourselves by acting as severe judges of the delinquents: but rather to ensure, by a mild punishment, that for the time to come our confederate states shall be available for our purposes in a flourishing financial condition: and to guard against their defection, not by measures of excessive rigour, but by the considerate⁴ spirit of our administration. We

¹ Poppo (ed. maj.) construes *χέρων βουλεύεσθαι* by 'pejus consultare.' He rejects Bloomfield's notion that 'a harsh decision' is meant.

² Poppo (ed. min.) is surely wrong in making *καὶ* in *καὶ ἀποστῆσα* equi-

valent to *καίπερ*.

³ Göller remarks the sarcastic reference to the corresponding passage in Cleon's speech, towards the close of the 39th chapter, above.

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) refers appro-

are, however, now acting on an opposite principle: and, if we succeed in subduing a city which, constitutionally free¹ and reluctantly ruled, has naturally enough sought independence by revolt, we fancy that policy requires us to punish her severely. True policy, on the contrary, instead of signally chastising free cities, when they revolt, vigilantly guards them before they revolt, preventing their even thinking of such a step: and, when a defection is quelled, imputes the fault to as few as possible.

47. Consider, too, how great a mistake you would make, in another point of view, by following Cleon's advice. At present, the commons in all the states are friendly to you, and either refuse to join the aristocratic party in revolting, or, if constrained, instantly declare their hostility to those who forced them to revolt:² so that, when you go to war, you are supported by the masses in the various cities of the hostile league. If, however, you exterminate the commonalty at Mytilene, which was not only no party to the revolt, but, as soon as it obtained arms, readily surrendered the city: you will, in the first place, be committing a crime by the slaughter of your benefactors: in the next, you will be realising the fondest wishes of the highest classes. For, when they induce a city to revolt, they will instantly find an ally in the commons, because you will have taught them beforehand that exactly the same penalty awaits the innocent as the guilty. I must add that, even if they *were* guilty,

vingly to Bloomfield's rendering of ἀπό τῶν ἔργ. τ. ἐπιμ., 'by having a care of our actions.' Bloomfield, in a note, explains the phrase to mean: 'by carefully abstaining from such conduct as may provoke revolt.'

¹ Poppo (ed. maj.) sees in these words a particular allusion to the Mytileneans, whose independence

Athens professed to recognise in theory at least. Their own spokesman (iii. 11) describes them as αὐτόνομοι δὲ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι, 'professedly independent and nominally free.'

² Bloomfield, mistaking ἀποστήσασσι for ἀποστᾶσι, construes 'the revolters.'

it would be good policy not to see it: to prevent the only class still allied to you from becoming hostile to you. I believe it to be far more conducive to the maintenance of our dominion, that we should voluntarily submit to a wrong, than that we should massacre those whom it is politic to spare, simply because they deserve it. Cleon, indeed, declared that justice and expediency would be combined in the punishment proposed: but we find it impossible to realise their union by that step.¹

48. Convinced, then, that mine is the preferable course: and, without allowing too much weight to compassion or clemency—I, indeed, am as far as Cleon from wishing you to be won over by those influences—but acting on the grounds I have laid before you, bring to a dispassionate trial the Mytileneans whom Paches sent off as criminals, and let the rest enjoy their homes. This course will at once conduce to our future good, and spread immediate alarm among our enemies; for men who take their measures wisely are more formidable to their adversaries,² than men whose opposition, violent in action, is weak in policy.³

¹ Poppo (ed. min.), Göller, and Arnold connect *ἐν ἀντῷ* with *τιμωρίας*: the full expression being *ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι*. Krüger wishes to read *τῷ ἀντῷ*, which would improve the sense.

² See Poppo, ed. min.

³ A small majority of the assembly voted for the repeal of the decree; but the Mytilenean prisoners, who had been chiefly implicated in the revolt, and who, to the number of more than a thousand, had been sent to Athens by Paches, were put to death. Mr. Grote (vol. vi. p. 336)

remarks that the proposed massacre of the whole male population of Mytilene was only a very rigorous application of the received laws of war, acted upon, without the slightest abatement, in the Lacedæmonian execution of the Plateans shortly afterwards. He, however, conveniently forgets, in the interest of his favourite democracy, a distinguishing feature in the case of the Plateans. They had been guilty of the cold-blooded murder of Theban soldiers while under the protection of a truce.

SPEECH OF THE PLATÆAN DEPUTIES,

Delivered before the five commissioners despatched from Sparta, to try the Platæan prisoners, after the surrender of their city, B.C. 427. Bk. III. chs. 53-60.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Platæans having voluntarily surrendered their city to the Peloponnesian force, and agreed to submit to the decision of Lacedæmonian judges, protected only by a stipulation that no one should be punished unjustly, five commissioners were sent from Sparta to decide their case. These judges, instead of instituting a formal enquiry, merely asked each of the prisoners 'whether he had rendered any service to the Lacedæmonian cause during the war?' As a categorical reply to this question would have been an act of suicide, the Platæans, in the teeth of strong opposition from the Thebans, asked and obtained leave to plead their cause at length.

CH. 53. When, in full reliance on your good faith, Lacedæmonians, we surrendered our city to you, we did not expect to be subjected to an ordeal of this kind, but to a procedure more conformable to law: we also agreed that we should not, as we now are, be at the mercy of any other judges but yourselves, believing we should then be most likely to obtain justice. As things are, however, we are afraid that we have lost both these securities at once. We have good grounds, on the one hand, to fear that the deadliest issues are involved in the struggle before us, and, on the other, to distrust your impartiality: judging at once from the fact that no formal charge, for us to answer, has been preferred against us (indeed, *we* had to ask leave to speak): and from the narrow scope of the question, a literal reply to which is an adverse verdict, while a false one carries its

own refutation. Surrounded, however, as we are, by manifold perplexities, we have no alternative: and it seems the safer course not to risk our lives without a word from our lips;¹ for, if men in our position left our cause totally unpleaded, we might afterwards think, with self-reproach, that we might have been saved by a defence. In addition, too, to our other disadvantages, we find a peculiar difficulty in convincing you. If we were strangers to each other, our cause might be served by bringing forward evidence in our favour on points unfamiliar to you: but, as it is, the judges whom we address are conversant with all the features of our case: and our fear is, not that you may find a true bill against us through having previously judged our services² less meritorious than yours, but that, to gratify a neighbouring power, we may be standing at a bar where sentence has already been recorded against us.

54. However, notwithstanding these difficulties, we will recall our public services to your remembrance, and endeavour to bring you over to our views, by laying at once before you the pleas on which we rest our case. Those pleas will meet the hostility of Thebes, and will reveal the tenor of our conduct towards you and the rest of Greece.³ We say, then, in answer to your rather curt enquiry, 'whether we have rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the course of the present war,' that, if your question is addressed to us in

¹ Poppo (ed. maj.) remarks on Bloomfield's version, 'to venture somewhat by thus pleading,' 'non perpendit *εἰπόντας* non *loquentes* significare, sed *locutos*.'

² See Göller and Dr. Arnold on *τὰς ἀρετὰς*.

³ Poppo (ed. maj.) shows that Bloomfield, Heilmann and other

commentators, are quite mistaken in taking *ἐς ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους* 'Ἕλληνας with *τῶν εὖ δεδρασμένων*. The use of *τε* and *καί* proves that all the words from *πρὸς τε* to 'Ἕλληνας refer to *παρεχόμενοι*. My version, though it alters the machinery of the sentence, is, I hope, true to the construction.

the character of enemies, it was no wrong to you, if you received no benefit at our hands; while, if you regard us as friends, you yourselves rather than we, were in the wrong in making war upon us. During the peace, as well as in the campaign against the Mede, honesty was the type of our policy; we were the only¹ Bœotians who joined your attack upon him in the cause of Grecian freedom; and, on a recent occasion, *we* were not the first to break the peace. Although an inland people, we took part in the naval action of Artemisium: we stood by you and Pausanias in the battle fought on our own soil: and we overtasked our strength in sharing all the other dangers which at that epoch overshadowed Greece. We also did you, Lacedæmonians, a special service; at the very moment when, after the earthquake, Sparta was besieged² by the terrible panic caused by the secession of the Helots to Ithome, we despatched two-thirds of our own citizen force to your aid. Claims like these should not be forgotten.

55. Such then was the part we had the courage to play in former days and at the most critical junctures; later, indeed, we became your enemies: but that was your own fault. When hard pressed by Thebes, we entreated your alliance: you rejected our suit for selfish reasons,³ bidding us apply to Athens, on pretence of her being a neighbouring, while you were a distant, power. However, when we were at war, you neither suffered, nor were destined to suffer, anything foreign to the usages of war at our hands. And, if we refused to separate from

¹ Herodotus, however, gives the Thespians a share in this patriotic act.—Bk. viii. 50.

² Demosthenes (*De Cor.* § 195) employs the same metaphor: *κινδυνος και φόβος περίεστη την πόλιν.* Comp.

Tacitus (*Hist.* iv. 79): ‘Circumsteterat Civilem metus.’

³ The account given of this transaction by Herodotus (bk. vi. ch. 108) suggests this sense of the middle verb *ἀπέσωσθε*.

Athens at your summons, we were not in the wrong : considering that she supported us in opposition to Thebes, when you shrunk from us : after which we could ¹ not, in honour, abandon her, especially as she had shown us ² much kindness before she received us, on our own petition, into alliance, and had also conferred upon us her municipal franchise.³ On the contrary, it was natural we should heartily obey her injunctions. We must add that, as to the enterprises into which you, the chiefs of the two leagues, lead your allies, it is not your followers who are responsible for any wrong you may commit, but those who implicate them in questionable ⁴ acts.

56. The Thebans have often injured us ere now ; as to their last outrage, the cause, indeed, of our present distress, you need no information from us. When they attempted to seize our city, not only in the midst of peace, but, what is more, on a solemn festival, we were justified in turning our avenging arms upon them by that universally recognised law which allows retaliation on an invading foe. It cannot therefore be fair that we should now suffer on their account. For if your own present convenience and Theban animosity are to be the basis of your decision,⁵ you will prove yourselves no conscientious judges of right, but rather the courtiers of policy. And yet, when we talk of policy, if Thebes seems an useful ally to you now, we and the rest of the Greeks were far more so at the time we referred to, when the perils around you were greater than at present. You are now

¹ That is, when the Lacedæmonians called upon Plataea to do so, B.C. 429 (Poppo, ed. min.).

² See Poppo's note on *τις* as equivalent to *ἡμεῖς* (ed. min.).

³ The 'jus connubii et commercii,' but not the right of voting in the public assembly or of bearing office.

⁴ Here the speaker replies by anticipation to the Theban charge of complicity in Athenian encroachments on the liberty of Greece.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) explains *τὸ δίκαιον λαμβάνειν* by the Latin equivalent, 'decernere de jure.'

in an attitude of aggression, and you are formidable foes ; but in those days your attitude was one of self-defence : all Greece¹ was threatened with slavery by the Mede : and the Thebans then took part with him. It is only fair to balance the public spirit we then displayed against our present error, if indeed we have committed any : the former, you will find, outweighed the latter : it was shown, too, at a crisis when it was rare indeed for any Grecian power to set sheer courage in array against the might of Xerxes : and therefore public opinion honoured the more those who did not stand aloof from danger² and meet the invasion with paltry manœuvres for their own interests, but who boldly braved the storm, and did what was best for their country. To the latter class we belonged, and highly were we honoured for it : yet now we fear that those very principles,³ which led us to consult right by joining Athens instead of convenience by joining you, may involve our ruin. And yet you ought to show that your estimate of principles⁴ is consistent and impartial : and to see that true policy⁵ lies in recon-

¹ 'Id tantum observandum, scriptorem, quum Lacedæmonios olim in majore periculo constitutos fuisse demonstrare velit, proprie sic debuisse pergere: *νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἑτέροις ὑμῖς ἐπέρχεσθε δεινοί, ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ καιρῷ πᾶσι δουλείαν ἐπέφερον ὁ βάρβαρος, καὶ τότε οἶδε μετ' αὐτοῦ ἦσαν.*'—Poppo, ed. maj.

² Poppo (ed. min.) explains ἀσφαλεία by 'in tuto, i.e. per otium et tranquillitatem.'

³ 'Ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, 'propter eandem agendi rationem.'—Poppo, ed. maj.

⁴ They contend that they acted on one and the same principle of right in resisting the Mede and in adhering to their connection with Athens ; and that, as Sparta rewarded

the former act, she could not consistently punish the latter.

⁵ To the translator, it makes little difference whether we read *ἔχουσι*—Heilmann's conjecture adopted by Göller, and approved but not adopted by Poppo—or *ἔχουσι*. I have, however, followed Göller in reading *ὑμῖν* for *ἡμῖν*. Poppo, who (ed. min.) retains *ἡμῖν*, admits the former pronoun to have the support of the best MSS. 'Ἡμῖν, of course, generalises the sentence: *ὑμῖν* pointedly refers to the Lacedæmonians. Poppo (ed. maj.) thus turns the passage, according to Heilmann's reading, and adopting in the version, though not in his text, *ὑμῖν* instead of *ἡμῖν*, 'Oportet utilitatem nihil aliud esse existi-

cing your own immediate interest on any occasion with a firm and changeless gratitude for the services of your brave allies.

57. Consider, too, that you are now regarded by most of the Greeks as models of honour and virtue: but, if your decision in our case is otherwise than just (and you cannot hush¹ up a sentence pronounced by judges so distinguished on prisoners far from insignificant) beware lest they disapprove of your coming to an unworthy decision on the fate of men inferior only to yourselves: and of your dedicating, in the national temples, spoils torn from us, the benefactors of Greece. It will seem monstrous indeed that Lacedæmonians should sack Plataea! and that, while your fathers inscribed the name of our city on the Delphian tripod in honour of her valour, you should actually blot her out, house and home, from the map of Greece, to gratify Thebans! It is indeed too true that we have reached the very climax of calamity. Formerly, when the Mede gained the advantage,² we were on the verge of destruction: while, now, we find ourselves supplanted in your regard, though you were formerly our best friends, by Thebans; we have also undergone two trials, the most terrible of all: lately, the risk of perishing from famine, had we not surrendered our city: now, of being tried for our lives. Yes, we, Plataeans as we are, whose zeal for the freedom of Greece exceeded our strength, have been insultingly pushed aside as outcasts³

mare, quam si a vobis firmam gratiam virtutis bonis sociis habentibus etiam præsentia ex usu vestro constituentur, i.e. quam si præsentia ita ex usu vestro constituatis, ut simul bonis sociis gratiam habeatis.'

¹ Poppo makes ἀφανῆ equivalent to ὥστε ἀφανῆ εἶναι.

² Poppo (ed. min.) refers κρατησάντων to the advantages gained by

Xerxes at Thermopylæ and Artemisium. He burnt Plataea in the course of his march through Bœotia: but the Plataeans had migrated, before his approach, into the Peloponnese.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) approves Heilmann's version of ἐκ πάντων, 'ex omni societate humanâ.'

from society, and left destitute of resource and redress! Not only does everyone of our former confederates refuse us aid, but we even fear lest you, Lacedæmonians, our only hope, may not prove firm friends.

58. Nevertheless, we earnestly implore you, in the name of the Gods who sanctioned our former alliance, and of our own services to the cause of Greece, to relent, to revoke any promise you may have made to the Thebans, and to ask back again of them the free gift of our lives¹—to save you the shame of a massacre disgraceful to you, to ensure yourselves an honest gratitude from us, instead of a base gratitude bought by serving Thebes, and to prevent your reaping a harvest of infamy by gratifying the vindictiveness of others. Of infamy— for, though it is easy to take our lives, it will be a difficult task to blot out the dishonour of the deed: since we are not enemies, the natural objects of your vengeance, but well-wishers, involved, by an imperious necessity, in war. By allowing us, therefore, personal security, you will only be deciding justly: considering,² too, before³ it is too late, that we became your prisoners by free surrender, and in the sacred character of suppliants, whose blood it is against the law of Greece to shed: and, still more, that we have done you good service throughout our career. To assure yourselves of this, only glance at the tombs of your fathers, who fell by the swords of the Medes, and were buried on our soil. Year by year we have publicly honoured them with robes⁴

¹ Poppo (ed. maj.) remarks: ‘Δωρεάν μὴ κτείνειν utrum valeat *gratiam*, *ne occidant*, ut Göll. et Arnold acceperunt, an *gratiam non occidendi*, seu *ne vos coacti sitis necem inferre*, minus certum est; sed posterius malim.’

² ‘Καὶ εἰ, quod post ὥστε particulam positum est, respondet.’—Poppo, ed. min.

³ This perhaps is the force of the preposition in *προνοοῦντες*.

⁴ See Dr. Arnold's note.

and all the solemnities of mourning, and with lavish offerings of the firstfruits of all the produce which the various seasons elicit from our soil: the tribute of friendly hands from a friendly land, and of allies to their former companions in arms. By a wrongful sentence, you will reverse all this. Just reflect: Pausanias¹ laid your fathers in their graves in the belief that he was consigning them to a friendly soil, among a people attached to them; now, if you massacre us, and turn the territory of Plataea into an appanage of Thebes, will you not in effect be abandoning your fathers and kindred in an enemy's land, in the midst of their murderers, no longer honoured by the offerings they now receive? Besides, you will be enslaving the country in which the liberation of the Greeks was achieved: you will² be desolating the temples of the Gods to whom they offered their vows on the eve of their defeat of the Mede, and you will be robbing the pious founders of the family sacrifices endowed by them.

59. No, Lacedæmonians! it is not worthy of your fame to act thus, or to outrage the public opinion of Greece and the memory of your ancestors: nor, unwronged yourselves, to sacrifice us, your benefactors, to the enmity of a neighbouring state; no, you should spare us, and receive³ us with softened hearts and honest compassion, remembering not merely the dreadful fate we should be doomed to suffer, but the character of the sufferers, and how little we can calculate upon whom, however undeserving, calamity may some day fall. We

¹ Poppo (ed. maj.) quotes Strabo's statement that the graves of those who fell at Plataea were shown even in his day.

² 'Inter futura præsens est loco futuri.'—Hæck, quoted by Poppo,

ed. maj.

³ Instead of connecting λαβόντας with οἴκτω, as Gøller and Arnold do, Poppo (ed. min.) takes it as equivalent to *in fidem recipientes*.

then, as becomes us, and as this emergency urges, implore you, in the name of the Gods who are worshipped by all Greece in common at the same¹ altars, to let our prayer prevail with you: we plead the oaths your sires swore, and entreat you not to forget them: we appeal as suppliants to² the tombs of your fathers, and we solemnly invoke them, now at rest in their graves, not to surrender us to the mercy of Thebes, nor to suffer their³ dearest friends to be handed over to their⁴ bitterest foes. We would remind you, too, of that glorious day, when, side by side with them, we won a brilliant victory, and yet, on this day, are in imminent peril of the most cruel doom.

In conclusion⁵—and to finish our speech is alike necessary and painful to men in our position, as our lives will be endangered at its close—we repeat that it was not to the Thebans that we surrendered our city—indeed, rather than so degrade ourselves, we would have perished by that most ignoble death, famine—no, it was in reliance on you that we capitulated. It is therefore only fair, if we fail to persuade you, that you should restore us to our former position, and allow us to take on our own shoulders all its contingent risk. At the same time we earnestly beseech you that we, Platæans, the most zealous champions of Grecian freedom, may not, suppliants as we are, be severed from your custody and the protection of your promise, and given up to the

¹ See Poppo (ed. min.) and Dr. Arnold, on ὁμοβωμίους.

² So Poppo, in both editions, takes the phrase: but other commentators construe it: 'we kneel as suppliants before you in the name of the tombs of our fathers.'

³ See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on φίλτατοι ὄντες.

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) understands ἡμῖν, not τοῖς κεκμηκόσι, to be the object of τοῖς ἐχθίστοις. My version leaves the question open.

⁵ The construction is, πανόμενοι εἰ, ὕπερ ἀναγκαῖον, κ.τ.λ. Λόγου τελευτῶν is epexegetical; it explains the relative clause introduced by ὕπερ.

Thebans, our implacable foes : but that you may prove yourselves our deliverers, and refrain, while restoring freedom to Greece, from staining your hands with our blood.

SPEECH OF THE THEBANS :

Bk. III. chs. 61-68.

THE Thebans, fearing that the above address of the Plataëans might make an impression on the Lacedæmonian judges, request permission to reply at length to it, which they do in the following speech.

CH. 61. We should not have asked permission to speak, had the Plataëans, on their part,¹ tersely answered your question, instead of attacking us with a studied invective, and indulging in a long defence of themselves on points foreign to the issue—whereon, too, they were never impeached—and eulogising deeds which no one censured. As things are, however, we feel called upon to answer their charges against us, and to sift their praises of their own career : to prevent their cause being furthered either by the villany they impute to us, or the glory they claim for themselves : and to place you in possession of the truth on both points, before you decide.

Our disagreement with them originated thus : after our settlement of the rest of Bœotia, we established Plataëa, and, together with her, some other places, which we obtained possession of by driving out a motley population of various race. The Plataëans, however, would not condescend to recognise our supremacy, according to the original agreement : and, breaking away from the common interests of Bœotia, contrary to the institutions of their fathers, went over, the moment we resorted to

¹ *Kai.*

compulsion, to Athens, in league with whom they did us much mischief, for which they suffered in return.

62. Again,¹ when the barbarian invaded Greece, they say they were the only Bœotians who did not join him and it is on this pretended piece of patriotism that they plume themselves and reproach us. We reply that, if they did not join the Mede, it was simply because the Athenians did not either : and they acted on exactly the same principle,² when Athens subsequently essayed the subjugation of Greece, for then again they were the only Bœotians who Atticised. But first consider, under what form of government we were living respectively, when we acted thus. On our side, Thebes at that time chanced to be ruled neither by that form of oligarchy wherein all citizens enjoy equal laws in private life,³ nor by a popular constitution ; our affairs were controlled by a small clique invested with absolute power—of all systems the one most opposed to the ascendancy of law and to good government, and the closest approach to a despot's⁴ sway. These rulers, naturally supposing that,

¹ Poppo (ed. maj.) says: 'particulum καί nullus interpres præter Hier. Müll. reddidit; nam depravat orationem, quum prius jam de aliis, qui in Græciam venerint, actum esse indicare videatur.' But surely καί simply designates the second apostasy of the Plataeans from Bœotian politics.

² So Heilmann and others explain *ιδέα*. But it may be taken, as the Scholiast suggests, with *ιόντων*. Poppo (ed. maj.) leaves the point open: but, in his ed. min., he rules in favour of the Scholiast. The question is of little consequence; for, in either construction, *ιδέα* assumes nearly the same sense. If it is construed with *ιόντων*, the passage may be rendered: 'and when, at a later period, the Athenians made a

similar (*τῇ αὐτῇ ιδέᾳ*) attack on the freedom of Greece,' etc.

³ Dr. Arnold thus explains the term *ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον*. 'The term *ἰσόνομος* relates to the equality of all the citizens with one another, as far as related to their private disputes and private injuries; whereas under that worst form of oligarchy, which was called *ἐνναστυία*, those who were possessed of political power were also above the law in all private matters, and could oppress their fellow-citizens at their pleasure.—See Aristotle, *Politics*, iv. 5.'

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) appositely quotes the dictum of Tacitus: 'Paucorum dominatio regie libidini propior est.' — *Ann.* vi. 42.

if the fortunes of the Mede should prevail, they might strengthen the tenure of their own power, forcibly held down the people, and enticed him on. This indeed was the act of the whole community, but she had no control over her own movements: and it is not fair to reproach¹ her for errors committed when not under constitutional rule. At any rate, you will remember that, after the retreat of the Mede, when we had recovered our constitution, and when the Athenians, having commenced their career of aggression,² were endeavouring to reduce our country—most of which they already held³ through partisans—in common with the rest of Greece: you will remember, we say, that the victory we gained over them on the field of Coronea set Bœotia free, and that we are now zealously contributing towards the emancipation of our fellow Greeks, by supplying cavalry and munitions of war on a larger scale than any other member of the league. Such, then, is our defence against the charge of joining the Mede.

63. We will now endeavour to show that *you*, citizens of Plataea, rather than we, have wronged Greece, and that, instead of meriting forgiveness,⁴ you deserve the severest punishment. You became confederates and fellow-citizens of the Athenians with a view, as you say,

¹ Thucydides characteristically places in the mouth of the Theban orator a more favourable version of the part played by Thebes in the great drama of the Persian war, than was generally current in Greece. See the note on bk. i. ch. 75.

² The position of *τε* and *και* show that Poppo (ed. min.) is right in placing a comma after *ἐπιόντων*, as Dr. Arnold should have done.

³ After the battle of Œnophyta, B.C. 456. The independence of Bœotia was regained in the battle of Coronea,

B.C. 447.

⁴ Dr. Arnold takes *ἀξιώτεροι* to mean 'more worthy of all punishment than we, whom you affect to call traitors to all Greece.' To this Bauer, with whom Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller agree, objects in the following terms: 'Thebanos cogitare non licet se dignos poenâ confessos esse. . . . Solvendus ille comparativus in *μᾶλλον ἀξιοί*, ut *μᾶλλον* non ad *ἀξιοί* pertinet, sed ad totum: *digni estis poenâ potius quam veniâ aut beneficio.*'

to wreak¹ your vengeance upon us. You ought, therefore, to have called in their aid only in relation to us, and to have refrained from sharing in their aggressions on other states, in which you certainly were at liberty to refuse to join, if ever Athens drew you on against your will, since that very Lacedæmonian confederacy against the Mede, your cooperation with which is the citadel of your defence, was already on foot. It was strong enough, at any rate, to divert us from attacking you: and—a point of the highest consequence—to allow you to lay your plans in security. Yet you voluntarily, and while² you enjoyed perfect freedom of action, espoused the Athenian interest. You plead, indeed, the dishonour of abandoning one's benefactors: but surely dishonour and injustice lie rather in abandoning all the Greeks, whose sworn allies you were, to ruin,³ than in dissolving your alliance with Athens only, as she was enslaving, and they were emancipating, Greece. Besides, you did not repay her kindness by a real equivalent: the return you made was stained with disgrace. For, by your own confession, you summoned her aid when you were oppressed: and, instead of helping her when she was oppressed, you became her accomplices in oppressing others. Yet the real dishonour consists in not requiting a favour by an honest equivalent, rather than in failing to acknowledge it by a compensation which, if due in justice, can only be paid in infamy.⁴

¹ See Poppo, ed. min.

² Poppo (ed. min.) points the allusion to the passage (ch. 55) in the speech of the Platæans, where they describe themselves as, at one time, hard pressed by Thebes.

³ Poppo (ed. maj.) endorses Bloomfield's notion of the relative force of *προδοῦναι* and *καταπροδοῦναι*.

⁴ Dr. Arnold thus explains the passage: 'The sense is as follows: "When men call ingratitude a crime, they mean by ingratitude the not returning an honourable kindness when it can be done honourably: they do not mean to blame him who does not return a kindness, however justly due, when he cannot return it

64. You made it quite clear, too, that even if, at the time of the Persian invasion, you were the only Bœotian state that refrained from joining the Mede, it was not from patriotic motives, but because the Athenians did the same. Yes, you refused to aid the Mede, because you wished to follow the policy of Athens, in opposition to the interests of Greece.¹ Yet you now claim the benefit of a patriotism due only to the influence of others. But this is unreasonable: you chose the Athenians: follow, then, their fortunes in the struggle: and do not appeal to the alliance formerly made against the Persians as any title to protection now. You disowned it: you violated it, by promoting instead of actively resisting the enslavement of the Æginetans and some others² of your fellow-confederates: and that, when, so far³ from being under constraint, you were living under the laws which have ruled you to the present hour, and no one had despotic control over you, as our oligarchs had over us. Besides, you persisted in declining⁴ the final proposal which, before commencing the siege, we made to you, engaging to secure you from molestation on condition of your

without a crime." So Cicero (*De Officiis*, i. 15): "Non reddere beneficium (μη ἀντιιδόναι χάριν) viro bono non licet (αἰσχροῦν), modo id facere possit sine injuriâ (τὰς ὁμοίας χάριτας)." But if it can only be returned cum injuriâ (ἐς ἀδικίαν ἀποδομένας), then the not returning it (μη ἀντιιδόναι) is allowable in a good man (οὐκ αἰσχροῦν)."

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) rather summarily refers τοῖς δὲ to "Ἕλλησι, on the Scholiast's authority. In his ed. maj. he cites the following commentary of Dukas on τοῖς δὲ: 'Βοιωτοῖς δηλονότι· ἀλλ' ἀπεσιώπησε τοῦτο ὁ Θηβαῖος ἐνταῦθα, ὡς μὴ ξυναγωνιζόμενον αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,' i. e. because

it did not suit his purpose. On this Poppo remarks: 'At, quanquam Bœoti præcipue intelliguntur, tamen, ut verba scripta sunt, nihil nisi τοῖς Ἕλλησι cum Schol. suppleri posse apparet.'

² Such as Thasos (bk. i. 101), Samos, Byzantium (i. 117), and others. As to Ægina, see bk. i. 105, 108.

³ The use of οὔτε and τε shows that ἄκοντες and ἔχοντες, κ.τ.λ., are intended to stand in the broadest opposition to each other.

⁴ 'Imperfectum ἐδέχεσθε positum videtur, quoniam sæpius legati ultro citroque missi sunt.'—Poppo, ed. min.

strict neutrality. Can any other state, then, rival your pretensions to the hatred of all Greece, since the good qualities you held up to admiration were used only to injure her? you have publicly proved that you have no longer any title to the virtues which you pretend you once possessed: the aspirations you had always at heart were laid open and proved to conviction, when you joined Athens in her career along the path of iniquity. Such, then, are the remarks we have to offer, touching our involuntary alliance with the Mede and your wilful conspiracy with Athens.

65. As to the last outrage which you represent yourselves to have suffered in our—as you call it—illegal assault on your city during a truce and on a holyday: we do not consider that even on that occasion we were so much to blame as yourselves.¹ No doubt, if we, unsolicited,² attacked your city in arms, and ravaged your territory as foes, we were³ in the wrong; but if, as was the case, the richest and noblest of your citizens, in their anxiety to withdraw you from an alien alliance, and to reunite you to the common confederacy of Bœotia, of their own free will invoked our aid—of what crime were we guilty? To quote⁴ your own words, the real transgressors are the instigators, not their followers. In our opinion, however, neither they nor we were in the wrong. They, like you, were citizens of Plataea: only they had a larger stake in the land; and, in throwing open their gates and admitting us, not as enemies, but as friends, into their city, they aimed at reforming their disaffected⁵

¹ 'Minus quam vos, non tam nos quam vos.'—Poppo, ed. maj.

² *ἄντροι*, i. e. 'nostrâ sponte.'—Poppo, ed. min.

³ 'Perfecti vim habet præsens ἀϊκοῦμεν.'—Poppo, ed. min.

⁴ 'Respicitur ad verba cap. 55.'—Poppo, ed. min.

⁵ The full expression would be *μηκίτι γενέσθαι χείρους μάλλον ἢ ἀγαθούς*. The *οἱ χείρους* are of course the partisans of the Athenian, the *οἱ*

fellow-citizens, and rewarding the well-disposed with the honours they deserved; acting, in fact, as censors of your political principles, and—without banishing¹ members of the opposite party from their native city, trying to bring that city home to the brotherhood of a common race; besides, they involved you in enmity with none, but left you equally at peace with all.

66. Indeed, we can prove that we were acting in no hostile spirit: we did not injure a single Plataean, and we called upon all who wished to be governed by the ancestral system of Bœotia, to come over to us. You willingly joined us, and, after coming to an agreement, kept quiet for a time, till you noticed the smallness of our force: and then—even allowing that we acted rather inconsiderately in entering your city without the consent of your commons—still you did not treat us as we treated you, by refraining from acts of violence, and resorting to expostulation to induce our men to retire. On the contrary, you attacked them in violation of the agreement: and—though we are not so indignant at the fate of those whom you slew in hot blood, there certainly being some warrant for their treatment—yet how can we acquit you of a fearful crime, when you lawlessly massacred others in the act of stretching forth their suppliant hands, after giving them quarter, and afterwards promising us to spare their lives? Nevertheless, after consummating three atrocities in a very short interval—in your breach of the agreement, in the subsequent murder of your prisoners,

ἀμείβους the satellites of the Theban connection. Similarly, Theognis lavishes the epithets *χρηστοί* and *ἀγαθοί* upon the aristocrats, *κακοί*, *κ.τ.λ.*, on the democrats of his day. In Cicero's political vocabulary, too, the 'boni' are the 'optimates,' or

Conservatives, as opposed to the 'populares,' the popular party.

¹ 'Sensus est, "ab urbe cives non abalienantes, sed urbem suorum consanguineorum fœderi adjungentes."'—Göller. Poppo (ed. min.) approves this.

and in the violation of your engagement not to spill their blood, provided we did not injure your property in the country—in the face of all this, you contend that *we* were the transgressors, and deny your liability to punishment. Not so! at any rate if the Lacedæmonians here present rightly decide: you shall suffer once for all the penalty due to all these crimes.

67. We have entered into this detail, Lacedæmonians, both in your and our own behalf, to convince you that you will be acting justly in condemning them, and to assure ourselves that our revenge will be even more righteous than your sentence.¹ Re^lent not, then, at the recital of their former public services, if indeed they ever rendered any: for, though heroic deeds are the true defence of the oppressed, they entail a double penalty on the authors of a shameful act, because the offence is out of keeping with their character. Nor suffer them to move you to mercy by their piteous lamentations, and appeals to the tombs of your fathers, and their own forlorn desolation. For we can declare, in refutation of their claims, that our youth, massacred by their hands, suffered a far more cruel fate: our youth, some of whose fathers died on the field of Coronea, struggling to restore Bœotia to your confederacy: while others, left lonely in their old age, amid desolated homes, address to you a far more righteous prayer to avenge them on their murderers. And, surely, if anyone deserves compassion, it is the victims of a flagrant outrage: the victims, on the contrary, of a merited chastisement, like these Plataeans, may expect men to smile at their woe. Their present desolation, too, is all their own fault, as it springs from their wilful rejection of better allies. No provocation on

¹ I have followed Poppo (ed. min.) in placing a full stop after *τετιμωρημένοι*.

our part led to their atrocious act: they condemned our men rather from hatred than a sense of justice; and even now the penalty they have to pay¹ is no equivalent: for they will suffer by judicial sentence—not, as they pretend, as prisoners of war suing for mercy, but as men who by formal compact have surrendered themselves to justice. Vindicate, then, Lacedæmonians, the² law of Greece, violated by these men: and reward us, sufferers from a lawless outrage, by a just return for our zealous support of your interests, instead of allowing us to be pushed aside and supplanted in your favour by their eloquent appeal. Let Greece read in their fate a warning that, when you open the lists, it is not to reward declamation,³ but deeds: a brief relation of which is sufficient, when they are honest: and whose deformity, when they are immoral, the artificial ornaments of rhetoric only serve to veil. If, however, the representatives of ruling states were to punish criminals by their merits, without⁴ heeding their arguments, as you will be doing now, if you summarily⁵ pronounce sentence on all these men collectively, people would be less disposed to seek fair words to screen evil deeds.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) gives a quasi-future or anticipatory sense to *ἀνταποδόντες*, construing the clause, 'utpote qui non rependerint æquam pœnam (quum supplicio affecti fuerint).' He shows that Dr. Arnold's explanation cannot stand, because, if it is accepted, we must supply the words—'in surrendering themselves to justice:' the omission of which would have been a great breach of clearness on the historian's part. In the aorist, *ἀνταποδόντες*, Thucydides seems to me to make the Theban orator speak, naturally enough, as if he had the Lacedæmonian sentence of death in his pocket. For the

Thebans were privy to the intentions of the judges.

² See Poppo's note (ed. min.) explaining the insertion of *καί* before *τῷ τῶν, κ.τ.λ.*

³ A satirical allusion to the rhetorical contests so popular at Athens, but not equally acceptable at Sparta.—Poppo, ed. min.

⁴ Dr. Arnold ingeniously supplies the omissions, and elucidates the curious confusion, of this passage.

⁵ Göller regards *κεφαλαίωσαντες* as conveying a hint to the Lacedæmonians to base the issue on a literal answer to the summary question addressed by them to the Plataeans.

SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES

To his soldiers at Pylos. Bk. IV. ch. 10.

INTRODUCTION.

DEMOSTHENES, the Athenian commander, took advantage of the accidental detention of the Athenian fleet, B.C. 425, in the harbour of Pylos, on the Messenian coast, to construct a fort on the shore, by way of occupying a post on the enemy's territory. On receiving intelligence of this descent, the Spartans withdrew their forces from Attica, and, with the aid of the Peloponnesian fleet of forty-three triremes, which had been recalled from Corcyra, and approached Pylos about the same time as the land forces from Lacedæmon, made an attempt to dislodge the Athenians from their position. Thereupon Demosthenes called upon his men to defend the fort to the last: and to guard the line of the sea-shore, so as to prevent the enemy from landing.

CH. 10. Soldiers, my comrades in this adventurous enterprise! in an emergency like ours, none of you should try to show his ingenuity by computing the degree of danger with which we are threatened; you should all resolve¹ to charge the enemy home in the reckless spirit of a sanguine confidence, and then you will² probably weather the peril, great as it is. For, when matters have reached a crisis, as in our case, they will not brook calculation, but demand the earliest venture. And I *do* believe the odds are on our side, if we resolutely hold

¹ Göller rightly repeats βουλέσθω and supplies ἕκαστος before χωρήσαι but surely it is not necessary to follow him, as neither does Poppo (ed. min.), in repeating δοκεῖν also.

² Göller says ἂν περιγεγόμενος 'præteriti vim habet.' Poppo, how-

ever (ed. min.), supports Dr. Arnold in assigning to the words a future or contingent sense far more relevant to the context. He explains the clause as equivalent to, ἐπεὶ, εἰ ὁμοσε χωρήσειε, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἂν περιγένοιτο.

the position, instead of surrendering the vantage ground we possess to a panic inspired by the enemy's superiority in numbers. On the one hand, I consider the difficulty of landing on this beach in our favour; for, if we stand fast, it is our ally: whereas, if we once fall back, though the ground is rugged, it will become easy of access, when there is no one to oppose a landing. We should also find the enemy more formidable, because his retreat will not be easily effected, supposing he *should*¹ be hard pressed by us. And² it will be a harder task to repulse him when on shore: for though it is very easy to keep him off while on shipboard, yet the moment he disembarks he will be on the same footing with us. On the other hand, we need not be very much afraid of his superior numbers: for his troops, though numerous, will have to fight in small detachments, because they have no room to moor their ships in a line close to the shore; and we have not got to do with an army on land, exceeding us in numbers, and equal to us in other respects, but with one on board ship: and ships, to act with effect, require the concurrence of many favourable accidents at sea. So that I think our inferiority of force balanced by the difficulties of our foes: and I call upon you, Athenians as you are, who know from experience that a naval

¹ The force of *καί*, so often used to give emphasis, may perhaps be best expressed by italics. Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. p. 634) gives many such instances, and, among them, the following line of Xenophon (*Hell.* iii. 3, 11): ἤροντο δέ, τί καί βουλόμενος ταῦτα πράττοι; 'what he meant by acting thus.'

² Arnold, in explaining this text, omits to connect the sense of the clause ἐπὶ γὰρ ταῖς ναυσί, κ.τ.λ., with the preceding sentence. Göller aptly supplies the missing link by the fol-

lowing words: βιάζεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν γῆ χαλεπώτερον ἔσται, without which the passage is unintelligible. The difficulty arises from the argumentative connection between the clause ἐπὶ γὰρ ταῖς ναυσί, κ.τ.λ., and the first clause of the preceding sentence, which thus requires to be in some form repeated. Poppo (ed. min.) connects the two sentences by a link, differing verbally from, but similar in sense to, that proposed by Göller: 'And he will fight more desperately: for though, etc.

descent¹ on an enemy's coast cannot be effected by force, if the opposing troops stand firm, and do not give way from fear of the breakers, and the imposing approach of the ships as they bear down : I call upon you to support me² in holding our ground now, and by fighting close to the margin of the surf to save at once yourselves and the fort.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller agree with Krüger's idea of the construction of this passage. He regards *ναυτικῆν ἀπόβασιν* as the accusative by attraction, and makes it the sub-

ject of *βιάζοιτο*.

² ' *Καὶ αὐτοῖς* bene Haack : verbis "ipsos quoque" videtur exprimere, ut respiciatur ad Demosthenem litus non relicturum.'—Poppo, ed. min.

SPEECH OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN AMBASSADORS

Before the Athenian popular assembly, B.C. 425. Bk. IV. chs. 17-21.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Lacedæmonians, having been twice defeated at Pylos, purchase an armistice by surrendering all their ships to the Athenians, to be restored on the final conclusion or rupture of the negotiations: and allowing them to secure the detention of the Lacedæmonian soldiers cut off in the isle of Sphacteria. At the same time they despatched an embassy to Athens, to treat for peace: the spokesman of which delivered the following speech.¹

CH. 17. Lacedæmon² despatched us, Athenians, with ample powers to negotiate, on behalf of our troops on the island, any terms we may show to be advantageous to you, and likely, at the same³ time, so far as circumstances admit, to prove creditable to us in our present disaster. And, if we now address you at more than ordinary length, it will be no violation of custom: for, though we are not in the habit of using many words when few suffice, we are ready to speak at length, whenever a detailed exposition of the main points of a case is essential to the fulfilment of our mission.

Do not suppose for a moment that we are addressing

¹ See Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. vi. p. 440.

² Grote (vol. vi. p. 444) remarks: 'On this occasion the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little

scruple as the Spartan general Menedæus during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Ambraciot confederates after the battle of Olpæ, to conclude a separate capitulation with Demosthenes.'

³ 'Τὸ αὐτό, idem, i. e. simul.'—Poppo, ed. min.

you in a spirit of hostility, or as if we were lecturing a half-educated audience in you: look upon us as merely suggesting, to men familiar with political ethics, the principles of an equitable decision. You¹ have now the opportunity of establishing your present prosperity on a firm basis: you may retain² your existing possessions, and at the same time add to your honour and glory: and you may avoid the fate common to men blessed with unusual good fortune: for hope is ever tempting them to grasp at more, since even their present success exceeds their expectations. Those, on the contrary, who have experienced constant alternations of prosperity and disaster, may fairly be expected to have learnt a strong distrust³ of good fortune. A sentiment we may well suppose would be very sensibly felt by your countrymen, owing to their wide experience, as well as by ourselves.

18. A glance at our present disaster will, among other examples,⁴ convince you of the instability of fortune: for we, who had the proudest name in Greece, are now here as your suitors: though, previously, we considered it rather our privilege than yours to grant those favours which we have now repaired to you to entreat. Yet it was neither from a decline of power, nor from arrogance

¹ Γάρ is not argumentative here: it is simply used to introduce the *ὑπόμνησις* mentioned in the preceding sentence. In such cases, no introductory particle is used by the English idiom: in Latin, as Klotz (*Devar.*) has shown (vol. ii. p. 234), *igitur* corresponds to it.

² Poppo points out that, when the Lacedæmonians and Athenians came to an understanding, one of the articles was that they should respectively retain the places they possessed at the time—*ἐκατέρου εἶχεν ἅπερ ἔχουσιν*.—Ch. 118, below.

³ In the expression *καὶ ἀπιστότατοι*, *καὶ* is apparently used to compare the idea of the result with that of the cause, and to show the closeness of the connection between them. See the passage cited from Klotz, *Devar.*, note ¹, p. 41. It is possible, however, that it may tacitly compare the idea expressed by *ἀπιστότατοι*, κ.τ.λ., with some other idea latent in the writer's mind. The passage might then be rendered 'may fairly be expected to have learnt, among other lessons, a strong distrust,' etc.

⁴ *καὶ*. See note ², p. 2.

caused by large accessions to it, that we suffered this¹ calamity: but simply because, while in command² of our ordinary resources, our calculations failed us: a contingency in which all men are liable to disaster.³ It would therefore be irrational in you to infer, from the present strength of your city and her acquisitions, that fortune must needs⁴ prove your constant ally. Those politicians are wise, who act on the safe principle of regarding prosperity as a prize they may lose: (such men, too, would meet calamity in a more intelligent spirit than others) and who believe that war will not exactly confine itself to the limited sphere within which they may desire to deal with it, but will follow its own⁵ varying fortunes. Men of this stamp, as they would not be carried away by a blind confidence in military success, would at once be the last to miscarry, and the first to come to terms in their hour of triumph. And this, Athenians, you have now an excellent opportunity of doing: and of avoiding, by a reconciliation with us, all future imputation—in the very possible contingency of your meeting with a disaster through refusing our overtures—of owing even your present successes to chance, when you might bequeath to posterity a reputation for power and wisdom, which nothing could endanger.

19. The Lacedæmonians now invite you to a truce

¹ See note 1, p. 3, on the peculiar use of *αὐτό* for *τοῦτο* by Thucydides.

² Poppo (ed. maj.), commenting on the phrase *ἀπὸ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων*, says: 'Sententiam his verbis recte exprimit Port.: *quam pristinam potentiam obtineremus*. 'Aei hic non, ut sæpe post articulum, est *unus post alterum*, sed *perpetuus, constans*.'

³ *Τὸ αὐτό*. lit. 'to the same fate.'

⁴ Such, perhaps, is the force of the particle *καί* which precedes *τὸ τῆς*

τύχης. It connects together, more closely, the two ideas: that of the present strength of Athens, and the question of the constancy of fortune. See Wolf, on *Leptin.* p. 230. Comp. note 3, p. 215.

⁵ 'Pluralis *αὐτῶν* aut ad *ἄνδρας*, subjectum orationis, aut ad partes belli, quæ insunt in colectivo *ἔσον ἂν μέρους*, referri potest.'—Poppo, ed. min.

and a termination of hostilities, tendering to you peace and alliance, and, besides,¹ the reciprocal maintenance of very friendly and intimate relations: soliciting, in return, the liberation of our troops in Sphacteria, and thinking it better for both parties not to prolong the dangers of the situation, for the chance of our men either forcing their way out of the island, should any means of escape offer: or of their being consigned to an even worse fate in the event of their position being stormed. We believe, too, that bitter enmities are most likely to be effectually cancelled, not when a belligerent insists on retaliation, and, because the balance of military success has been on his side, binds his adversary by stringent oaths to unequal terms of composition: but when, with full power to do all this, he consults equity, vanquishes his antagonist² by his generosity, and disappoints his fears by concluding a peace on moderate conditions. For as the adversary has then no debt of retaliation to pay, as if he had been forcibly coerced, but a debt of kindness, he is the more disposed, from a sense of honour, to abide by the terms of the compact. Men, too, are more apt to grant their greatest enemies moderate conditions,³ than those with whom they are at issue on minor points: and it is their nature, when their antagonists voluntarily make concessions, to take a pleasure in meeting them halfway: while they confront overbearing pretensions with a resolution to run all risks, even against their better judgment.

20. Now, if ever, a fair opportunity of coming to terms presents itself to both of us, before we are over-

¹ ἄλλην.

² Ἀπὸν νικήσας, a reading not devoid of authority, and preferred by Arnold and Bloomfield, suits the sense better than ἀπὸ νικήσας, which Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller retain.

³ Poppo (ed. maj.) rightly censures Göller for referring τοῦτο δρῶσιν to τὸ ἀνταμίνεσθαι. He explains τοῦτο as equivalent to τὸ μετρίως ξυναλλαγῆναι.

taken, meanwhile, by some irreparable disaster, a contingency in which we must of necessity cherish an undying enmity towards you, on private¹ as well as on national grounds: while you will lose the advantages we now proffer to you. Let us, then, while the issue is still pending, while honour and our friendship are flowing in upon you: while we can forestall a disgrace and make a tolerable compromise with our disaster: let us be reconciled: let us choose peace instead of war for ourselves, and secure a respite from suffering to the rest of the Greeks, who,² we must add, will look upon you as the main instruments of their release. For at present they find themselves involved in war without knowing which of the leading states gave the provocation: whereas, if a pacification is effected—a question of which you are now the main arbiters—their gratitude will fall to you. Besides, by thus deciding, you may make firm friends of the Lacedæmonians, as you will be accepting their own invitation to peace, and, instead of extorting a concession, will have granted³ a favour. Finally, consider the many advantages in all probability involved in this course: for, when you and we agree, the rest of Greece will assuredly, from inferiority of power, as you know, pay us the greatest deference.⁴

¹ See Dr. Arnold's explanation. It is approved by Poppo, ed. min.

² Καί, as Klotz shows (vol. ii. p. 636), is often added to relatives merely to emphasise the idea they introduce. Thus, Plato (*Laches*, p. 198, B): ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς εἰνὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ ὄιος παρέχει, θαρράλεια δέ, ἃ μὴ ὄιος παρέχει.—The Scholiast explains the clause by the following paraphrase: ἐν τῷ γενέσθαι δηλοῖσθαι

τὴν εἰρήνην, ὅμῃς νομιοῦσιν αἰτιωτέρους.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) remarks on the participles χαρισσάμενοις and βιασαμέντοις, 'aoristi participia vim habent futurorum exactorum.'

⁴ Aristophanes holds out the same inducement to peace between Athens and Sparta: ἐξὸν σπεισαμένοις κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχειν.—*Παρ.* 1048.

SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES,

The representative of Syracuse, at the Congress of Sicilian States held at Gela, B.C. 424.
Bk. IV. chs. 59-65.

INTRODUCTION.

AT the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta could count on the sympathy, though not on the active cooperation, of most of the Dorian cities in Sicily—such as Syracuse, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum and Selinus, together with the Italian communities of Locri and Tarentum. Instead, however, of aiding Sparta with the naval armament which, on commencing the war in 431 B.C., she expected from them (Thucyd. ii. 7), they thought it better policy to turn their arms against the Ionic or Chalcidic cities in their own country—viz. Naxos, Catana, and Leontini; who, hard pressed by their assailants, applied, in the summer of 427 B.C., to Athens for aid; a petition in which they were joined by the Dorian Camarina, who had much to fear from the ambition of her powerful neighbour, Syracuse, and by the Italian Rhegium. Athens, who had everything to gain by checking a Dorian supremacy in Sicily, which might have ensured the Lacedæmonians active support, complied with the request, and despatched a squadron of twenty triremes in the year 426 B.C. Their operations, under Laches, met with some success; afterwards, however, difficulties arose: reinforcements were applied for: and a fleet of forty sail left the Piræus, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles. Their presence in the Sicilian waters, combined with the impression produced by the recent decisive triumph of the Athenian arms at Sphacteria, intimidated the Sicilian Dorians, and made them eager to forestall Athenian encroachments by coming to terms with the Chalcidic cities. Accordingly, deputies from the several states were invited to attend a congress at Gela, which met in the spring of the year 424 B.C., when Hermocrates, the representative of Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, delivered the following speech, in which he strongly urges a general pacification as the common interest of all.

CH. 59. In the address I am about to deliver, Siceliot, I do not speak as a member either of a weak state, which has most to fear from war, or of one distressed beyond others by recent hostilities; I speak as the advocate of what seems to me the best policy for the national interest of all Sicily. As to the hardships of war in the abstract, what purpose could I serve by singling out all the horrors it involves, and detailing them at length to an audience familiar with the subject? Inexperience of those hardships has no more power to tempt a man to go to war, than fear has to divert him from it, if he imagines he can gain any advantage by it. The fact is, some¹ men think the prospective gain of war outweighs its risks: others, again, are willing to brave all its dangers rather than brook the slightest immediate loss. If, however, two belligerent powers happen to be exchanging hostilities at a time which suits neither, recommendations to peace are seasonable enough. And, if we believe this to be the case with *us*² at the present time, such advice might prove of the utmost value. It³ was, I presume,⁴ with the view⁵ of obtaining a satisfactory adjustment of our

¹ I have followed Heilmann and Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller's second edition, in taking *τοῖς μὲν* and *οἱ δὲ* as equivalent to the Latin *alii—alii*: not, as Göller did in his first edition, to *alteri—alteri*. He had formerly connected the two clauses of this sentence, respectively, with the corresponding members of the preceding one.

² Perhaps the force of the particle *καί*, which precedes *ἡμῶν*, may be best given by italicising the English pronoun '*us*.' If the meaning of *καί* is to be fully expressed, it must be rendered somewhat as follows: 'if we believed this to be the case with us, as well as with other belligerents

at war with each other at times unfavourable to both.'

³ The connection, marked by *γάρ*, between this sentence and its predecessor, seems to be this. This is the time for such recommendations of peace: for, unless the belligerents can be persuaded that further contention will be unseasonable, there is much reason to expect a renewal of hostilities. See note¹, p. 142.

⁴ Poppo justly rebukes Gottl. for attaching an ironical sense to *εἴ* here.

⁵ *Βουλόμενοι*, a various reading, yields a fitter sense than *βουλοόμενοι* here.

several special interests, that we originally took up arms : we are now trying to effect a reconciliation with each other by holding conferences on the questions at issue : but there is every prospect of our resuming hostilities, should the representatives of the several states eventually fail to obtain equitable terms, before they leave Gela.

60. However, you must remember that the business of this Congress, if we are wise, is not to discuss special interests only, but to consider whether we may still be able to save all Sicily, attacked, I sincerely believe, by the machinations of Athens. The Athenians you may certainly regard as far more cogent mediators in our domestic difficulties than any arguments of mine ; they represent the strongest power in Greece, and are at hand, with a small ¹ squadron, watching our mistakes : and, while pretending to act as the rightful allies of Chalcis, are, with a decent regard for appearances, turning their inborn hatred of us to excellent account.² Now,³ if we go to war with one another, and invite their arbitration—ready as they are, unsolicited, to send expeditions even to those who never summoned them—if, I say, we spend our revenues in ruining each other, and at the same time pave the way for their ascendancy : we may fairly expect that, when they see we are worn out by war, they will some day appear again with a larger armament, and endeavour to subject all Sicily to their sway.

61. If, however, we call in foreign aid at all, and thereby⁴ expose ourselves to danger, it ought surely, if

¹ See Mr. Grote's note, vol. vii. p. 188.

² The Scholiast, quoted by Dr. Arnold, wastes his ingenuity in a prolix paraphrase of this sentence, which admits of a literal rendering. As Poppo (ed. min.) says, ' τὸ φύσει

πολέμιον ad Atheniensium cupiditatem Siciliæ expugnandæ refertur.'

³ Γάρ, as Gottl. and Poppo (ed. min.) remark, refers to διαλλακτάς, not to the concluding clauses of the previous sentence.

⁴ Poppo's interpretation (ed. min.)

we know our own interests, to be with the view of enriching our several territories by fresh acquisitions, instead of damaging our actual possessions. And we may fairly recognise in faction the deadly enemy of our various states and of all Sicily: since it renders the whole population of the island, while its cities are divided by feuds, the common prey of foreign intrigue. In this conviction, let us all make peace with each other, citizen with citizen, city with city, and strive by common effort to ensure the safety of all Sicily; and let no one imagine that, while the Dorians among us are the natural enemies of Athens, the Chalcidic population is protected by its Ionian blood. Athens is attacking us, not because our country is divided¹ between two races, one of which she hates, but because she is longing for the good things of Sicily, our common property. Her motives clearly betrayed themselves recently, when the Chalcidic states invited her interference: for she then went further,² in her zeal, than her engagements required, in giving the full benefit of the treaty³ to confederates from whom she never yet received a particle of the aid stipulated by the bond of alliance.

Now, I can well forgive the Athenians for the ambitious spirit and the political foresight thus displayed; it is not the lovers of empire that I blame, but those who are

of *προσλαμβάνειν κινδύνους* seems the best: 'pericula, quæ cum hac sociorum invitatione cohærent, suscipere.' He thinks *προσλ. κινδ.* means simply 'suscipere pericula:' not, as Dr. Arnold insists, 'add to existing dangers.'

¹ I have followed Poppo (ed. min.) and Gøller, who strike out the comma before *ὅτι δίχα πέφυκε*, and translate 'quod Sicilia in duas partes divisa est,' making *ἡ Σικελία* the nominative

case before *πέφυκε*.

² Portus, quoted by Dr. Arnold, takes *μᾶλλον* to mean, 'rather than demand aid of them.' But it seems better to follow Dobree and Poppo (ed. min.), and to take *μᾶλλον* as governing *συνθήκης*. The words, fully expressed, would run as follows: *τὸ ἕκαιον [τῆς συνθήκης] μᾶλλον τῆς συνθήκης*, which is equivalent to *μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν συνθήκην*.

³ See Thucydides, iii. 86.

too ready¹ to submit. For man is naturally prone to domineer over the yielding, but to be shy of meddling with the strong.² Those among us who know all this, yet fail to take proper precautions: or who have entered this Congress without a conviction that the first care of all of us should be to make a good settlement of a question formidable to all: have made a mistake. A reconciliation with one another would prove our speediest deliverance from the danger; the Athenians would then have nothing to do; for they are not coming direct from their own country, but from those cities which invited them. If we follow this course, we shall not have one war concluded by another, but domestic differences easily adjusted by peace; and the foreign auxiliaries, who visited our shores with excellent pretexts for doing wrong, will leave them with excellent reasons for doing nothing.

62. So far, then, as the Athenians are concerned, such are found to be the advantages of sound policy on our part. And, as peace is universally held to be the greatest of blessings, why should we not make it among ourselves?³ Unless, indeed, you really believe that, if one man is enjoying prosperity, and another suffering adversity, tranquillity is not more likely than war to relieve the evil and secure the good: or that the honours and glories incident to peace are not held by a less precarious tenure; to say nothing of its other advantages, in

¹ Ἐτοιμοτέρον is probably a classical comparative. But it may mean, 'more ready to submit than others to rule,' as Tiberius said of the Romans of his day.

² The Scholiast explains τὸ ἐπιόν by τὸ κρείττον, the effect being put for the cause.

³ The particle καί before ἐν ἡμῶν

αὐτοῖς is used to contrast what is special with what is general in the terms of the proposition: and to emphasise the pronoun. See Klotz, *Devar.* vol. ii. p. 635. He instances Soph. (*Æd. Col.* 53), "Ὅσ' εἶδα κάγω, πάντ' ἐπιστήσαι, where καί throws the emphasis on the personal pronoun.

the detail of which one might be as copious as in painting the evils of war.¹ Pray consider this, and do not think lightly of my advice: employ it rather as a means of providing² for the personal safety of each and all.

Such,³ indeed, is the uncertainty of fortune, that even if a man feels assured⁴ of success in any project, which he may be compassing either by rightful claim or by open violence, he must not think it hard if he is baffled by an unexpected result. He must be aware that many, ere now, in seeking redress⁵ for oppression, have lost their lives as well as their revenge: while the efforts of others to achieve aggrandisement by force have resulted in the total loss instead of the enlargement of their possessions. For retribution does not succeed, as of right it should, simply because a wrong has been done: nor can we rely on power, merely because it makes us sanguine.

¹ Krüger, when he condemned this last clause, forgot its reference to the similar passage in ch. 59, above.

² I have not attempted to echo the tasteless alliteration of *ὑπεριούτων* and *προουδίων*, which might be preserved by rendering the passage 'do not overlook my advice: look upon it rather as a means of providing for your safety.'

³ None of the commentators afford us any aid in tracing the connection of thought between this and the preceding paragraph. It seems to be intended as an illustration of the uncertainties of life and the vanity of hope: pointing to the expediency of closing at once with the safest bargain, which peace had just been declared to be. I have ventured the insertion of a few words, intended to serve as a bridge between this and the preceding sentence.

⁴ Poppo (ed. maj.) endorses, by

silent quotation, Bloomfield's connection of *βεβαίως* with *οἴεται*. The Scholiast supports that view.

⁵ Poppo (ed. maj.) has a right to complain of the position of *ἔτρωτοι*, which should have preceded *ἐλπίσαντες*. But he is surely mistaken in saying that *καὶ* before *τιμωρίαις* 'deesse debet:' it is simply opposed, disjunctively, to the following *καὶ*. Literally the passage might be rendered thus: 'he must not think it hard if he is baffled by an unexpected result; knowing that many, ere now, whether (*καὶ*) in quest of vengeance for oppression, or, in other cases (*ἔτρωτοι*), hoping to aggrandise themselves by sheer force, have, on the one hand (*οὐ μέν*), not only failed of their revenge, but have lost their lives in its pursuit: and, on the other (*τοῖς ἐν*), instead of gaining more, have chanced to lose into the bargain all they had.'

Most¹ of our plans are baffled by the uncertainty of the future : an element at once fertile in disaster, and full of advantage : for as it inspires equal distrust in all, it makes us the more cautious in attacking each other.

63. If, then, that indefinable fear which the unseen future inspires, and the formidable presence of the Athenians on the spot, combine to scare us : if we believe that the full² realisation of the hopes we had severally formed of great achievements, has been effectually prevented by the obstacles I have mentioned : let us dismiss from our country the foes who are hovering over her, and come, if possible, to terms of perpetual amity with each other : or, failing this, let us sign a truce for the longest possible period, and adjourn the settlement of our private differences till a future season. In one word, let us only feel assured that, if my counsels are adopted, all our cities will be free : and, as we shall then be absolute masters of ourselves, our moral strength³ will enable us to reward good and evil deeds as they deserve. If, on the other hand, my advice is rejected, and we listen to foreign mediation, we shall no longer be fighting⁴ for revenge on one another : or, at the best, if very successful in that

¹ Mr. Sellar (in his interesting essay on the *Characteristics of Thucydides*) observes that there is 'a deep irony' in the last sentence, suggested, perhaps, by the signal instances of triumphant iniquity—that especially of Thebes, never visited for her share in the extinction of Plataea—which the history of cotemporary Greece afforded.

² Göller's interpretation of this passage seems preferable to Dr. Arnold's. He takes τὸ ἄλλοτεν τῆς γνώμης as equivalent to 'quod attinet ad inexpectum et mancum illorum consiliorum,' and understands ἡμᾶς

before εἰρχθῆναι. Literally, therefore, the passage would construe thus: 'if, as regards our imperfect realisation of the hopes we had severally formed of great achievements, we believe ourselves to have been effectually debarred by these obstacles.'

³ Poppo (ed. min.) approves Heilmann's version of ἀρετῇ by the Latin equivalent *per virtutem*.

⁴ Ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται seems to have been suppressed after τιμωρήσασθαι, as Dr. Arnold remarks. In the next clause, I have adopted Göller's reading γιγνοίμεθα.

revenge, we shall be forced into friendship with our bitterest foes, and estranged from our natural allies.

64. For my part, although, as I said on the threshold of my speech, I represent a very powerful city, and am rather in a position to attack others than to defend myself, I am resolved to anticipate these calamities by coming to terms, instead of continuing hostilities with every prospect of doing myself more harm than my enemy. Nor will I allow an infatuated animosity to persuade me that I am as absolute a master of Fortune, whom I cannot rule, as of my own plans: no! I would rather make every reasonable concession. And I call upon you, my compatriots, to follow my example, by abating¹ your pretensions of your own accord instead of having them abated by our foes. For there is nothing humiliating in concessions between kinsmen, between Dorian and Dorian, between Chalcidians and others of Ionian blood: in one word, between men bound together by the common tie of neighbourhood,² fellow-colonists of one country, and that country girt by the waves,³ and all known by one name as Siceliots. And, as Siceliots, we shall, I suppose, when Fate decrees, go to war among ourselves, and make peace, too, afterwards, through negotiation and discussion; but we shall always combine together, if we have a particle of sense, to repel a foreign invasion, inasmuch as, even⁴

¹ I have followed Poppo (ed. min.), Becker, and Göller, in reading *καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους εἰκαιῶ ταὐτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὑφ' ἑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολέμιων τοῦτο παθεῖν.*

² 'Hermocrates,' says Dr. Arnold, 'introduces this clause, because he was not only urging Dorians to give way to Dorians, but Dorians to Chalcidians, and Chalcidians to Dorians: so that the local connection afforded

the only argument that was universally applicable to every part of this case.'

³ The epithet probably alludes to the national unity belonging to an insular position.

⁴ *Καὶ* seems to belong to *καθ' ἐκάστους* rather than to *εἴπερ*. *Εἴπερ καὶ* occurs in the *Odyssey* (ix. 53), but in the sense of 'even if.'

when separately injured, we are nationally endangered. Nor will we ever, for the future, call in confederates or mediators in our quarrels. By adopting this course, we shall, at the present crisis, avoid robbing Sicily of two advantages, riddance of the Athenians and of civil war : while for the future we shall have our country all to ourselves, free and independent, and less exposed to the machinations of foreign intrigue.

SPEECH OF BRASIDAS,

Addressed to the popular assembly of the city of Acanthus, B.C. 424. Bk. IV. chs. 85-88.

INTRODUCTION.

PERDICCAS, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in Thrace, alarmed by the recent triumphs of Athens, sent envoys to Sparta to request the despatch of an auxiliary force for their protection. With this petition the Lacedæmonians, anxious to cause Athens embarrassment in Thrace, instantly complied: and an expedition left Sparta, B.C. 424, under the command of Brasidas. Having reached the Chalcidic by forced marches, he commenced operations by attempting to withdraw Acanthus, a subject ally of Athens, from the Athenian league. A party, within the city, anxious for a revolt, and acting in concert with the Chalcidians, persuaded their countrymen to admit the Spartan leader to explain his purposes before the public assembly, whom he addressed in the following speech. 'Its substance,' says Mr. Grote, 'is doubtless genuine: and it is one of the most interesting in Grecian history—partly as a manifesto of professed Lacedæmonian policy—partly because it had a great practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude which, though unfavourably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach of argument.'—Vol. vi. p. 547.

CH. 85. People of Acanthus! Lacedæmon, in despatching this expedition under my command, intended¹ to prove the sincerity of the motive she professed at the outset of hostilities, when she declared the liberation of Greece to be the object of her war with Athens. And if we have been long in coming to your aid, owing to the failure of the hopes we had founded on our operations nearer home, which we trusted would soon have levelled

¹ Such is the force assigned by Poppo (ed. maj.) to the present participle
επαληθιόνουσα.

the Athenian empire with the ground, without endangering you—no blame can be imputed to us. In sending this expedition, we embraced the first opportunity of giving you support; and, if our efforts are seconded by you, we will devote ourselves to demolishing Athenian ascendancy. I am, however, surprised to find myself excluded from your town, instead of being received with a cordial welcome. For, when we Lacedæmonians, in the fervour of our zeal for your interests, braved a dangerous march of many days through an alien province, it was in the belief that we should find ourselves among men, who, even before our actual arrival, were at any rate at heart our allies, and who would gladly welcome us. And it would be strange indeed, should you have any other views, or object to your own liberation and that of the rest of Greece. It is not as if you only were opposed to me; every other state to whom I may apply, will be less disposed to join me, because they will think it odd that you, to whom I first repaired, representing, as you do, a considerable city, and supposed to be very intelligent, did not receive me. Besides, I shall never be able to give them a satisfactory reason for your refusal: they will charge me either with dishonesty in offering freedom, or with having brought hither a weak force, powerless to protect you against any attack the Athenians may make. Yet it was with this very force which I now have, that the Athenians, though numerically stronger,¹ declined to cope, when I marched to the relief of Nisæa; it is therefore² improbable they can now

¹ This, as Mitford remarks, is untrue. Brasidas relied on the ignorance of the Acanthians. Comp. Thucyd. iv. 72, 2, with iv. 78, 1.

² Poppo (ed. maj. and min.), when he proposes to retain the evidently

interpolated words *τῷ ἐν Νισαίᾳ*, forgets that their retention entirely vitiates the true inferential sense of *ᾧστε*. Dukas, cited by him (ed. maj.), sensible of this difficulty, lays violent hands on the particle, and declares,

despatch against you, as their armament must come by sea,¹ a force competent to meet you. Next²—as regards my personal intentions—I have come among you with no sinister design, but with a view to the emancipation of Greece, after binding the Lacedæmonian government by the most sacred oaths solemnly to guarantee the independence of all whom I may induce to enter their league. Nor, again, have we any desire either to force or cajole you into alliance with us: on the contrary, we came here to fight your battles, and to redeem you from slavery to Athens. I think, therefore, that I ought not to be an object of personal distrust, since I give you the surest pledges of my honesty, nor to be regarded as a powerless avenger: and I call upon you to join my standard with confidence.

86. Should anyone hesitate to do so, from personal apprehension, perhaps, of some private enemy, in the fancied contingency of my giving up the city to a cabal, let him be the very first to feel assured. For I came not here to support a faction: nor do I intend to offer you a visionary freedom, as³ I should be doing were I to discard your⁴ established constitution, and enslave the many

as Poppo says, 'contra linguæ leges,' that it is not *συμπερασματικόν*, 'inferential.' The following version shows, that if *τῶ ἐν Νισαίᾳ* is treated as genuine, ὥστε, in its true sense, makes nonsense: 'Yet it was with this very force which I now have, that the Athenians, though superior in numbers, declined to cope when I marched to the relief of Nisæa; it is therefore improbable they will now despatch against you, as their armament must come by sea, a force equal to that which they had at Nisæa.'

¹ See the passage of Thucydides,

vi. 37, 1, which illustrates the difficulty of transporting large armaments by sea.

² I have followed Dr. Arnold's arrangement of the paragraph, in which Poppo (ed. min.) agrees, although he has adopted the common division.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) compares the passage in bk. iii. 11, 3, where it is needful, as here, to understand something before the clause commencing with *εἰ*. See², p. 96.

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) shows that it is ridiculous to refer τὸ πάτριον to the Spartan constitution, as Dr. Arnold

to the few, or the few to the many. Liberty on such terms would be a greater hardship than foreign subjugation: and we Lacedæmonians, instead of being rewarded with gratitude for our exertions, should meet only with reproach in place of honour and respect: and should be proving our own title to the very imputations with which we are crushing the Athenians, in a form still more odious than in the case of men who never betrayed a glimpse of political honesty. For self-aggrandisement, when wrought by plausible trickery, is more disgraceful,¹ at any rate to men of high repute, than when compassed by open violence; in the one case, the power conferred by Fortune is the plea for encroachments, which, in the other, spring from the treacherous craft of a dishonest policy.

You may therefore safely trust us: so careful and circumspect are we, when our interests are so vitally concerned. Nor could you possibly receive a surer pledge, in addition to the oaths of the Spartan authorities, than our actions, when compared with our professions, afford; they will irresistibly convince you that it is really our policy to act as I have told you.

87. If, however, you meet my offers by pleading inability to avail yourselves of them, yet claim, on the strength of friendly intentions, exemption from the penalties of refusal, contending that freedom does not seem to you devoid of danger, and that we had better offer it to those only who are able to accept it, forcing it on none against their will; in that case, I will first call the Gods and the heroes of your country to witness your rejection

does: for the Acanthians could not be ignorant that it was not a popular government.

¹ Comp. Cicero (*De Off.* i. 13):
'Quum duobus modis, id est aut vi

aut fraude, fiat injuria, fraus quasi vulpeculæ, vis leonis videtur, utrumque homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna majore.' See also Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 11. Xenophon, *Hell.* iii. 5, 15.

of my friendly mission : and I will then endeavour, by ravaging your land, to extort your compliance. And in that case I cannot think I am doing wrong : but that I am acting on legitimate grounds, for two most cogent reasons especially. First, in the interest of the Lacedæmonians, to prevent any prejudice accruing to them, in spite of your professed good-will, from the tribute you pay to Athens, should you refuse to join our league : secondly, in the interest of the Greeks, to prevent their deliverance from political vassalage being hindered by you. Apart, indeed, from these considerations, we should certainly not be justified¹ in resorting to compulsion : nor is it our duty, as Lacedæmonians, to emancipate states against their will, save on the plea of some great public advantage. Again, we are not ambitious of dominion : but, as we are anxious to check the domination of another power, we should be wronging the general welfare, if, when offering independence to all, we allowed you to thwart our designs.

Weigh, then, the issue well : strive to be foremost in inaugurating a new æra of Grecian freedom : to lay up for yourselves immortal fame : to save your private property from pillage : and to crown² the whole of your community with the brilliant wreath of Honour.

¹ Dr. Arnold aptly compares the arguments used in defence of the expedition against Denmark in 1807.

² 'Ab ornatu translatum est verbum περιθειναι ad alia, et similiter

Tacitum aliquoties "circumdare alicui aliquid" de conciliando dixisse docent interpretes, *Agrie. c. 20.*—Poppo. The same figure graces the speech of Alcibiades, vi. 89.

SPEECH OF THE THEBAN BŒOTARCH, PAGONDAS,

To his soldiers, B.C. 424. Bk. IV. ch. 92.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the early autumn of 424 B.C., an expedition was planned by Athens against Bœotia, under the command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates: the former entering the country from the seaport town of Siphæ, the latter on the side of Delium, a temple of Apollo, overhanging the sea, a little more than a mile from the Athenian border territory of Oropus. Hippocrates fortified the temple: and the army commenced its return march, halting within the district of Oropus. Meanwhile the Bœotians, who had repulsed Demosthenes, mustered at Tanagra, under the command of the two Theban Bœotarchs, one of whom, Pagondas, remonstrates, in the following speech, against the unwillingness of the other officers to hazard a battle with an enemy already within the line of his own frontier.

CH. 92. My Bœotian comrades! It ought never even to have entered the heads of any of us, your commanders, that we have no right to force the Athenians to give battle, should it turn out that they are no longer in Bœotia when we overtake them. It is Bœotia, which they entered from a frontier district, on whose soil they have already built a fort, that they intend to lay waste; besides, they are, I presume, our enemies, independently of the country in which they may be found, or whence they issued to perpetrate acts of hostility. If, however, anyone *has*¹

¹ The force of the particle *καί* may be given by italicising the English auxiliary verb. Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. p. 637) cites, among many similar instances, the following passage from Herod. i. 80): 'Ὡς δὲ καὶ συνήσαν

εἰς τὴν μάχην (when they *did* join battle), upon which he remarks: 'idcirco effertur per *καί* particulam verbum *συνήσαν*, quia multis verbis quem ad modum parata acies esset, descriperat.'

fancied it will be safer, just at present, to avoid an action, he had better revise his opinion. For when men are attacked by a foreign invader, and their all is at stake, prudence has not so fair a field for nice calculations, as she has, when men, in full possession of their own territory, invade their neighbours in a spirit of wanton encroachment. Besides, you have always, as your fathers did before you, repulsed the incursion of foreign armies with equal courage, whether on your own or alien¹ soil. And if there are any towards whom, above all others, it is needful thus to act, it is the Athenians, especially as they are a frontier power. Indeed, in our relations, generally, with neighbouring states, we can only preserve freedom by rivalry of spirit:² how much more³ then, when we have to contend with foes like these, whose boundless ambition⁴ aims at enslaving, I say not their neighbours, but even distant countries, is it our duty to fight to the very last? If we want instances of their encroachments, we have only to glance at the Eubœans across the strait, and at the policy⁵ of Athens towards the greater part of Greece. We must remember, too, that, while, in other cases, boundary questions are the subject of the contests between frontier states: in our case, should we be conquered, there will be no such question; one boundary line, no longer to be controverted, will be drawn: and the whole of our country will

¹ See Poppo's note (ed. min. i. 32, 1) on οἱ πέλαις. *fortiori* argument.

² Τὸ ἀντίπαλον can hardly mean 'the balance of power' here. As Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, τὸ ἀντ. ob superiora non 'æqualitatem virium,' sed 'animum ad τὸ ἀντιπαλαίειν paratum' debet designare.

³ Γε δὲ, as Poppo (ed. min.) shows, signifies *utique*, here, as in ch. 78, 2, above. It is used to usher in an *à*

⁴ Some such idea seems to be conveyed by the particle καί which follows the relative οἱ. Poppo (ed. min.) approves Haack's version, 'qui adeo.'

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) translates ὡς αὐτοῖς εἰάκεται, κ.τ.λ., 'quomodo tractata sit ab illis maxima Græciæ pars.'

sink into a province of Athens,¹ whose troops will forcibly invade and dispossess us. So much more dangerous to us is their neighbourhood, than that of other states. Those, as you know, whom the arrogance of superior strength tempts to encroach upon their neighbours, as the Athenians are now doing, generally march with less hesitation against a foe who stands on the defensive and resists only on his own soil: but they are not so ready to grapple² with an enemy who forestalls invasion by meeting them beyond his frontier, and, when he has an opportunity, strikes the first blow. We can prove that this is true of the Athenians. For the victory we gained over them at Coronea, at a time when intestine factions had placed our country in their power, secured Bœotia immunity from alarm to this hour. Young and old, we must all cherish the remembrance of this signal triumph: our veterans must rival their former deeds: and our younger soldiers must, as the children of sires whose valour shone on that field, strive to add fresh lustre to the family virtues. Trusting, then, that our cause will be favoured by the God, whose temple the Athenians are profanely holding as a fort: relying also on the auspicious omens which reward our sacrifices: we must march at once to meet the foe, and teach him that, though he may get what he covets by attacking unresisting cowards, he shall not retreat without a struggle with men whose sense of national honour leads them always to vindicate in arms the freedom of their country, and never allows them to sully their hands by the iniquitous enslavement of other states.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) thus translates: 'termini nostræ terræ ab Atheniensibus victoribus haud dubie ita con-

stituentur, ut tota illorum agro contineatur.'

² See Poppo, ed. min.

SPEECH OF HIPPOCRATES,

The Athenian general, to his troops, delivered on the same occasion as the preceding address. Bk. IV. ch. 95.

INTRODUCTION.

PAGONDAS, finding his address favourably received, conducted his army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. Hippocrates, hearing of this movement, joined his army, and addressed the following brief harangue to his soldiers, who, 'as the battle was just on the Oropian frontier, might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they were therefore exposed without necessity.'—Grote, vol. vi. p. 529.

CH. 95. Athenians, I have but little time to address you: but with brave men a short speech is as effectual as a longer one: and my aim is rather to remind you of your former deeds than to stimulate your courage. None of you should for a moment entertain the idea that we are running a great and a thoroughly gratuitous risk by fighting on alien¹ ground: for, if the field of battle is on Bœotian soil, still the struggle is for our own country; while, if we conquer, the loss of the Bœotian cavalry will prevent the Peloponnesians from invading Attica: and, in one action, you will at once gain the territory on which we stand, and give a surer freedom to your own. Forward, then, to meet them, with a courage

¹ It was, really, on a border territory, which, at the time, belonged to Athens. It had suited the purposes of Pagondas, in his speech

(ch. 92), to claim it as Bœotian soil: but Hippocrates, as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, is not so dexterous a pleader.

worthy of that country in whose possession each of you takes pride as the most illustrious in Greece: and of your sires, whose victory over these men at Œnophyta, under Myronides, gave them the command of Bœotia.

SPEECH OF BRASIDAS

To his soldiers, B.C. 423. Bk. IV. ch. 126.

INTRODUCTION.

BRASIDAS had accompanied Perdicas in his march into Macedonia against Arrhibæus, who, in an action which ensued, was completely defeated by their joint forces. After this, however, Perdicas quarrelled with the Spartan general: and the situation became complicated by the desertion of a horde of Illyrian auxiliaries, who, after having accepted the pay of the Macedonian monarch, joined Arrhibæus. On receiving this intelligence, the army of Perdicas, seized with sudden panic, broke up, and fled with the utmost precipitation, leaving Brasidas to confront the combined forces of Arrhibæus and his barbarian allies.

CH. 126. Had I not suspected, Peloponnesians, that the desertion of our allies, and the fact of our being attacked by barbarians, and those in numbers, might have dismayed you: I would not have presumed, as I am about to do, to offer you information as well as encouragement. As things are, however, I will touch upon two points—our abandonment by our allies, and the superior numbers of the enemy—and endeavour to impress upon you, in a few words of suggestion and counsel, some important considerations. I say, then,¹ that you ought to fight bravely on the field of battle, not in reliance on the constant presence of allies, but from your own inborn valour, undismayed by any foreign force,

¹ Γάρ is expegetic: it introduces the exposition promised in the preceding sentence. Klotz instances a very similar passage in Soph. *Trach.*

475: Πᾶν σοι φράσω τάληθῆς οὐδὲ κρίψομαι· ἔστιν γὰρ οὕτως ὥσπερ οὗτος ἐννέπει.

however multitudinous; for you do not come from those political communities in which¹ the multitude rules the few, but from states wherein the many are governed by the few, who acquired their power solely by their military prowess.

Inexperience leads you to fear the barbarians now before you: and it is needful you should feel convinced, as you well may be, partly from your previous trial of strength with their Macedonian troops, partly from my own assurance, backed by general report, that they will not prove formidable. It is needful,² I say: for though, when an enemy has genuine military skill, ignorance of its existence may increase the daring of an attack: yet, when his array is strong only in semblance, and weak in reality, an exact knowledge of his capabilities tends to embolden his opponents. And so with yonder host: their impending onset strikes inexperience with terror: their multitude alarms the eye: their loud shouts appal the ear: and the idle vibration³ of their glittering arms carries a menacing air. But in close conflict with troops who are proof against such terrors, they are not what they seemed; for as they are not drawn up in regular order, no feeling of shame prevents their abandoning any post under pressure: while it is impossible to put their

¹ I have followed Poppo (ed. min.) in considering *οὐ* before *πολλοί* as either an interpolation, or a confusion on the part of Thucydides. Göller, in his 2nd edition, encloses it in brackets.—The argument itself, to modern ears, seems curious enough, especially when addressed to soldiers. But, in those days, a man's profession as a soldier was more or less merged in his character as a citizen.

² If the commentators had translated this passage, they might have

discovered a difficulty which they have passed over. The particles *καὶ γάρ* refer to *μαθεῖν χρὴ* and the opposition between *μέν* and *δέ* answers to the English opposition of 'though' and 'yet.' But, as Mr. Shilleto has shown, in his clever essay, entitled, *Grote or Thucydides?*, p. 31, the clauses require to be reversed.

³ Livy has unconsciously translated this expression by the phrase 'armorum agitatio vana.'—Bk. vii. 10.

courage to the proof, because, with them, flight and attack are equally honourable;¹ and this independent style of fighting is just the one to give any man a decent excuse for self-preservation. Besides, they think it a safer game to keep out of danger and try to frighten you, than to meet you hand to hand; otherwise they would have adopted the latter course.

You now clearly see that all the danger you anticipated from them is trivial enough in reality, and has terrors only for the eye and ear. And, if you will firmly withstand it, as it rolls on, like a wave, towards you, and afterwards, at the right moment, fall back in perfect order and discipline, you will reach a safe position all the sooner: and you will know for the future that barbarous hosts like this, when their first onset is defied, are content to vaunt their courage by threatening demonstrations at a safe distance; but, if once their foe gives way, are eager enough to display their valour by hanging on his footsteps, when there is no danger.

¹ Compare Virgil, *G.* iii. 31. Horace, *Odes*, i. 19, 11. Tacitus, *Hist* ii. 12

SPEECH OF BRASIDAS

To his soldiers at Amphipolis, B.C. 422. Bk. V. ch. 9.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the year 422 B.C., Cleon was despatched with an Athenian armament to reduce Amphipolis, which had joined the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Brasidas held the city with a mixed force of Spartans, Amphipolitans and Chalcidic allies. The Athenian general, urged by the murmurs of his troops, mounted a rising ground on the Eastern side of the town: and, without any expectation of being attacked, began leisurely to reconnoitre the position. On this Brasidas, seeing his advantage, marched his men from the summit of a hill to the West of the city, into Amphipolis: intending to sally and surprise the Athenians before they could form their ranks, and offer effectual resistance. After sacrificing at the temple of Athene, he addressed the following speech to his troops, who, had they not known his plan of attack, might have been discouraged by the superior arms and equipment of their Athenian antagonists.

CH. 9. A few words, Peloponnesians, will suffice to remind you from what country we have come—a country whose valour has secured her constant independence—and of the character of the impending conflict, between Dorians on your side and Ionians on the other, a race you have been wont to vanquish. I will, however, explain to you the mode in which I intend to make the attack, to prevent your being discouraged by the seeming disadvantage of risking the battle with a detachment instead of our full force. My impression is that it was from contempt of us, and because they could not expect we should sally forth to fight them, that the enemy ascended the hill; they have now, I believe, left their

ranks, and are busy surveying the ground, with little thought of us. Now the successful general is the man whose eagle eye detects at a glance such mistakes on the part of his foe, and who, guiding himself by the force at his disposal, follows up the discovery by a rapid attack, not so much by open assault in battle array, as by suiting his tactics to the exigency of the moment. And those stratagems carry the highest credit, which are most effective at once in cheating one's enemies and serving one's friends. While, therefore, the Athenians are still full of confidence and quite unprepared, and are thinking, so far as I can see, rather of quietly withdrawing than of staying where they are: while their courage is yet unstrung,¹ and before they have made up their minds what to do: I will take my own division, and, if possible, surprise them by falling rapidly on the centre of their force. And do you, Clearidas, afterwards, the moment you see me in the act of charging their troops, and in all probability striking terror into them, suddenly open the gates and dash out at the head of your own division, the Amphipolitans, and the rest of our allies, making all haste to close at once with the foe. This manœuvre I think the most likely to scare them: for the force which seconds an attack has more terrors for an enemy than the force which he is fighting at the time. Prove, Clearidas, your own personal courage, a quality born in your Spartan blood: and do you, Allies, bravely follow him: assured that zeal, sense of honour, and obedience to your officers, are conditions of successful warfare: and that it depends on your bravery this day, whether you

¹ Mr. Grote remarks, on this text, that 'the Grecian hoplites, even the best of them, required to be peculiarly *wound up* for a battle; hence

the necessity of the harangue from the general which always preceded it.'—*Hist. of Greece*, vol. vi. p. 641.

are to maintain your freedom, and the title of confederates of Lacedæmon: or to become—supposing you are fortunate enough to escape slavery or death—the vassals of Athens, on terms far more rigorous than those formerly imposed upon you: besides hindering the liberation of the rest of Greece. But no! remembering how much is staked on this battle, you must not let your courage droop; while I, for my part, will show that I am not at all more disposed to preach valour to my followers than to display it myself on the battle field.

THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEGOTIATORS

On the question of the submission of the island of Melos to the Athenian dominion,
B.C. 416. Bk. V. chs. 85-113.

INTRODUCTION.

‘IN the beginning of the summer of 416 B.C., the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Melos—one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thera, which was not already included in their empire. Melos and Thera were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens: but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt: sending against the island a considerable force, under Cleomedes and Tisias. . . . These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject ally of Athens.

‘It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, and admitted the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of this conversation Thucydides professes to give a detailed and elaborate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no one of them separately long, and some very short—but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very impressive. There is indeed every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydides is in far larger proportion his own and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other

speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now, as all the Melian population were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.'—Grote, vol. vii. pp. 148–49.

CH. 85. *Athenians.* As we are not to address what we have to say to a general assembly of your people—for fear, to be quite candid,¹ of their being misled, if they listened² to a winning appeal from us, embodied in one continuous speech, and therefore safe from being questioned (for we know well enough what you mean by introducing us to a chamber of oligarchs), we recommend to your conclave a further refinement of caution. Do not confine yourselves, any more than us, to a single speech: decide each point by itself, interrupting us the moment we broach a proposition that does not suit you. But first let us know whether you accept our offer.

86. *Melians.* We cannot object to your equitable proposal that we should quietly enlighten each other; but your preparations for war, already made and no

¹ Δή, apparently, is used ironically here.

² Bloomfield commits a solecism in taking μή with ἀκούσαντες, which he construes 'by not hearing,' instead of with ἀπαρηθῶσι. If such

had been the meaning, Thucydides would have written οὐκ ἀκούσαντες, since the participle, so construed, would signify a cause or reason, not a condition or limitation.

longer threatened, seem to clash with it.¹ We see that you have come here to be your own judges of the points that may be raised: and that the conference will probably issue in our being involved in war, if we have the best of the argument and on that account refuse to yield: or in the loss of our freedom, should you succeed in convincing us.

87. *Athenians.* Nay, if your council is sitting to compute the value of your guesses as to the future, or for any purpose beyond that of consulting for the welfare of your country on the basis of the facts before your eyes: we cannot proceed; if, however, the latter is your object, we are ready to negotiate.

88. *Melians.* It is natural, and therefore excusable, for men in our position to exhaust every resource of argument or fancy;² since,³ however, the safety of our country is the question which this meeting was called to consider, the discussion may well be conducted, if you desire it, on the basis you suggest.

89. *Athenians.* Very well. On our part, we will not offer you a long and readily distrusted argument, plausibly founded either on our right to dominion as a reward for our overthrow of the Mede, or on the supposition that in coming here, we had wrongs to avenge; on the other hand, we presume you will not expect to move us by pleading that, though colonists of Sparta,

¹ Διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ· αὐτοῦ so clearly refers to τὸ διδάσκειν, that Col. Mure's (see his *Literature of Greece*, vol. v. p. 586) endorsement of Dionysius' censure of this pronoun as a solecism for αὐτῆς, is simply ridiculous.

² Δοκοῦντας. Upon this term Krüger remarks 'minus invidiosâ voce sententiam exprimunt eandem, quam Athenienses verbo ὑπονοεῖν.'

³ The double καί gives a logical,

and not merely copulative, connection to the two clauses. Poppo (ed. min.) remarks on the first καί, 'particula καὶ ita collocata est, ut si in altero membro καὶ τὸν λόγον . . . ἐχέτω γιγνόμενον vel similia quædam essent secutura.' See note ³, p. 220, and note ³, p. 238; and Donaldson's *Gr. Gram.* p. 570, on the syllogistic force of καί.

you never marched in her ranks, or that you never injured us; we presume that you will simply try to obtain the best terms you can get, dealing with the problem on the basis of the real aims and convictions of both parties, each of whom is well aware that, in political discussions, questions of pure right are weighed only when power is equally balanced:¹ and that, otherwise, the stronger exact all they can, and the weak submit, as a matter of course.

90. *Melians*. Well, if it comes to that, we² too think it *expedient*—a line of argument which your open repudiation of justice, and adoption of self-interest as your rule, compels us to take—we think it expedient that you should not destroy a principle beneficial to all mankind: but that anyone involved in danger should be allowed to reap some benefit, if he is able to satisfy his audience that his defence is reasonable and just, even should it fall a little short of strict right. A principle, indeed, even more favourable to you than to us: in proportion to the fearful retribution which, if you deal cruelly with us, will, in your hour of disaster, mark you as an example to mankind.

91. *Athenians*. Really, we³ are not very anxious about the catastrophe, even if our empire should be over-

¹ Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 150) thus renders this passage: 'Justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides.' He aptly compares this admission with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent previous to the attack on Copenhagen in 1807.

² I have followed Arnold and Götter in reading 'Ἡμεῖς δὲ, κ.τ.λ., and *πίσαντα* (which Poppo (ed. min.)

approves) in preference to *πίσαντα*. As to the construction of the clause commencing with the words ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀί, κ.τ.λ., I have adopted the views of Dobree, who makes τὰ ἐικότα depend on *πίσαντε*. Poppo (ed. maj.) and Götter are inclined to accept this explanation.

³ 'Ἡμεῖς δὲ—'Ἀπάντησις τοῦτο τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὸ 'καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν οὐχ ἤσσαν τοῦτο,' κ.τ.λ.—Ducas, cited by Poppo, ed. maj.

thrown. It is not imperial states, like ourselves¹ and Lacedæmon, whose vengeance is so terrible to the vanquished (with Lacedæmon,² indeed, at this moment³ we are not contending); what we have to dread is the vengeance⁴ of our subject allies, should a victory all their own ever give them the mastery of their rulers. However, it must be left to us to take this risk on our own shoulders; we will now clearly show you, that the support of our dominion is the object of our presence here, and that in this negotiation we have the welfare of your city in view: our only desire being to enjoy an untroubled sovereignty over you, and to ensure your safety on terms compatible with our joint interests.

92. *Melians*. Joint interests! How can it possibly be as⁵ advantageous to us to serve as to you to govern?

93. *Athenians*. Because, by choosing submission, you will escape a terrible fate: and, as you will be our subjects, we shall be gainers by sparing your lives.

94. *Melians*. Then you will not allow us to remain undisturbed, on terms of friendship instead of enmity with you, and of strict neutrality in the war?

95. *Athenians*. No: for we are not so much preju-

¹ "ὄσπερ καί· καί is probably used to compare Lacedæmon with Athens. Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. p. 635) thus explains the use of καί "in simplici comparatione:" dicitur καί particula ubi illa res aut persona, propter quam quæpiam res aut persona istâ particulâ effertur, aperte declarata non est.' It may, however, mean 'for instance.'

² I have followed Poppo (ed. min.) in considering this clause parenthetical.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that the sense of νῦν, which some editors insert, is contained in the definite

article prefixed to ἀγών.

⁴ Thucydides, when he wrote these words, must have had the catastrophe of the Peloponnesian war in his eye. When Athens was compelled to surrender to Lysander, the representatives of Thebes and Corinth, and of several other Grecian states, at Sparta, urged the Lacedæmonians to blot out Athens from the map of Greece. But this they refused to do. —Xen. *Hell.* II. ii. 19-21.

⁵ "ὄσπερ καί· καί points to χρήσιμον, which is virtually repeated in the second clause.

diced by your enmity as we should be by your proffered friendship, in which our subjects would read as clear a revelation of our weakness, as of our ascendancy in your hatred.

96. *Melians*. Do your subjects, then, entertain such views of equity, as to make no distinction between a people totally unconnected with you, and your dependencies¹—colonists, for the most part, of your own, some of whom have rebelled and have been reduced?

97. *Athenians*. Why, in point of equitable claims to independence they think neither one nor the other wanting; and that, if any of our subjects maintain their freedom, it is simply owing to their strength: just as, if we refrain from attacking them, it is simply owing to our fears. Your reduction, therefore, quite² independently of the extension of our empire, would contribute to our security: more especially, because you would be an insular³ province of a naval power, and a province—unless,⁴ indeed, you repulse our attack!—less able to resist us than others of our island subjects.

98. *Melians*. But do you not think you would be consulting your own security by allowing us to remain

¹ See Bauer's note, cited by Poppo, ed. min.

² 'καί ad ἔξω videtur referri.'—Poppo, ed. min.

³ Athens, as a maritime power, naturally found insular much easier of control than continental dependencies.

⁴ I have followed Hofmann, cited by Poppo (ed. min.), in governing *ναυκρατόρων* by *κατεστραμμένοι* understood, as the only means of eliciting sense from the last clause, *εἰ μὴ περιγένουσθε*, which, I imagine, is only a reference, made colloquially, and half jocosely, to the possibility of the repulse of the Athenian attack on

Melos. Poppo (ed. min.) leans towards Duker's interpretation, which governs *ναυκρατόρων* by *περιγένουσθε*, and whose Latin version may be rendered as follows: 'especially should you, an insular people, weaker, too, than other islanders, fail in repulsing us, the rulers of the sea.' To this I object: because it compels us to attach a sense to *καὶ ἄσθ. ὄντες*, which weakens the speaker's argument. The Athenians could not expect the prestige of their empire to be increased by the inability of an insular people weaker than their other island subjects, to defy them.

neutral?¹—a question we raise, because, at this point again,² as you debar us from appealing to equity, and invite us to consider your interests only, our best course is to tell you plainly what would suit us, in the hope of winning your assent, should you find that our interests coincide with your own.—We would ask, then,³ how, if you force our alliance, you can possibly avoid making enemies of all the neutral states, whom a single glance at the part you are playing here, will convince that your attack on them is only a question of time? And how, if you thus alarm them, can you fail to aggrandise your existing foes, and to invite those who have not a thought of opposing you, to become, against their inclination, your enemies?

99. *Athenians.* The fact is, we do not think the various inland cities, whose independence will render them very slow to take precautions against us, so formidable as the scattered insular communities, some of which, like yourselves, are not subjects of ours, while others have long been exasperated by the severity of our rule; for these are just the men to throw caution to the winds, and to plunge themselves as well as us into dangers that stare them in the face.

100. *Melians.* Surely, then, if *you*, and the states already subject to you, are ready to brave such desperate

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold print the sentence commencing with *δεῖ γάρ* and ending with *πεῖθειν*, as a parenthesis. '*Ἐν ἑκείνῳ* surely refers to what precedes, as Götter explains it: apparently it points to the enquiry made by the Melians at ch. 94. Poppo, however (ed. min.), refers it to *ὅσοι γάρ, κ.τ.λ.* But in this sense *τούτῳ* would have been used.

² Poppo (ed. min.) refers *αὐ* to ch. 90, above.

³ *Γάρ* is exepexegetic: it connects its sentence with the first sentence of the ch.: taking up the thread broken by the parenthesis. Klotz (vol. ii. p. 235) compares it, in this sense, to the Latin *igitur*: instancing a parallel passage, where it follows a parenthesis, from Aristoph. (*Plut.* 78): *'Ακούετον δὴ—δεῖ γάρ ὡς ἔοικ' ἐμὲ λέγειν ἂ κρύπτειν ἢ παρεσκευασμένος—ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι Πλοῦτος.*

risks—you to avert the fall of your empire, they to throw off the yoke: in *us*, who are still free, it would be sheer depravity and cowardice not to go through the whole catalogue of hardships rather than surrender.

101. *Athenians*. Not so; at any rate, if you take a sensible view of the case. For you are not engaged in an evenhanded contest on a point of honour, to save yourselves from shameful imputations: the safety of your country is the question before you, and it forbids you to defy a vastly superior force.

102. *Melians*. Perhaps so; but in war,¹ fortune, as we all know, sometimes betrays an impartiality² you could hardly expect from the relative numerical strength of the contending parties: and in our case, while surrender is instant and utter despair, there is still a hope that, by energetic action, we may yet preserve our freedom.³

103. *Athenians*. Hope is, indeed, a solace in danger: nor does she ruin, though she may compromise, those of her votaries who have ample reserves, in case she fails them; but when, like reckless gamblers, men stake their whole property on a single throw (and Hope is a lavish passion), her real character is only revealed amid the crash of a ruin so complete as to leave no room to guard against her for the future, when her true attributes are known.⁴ Refuse, then, weak as you are, with your lives

¹ Τὰ τῶν πολέμων is probably here only an amplification of ὁ πόλεμος.

² I have followed Poppo's reading (ed. min.), κοινοτέρως. The various, and doubtful, reading καινοτέρας perhaps improves the sense. Poppo remarks that the Homeric ξυρός Ἐνυάλιος is the germ of the idea contained in κοινοτέρας.

³ Στήραι ὀρθῶς means literally 'stand upright,' Horace's 'recto stare tulo.' It is used similarly in a meta-

phorical sense by Sophocles, *Œd. R.* 50.

⁴ I have followed the explanation given by the Scholiast, and supported by Krüger, Portus, and Dr. Arnold. Poppo (ed. min.) and Göller, however, apparently on very inconclusive grounds, adopt Scholefield's version: 'neque destituit, quamdiu ab eâ cognitâ cavere poterit aliquis.' They contend that ἐλλείπειν never bears the sense of 'relinquere,' but only

hanging on a turn of the scale, to be the victims of an influence so disastrous: nor imitate the mass of mankind, who, when they might still save themselves by human means, the moment that rational hopes fail them in the hour of distress, take refuge in the visionary expectations fed by divination and oracles, and similar delusions, which, with the hopes they inspire, are the agents of ruin.

104. *Melians.* We too, you may rest assured, think it an arduous task to struggle against your power, and against fortune, unless she proves impartial.¹ Nevertheless, we trust that the divine² protection, due to our righteous defence against an iniquitous attack, may secure us a fair share of the favours of fortune: and that our deficiency in material force will be balanced by our³ alliance with Lacedæmon, who is under a moral obligation to succour us, if for no other reason, still from community of race and a sense of honour. So that our defiance is not so utterly devoid of reasonable grounds.

105. *Athenians.* Really, as regards the Gods, we do not think ourselves less likely than you to be favoured by their good-will: for there is nothing in our theory or practice foreign to the principles which men suppose to

that of 'deficere': the former meaning, however, is the first assigned to it in Lidd. and Scott's *Lexicon*. Poppo's adoption of Scholefield's rendering compels him to lay violent hands on the particles ἅμα τε καί, which, he admits, generally answer to the Latin 'simul atque'—the sense I have attributed to them—but which he contends may here stand for τε ἅμα καί. Nor can he find in Thucydides any similar instance of the use of ἐν ὄρω to denote time, though it often signifies instrumentality, the meaning I have given to it. Sensible of this difficulty, he

proposes to cut the knot by reading ἐν ὄρω.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) inclines to think these words apply to τύχη, not to ἀγωνιζέσθαι.

² Probably this passage escaped Mr. Sellar's attention, when, in his interesting Essay on *The Characteristics of Thucydides*, he allowed himself to speak of 'the absence of religious faith in Thucydides' (p. 307). The same idea recurs below, ch. 112, in the final refusal of the Melians to submit to Athens.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) joins ἡμῖν with ξυμμαχίαν.

actuate them, and upon which they have chosen to act towards their fellow men. For we believe that the Gods, as far as we can judge, and that men, from what we see, obey an imperious law of Nature by inflexibly maintaining their dominion wherever they have power.¹ We did not make this law, nor were we the first to take advantage of its sanction: we found it established, and likely, when we leave it behind us, to continue for ever; and if we now avail ourselves of it, it is in the conviction that you and others, if your power equalled ours, would do so too. So far, then, as the favour of heaven is concerned, we have no reason to dread being eclipsed by you; while, as to your reliance on the Lacedæmonians—your trust that they will aid you, if only, as you say,² from a sense of honour—we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, but do not envy your want of sense. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, in their relations to each other, in their own social and political life, at home, are honest enough: but, if anyone wanted to summarise the character of their foreign policy, in illustration of which many stories might be told, he might do so, fairly³ enough, by describing them as evincing their conviction, with a barefaced impudence unknown elsewhere, that honour is a synonym of pleasure, and right of expediency. And, surely, views like these do not countenance your present ill-founded hopes of succour.

¹ With this assertion we may compare the argument of Callicles in the *Gorgias* of Plato, c. 86-7, pp. 483-4; and the following passage from Cicero: 'Et quoniam cum prius ageretur pro injustitiæ partibus contra justitiam, et diceretur, nisi per injustitiam rempublicam stare augerique non posse; hoc veluti validissimum positum erat, injustum esse, ut homines hominibus domi-

nantibus serviant: quam tamen injustitiam nisi sequatur imperiosa civitas, cujus est magna respublica, non eam posse provinciis imperare. —*De Rep.* iii. 24: ap. Augustin. *De Civ. Dei*, xix. 21.

² In τὸ αἰσχροὺν δὴ, δὴ clearly refers to the hope expressed in the last rejoinder of the Melians.

³ Μάλιστα.

106. *Melians*. To borrow your own words, it is just their notion of self-interest on which we still¹ chiefly rely; it will disincline them to ruin their credit with their well-wishers in Greece, and to give an advantage to their foes, by abandoning their own colonists in Melos.

107. *Athenians*. Then you do not think that expediency goes with safety, while works of justice and honour are wrought amid danger; a risk the Lacedæmonians are in general the last to run?

108. *Melians*. But we do² believe they will be more disposed to encounter risk in our defence, and will think it a better investment than if incurred in behalf of others, in proportion to the convenience arising, with a view to the operations of war, from our proximity to the Peloponnesian coast; and because, from community of race, they can place more than ordinary reliance on our loyalty.³

109. *Athenians*. But the loyalty of those who invoke their aid, is not exactly what men invited to share a conflict regard as a security; they look to the preponderance in material strength of the party they are called upon to aid: a point for which the Lacedæmonians have, if possible, a keener eye than the rest of the world. Thus, when they attack a neighbouring state, they take care⁴ to be supported by numerous allies, from distrust of their own resources: so that, while we command the sea, it is not likely they will cross over to an *island*.

110. *Melians*. But they would still be able to send

¹ For ἤδη Krüger conjectures δῆ, which would be quite in its place, emphasising τοῦτο.

² Ἄλλὰ καί. Poppo (ed. min.) renders καί by *adeo*.

³ Göller and Dr. Arnold make γνώμης depend on πιστότεροι: a construction to which Poppo (ed. min.)

objects only on the ground that πιστός is not one of the adjectives mentioned in Matthiæ's *Greek Grammar* as governing a genitive!

⁴ Καί emphasises ξυμμάχων, and points to it as the condition under which such attacks were ventured.

federal¹ troops : besides, the Cretan main is wide ; so that the capture of a hostile squadron is a more difficult task for the masters of the sea than the achievement of a safe run for a squadron anxious to elude them. Supposing, too, they should fail to relieve us, they might turn their arms against your territory and that of any of your confederates whom the expeditions of Brasidas did not reach ; you will then have to fight, not for a country that never belonged to you, but for one more nearly related to you, that of an ally,² or your own soil.

III. *Athenians*. You, like others,³ may possibly have some personal experience of such matters :⁴ and then you will learn that the Athenians never yet raised one single siege for fear of any foreign diversion. It strikes us, too, that although you declared the safety of your island should be the subject of your deliberations, throughout this long discussion you have advanced nothing on which men in your position can found a reasonable expectation of saving their country ; on the contrary, your chief reliance is on the precarious hopes of the future : while your present resources, compared with the force at this moment arrayed against you, are too slight to give you a chance of holding out. You will certainly prove yourselves thoroughly wrongheaded, if, after allowing us to retire, you fail to adopt some wiser resolution. For we presume you will *not*⁵ take refuge in that misleading influence, the fear of disgrace, which is

¹ "Ἄλλους" i. e. socios.—Poppo, ed. min.

² The Scholiast's explanation shows that he did not regard the words *ξυμμαχίδος τε καὶ γῆς*, which Poppo (ed. min.) has enclosed in brackets, as an interpolation. Gøller, however, is probably right in believing the genuine reading to be *οἰκειότηρας*

τε καὶ ξυμμαχίδος. In his text, *καὶ γῆς* appears in brackets.

³ *Καὶ ὑμῖν* significant 'vos quoque, sicut alii ante vos.'—Poppo, ed. min.

⁴ See Poppo's note on *τούτων τι*, ed. min.

⁵ Perhaps the force of *γε* may here be given by emphasising the negative.

always involving men in dangers disgraceful¹ to them, because foreseen. How often does the dread of what men call 'disgrace,' a word that has the virtue of a spell, entail upon them, in their abject fear of an empty term—though their eyes are open to the perils before them—the penalty of wilful entanglement² in real and irretrievable disasters: winning for them, besides, a disgrace the more shameful as the offspring, not of misfortune, but of their own infatuation! Against such a fate, if your counsels are wise, you will be on your guard: and will not think it undignified to defer to a very powerful state which invites your acceptance of moderate terms, allowing you to retain your territory on condition of becoming her tributary allies; and, when the option between war and safety is offered you, to refrain from obstinately choosing³ the perilous alternative of war. You may then hope for good fortune; for readiness⁴ to pay due respect to superior power is just as much one of the conditions of a prosperous career, as impatience of submission to an equal, or the considerate treatment of a dependant. Weigh, therefore, the issue well, when we withdraw;⁵ and again and again reflect that the question before you is the safety of your country: your one and only country: whose fate depends on the success or the failure of your final consultation.

¹ The alliteration of *αἰσχροῖς* and *αἰσχύνην* brings out the antithetical contrast between the two terms.

² Poppo (ed. min.) takes *περιπεσεῖν* and *προσλαβεῖν* as equivalent to substantives: not as final infinitives.

³ *Φιλονεικῆσαι* per breviloquentiam dictum est pro *φιλονεικοῦντας ἐλεῖσθαι* (Göller). Poppo (ed. min.) shows that the same construction occurs in Plato (*Protag.* 360, E): *φιλονεικεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.*

⁴ I have altered the machinery of this sentence, so as to give prominence to the middle term of the proposition, which relates to the case in point—the position of Melos towards Athens.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) renders *καὶ μεταστάντων ἡμῶν*, 'etiam semotis nobis (non solum presentibus).' This may be right, but the use of *καὶ* reminds one of the old English 'even' in such phrases as 'I will e'en do so.'

The Melian negotiators, after a brief private conference, apart from the Athenians, returned with the following ultimatum, which they addressed to the representatives of Athens :

112. Our view of the case, Athenians, is exactly¹ what it was at first; we will not, at a moment's notice, rob our city, seven hundred years after its foundation, of its independence; no, we will strain every nerve to save our freedom, putting our trust in that fortune which under Providence has hitherto preserved us, in the support of public opinion, and² the active aid of Lacedæmon. We therefore call upon you to allow us to remain friendly to you, without forcing us into hostile relations with either belligerent: and to withdraw from our shores after concluding a treaty on terms acceptable to both parties.

To this the Athenians, just as they were leaving the council, replied :

113. Well, then, judging by your decision, you seem to us to be the only men who regard future contingencies as more certain than palpable facts, and to look upon events quite out of sight, through the medium of your wishes, as going on before your eyes. You have staked a vital interest on the frail³ security of Lacedæmon, fortune, and hope; and your trust in them will be rewarded with a very heavy loss.

¹ On this use of *καί* see Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. p. 635), where he cites Plato (*Phæd.* 64, c): *Σκέψαι δὲ, ἴαν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῆ ἄπερ καὶ ἐμοί*, where the *καί* which precedes *ἐμοί* is used to strengthen the comparison between that pronoun and *σοί*.

² Poppo (ed. maj.) thinks Bauer and Bloomfield wrong in rendering

the *καί* before *Λακεδαιμονίων* 'especially:' he regards it as the counterpart of the Latin 'atque,' which, he adds, is often equivalent to 'et—quidem.'

³ The omission of the article before *Λακεδαιμονίους* and the two following words, implies that they are used in a characteristic sense.

SPEECH OF NICIAS,

Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, B.C. 415. Bk. VI. chs. 9-15.

INTRODUCTION.

HERMOCRATES¹ having succeeded, B.C. 424, in effecting a general pacification of Sicily, the Athenian squadron returned home. Shortly afterwards, a fresh dispute broke out between Leontini and Syracuse: when the former city, overborne by her powerful rival, appealed to Athens for aid. She, however, embroiled in the turmoil of Peloponnesian politics, was not then, nor for the three years which followed the peace of Nicias, at liberty to interfere. At the end of that period a quarrel broke out between Selinus and Egesta: Syracuse interfered in behalf of the people of Selinus, who, with her aid, reduced Egesta to dependance on foreign succour. The envoys of the distressed city appeared at Athens in the spring of the year 416 B.C., to sue for Athenian assistance. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy: representing that 'the Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second, and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to the Peloponnesians both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself.'² Alcibiades warmly seconded this petition; and, on the return of the Commissioners who had been sent to report on the ability of the Egestæans to contribute to the expenses of the war, the Athenians determined to despatch an expedition of sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals, Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, with the view, in the first place, of relieving Egesta: secondly, of re-establishing the city of Leontini: lastly, of furthering Athenian ascendancy in Sicily.

Nicias, who had been elected general against his will, and who strongly disapproved the expedition, availed himself of the opportunity offered by a second meeting of the assembly to reopen the whole question, and to reiterate his objections to the measure.

¹ See his Speech, bk. iv. ch. 59, *seqq.*

² Grote, vol. vii. p. 198.

CH. 9. I am aware that this assembly was convened to consider the details of our proposed expedition to Sicily; but I think we ought even now to weigh the previous question, the question of the policy of sending the fleet at all, instead of, after so short a consultation on a point of vital consequence, undertaking a war with which we have no business, in obedience to foreign instigation. And when I speak thus, I speak as one who owes his honours to the battle field, and is less anxious than others for his own personal safety—though¹ I do think a man as good a citizen for taking some care of his person and his property as well as of his country: a man of this kind being most likely to be anxious, for his own sake, for the public prosperity as² interwoven with his own. Notwithstanding this, I never at any former time courted power by proposing measures that my judgment disapproved; nor will I now: but I will frankly tell you in what direction I conceive our true course to lie. I know you too well to fancy my arguments would have any effect, were I simply to advocate the conservative policy of keeping what you have, instead of risking your present possessions for the visionary hopes of an unseen future; I will, however, show you that your ambition is mistimed, and that the project you have at heart is difficult of achievement.

10. I say, then, that you are acting as if, not content with leaving many enemies at home, you wished to invite others to attack you here, by sailing there. Perhaps you

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) says, 'hæc addit, quod illos seniores ab Alcibiadis factione timiditatis incusatos ipse nequaquam vult reprehendere.'

² Καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως· καὶ probably means 'as well as his own.' The former καί, that which precedes σῶ-

ματός, may of course be taken as simply emphasising προνοῆται· 'who does take some care of his person,' etc., or, as I have rendered it, as comparing personal with patriotic cares. See note¹, p. 7.

think the treaty concluded with you is something to rely upon: no doubt, while you remain quiet, it will still exist, though only in name (so treacherously was it dealt with by certain personages¹ on our as well as on the other side); but, the moment any considerable force of ours meets with a check, our enemies will take the first opportunity of attacking us, since, in their case, the convention was originally extorted by the pressure of disaster,² and was less³ to their credit than to ours; besides which, the treaty itself leaves many points⁴ of interest to us still at issue. There are also some states, and those not the least powerful, who have not accepted even this arrangement:⁵ on the contrary, some of them are openly⁶ at war, while others, again,⁷ because Lacedæmon has made no move yet, allow themselves to be restrained by a truce terminable every tenth day. And it is very likely that, should they find our forces divided, as we are now so anxious they should be, they would eagerly join the Sicilian Greeks, whose alliance they would have valued very highly at an earlier stage of the war, in attacking us. We⁸ certainly ought to weigh these considerations, in-

¹ Alluding to the underhand efforts of Cleobulus and Xenares, two of the Spartan ephors, for the dissolution of the alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, B.C. 421 (Thucyd. v. 36, Grote, vol. vii. p. 33). By *ἐνθὺνδὲ* Alcibiades is meant; see Thucyd. v. 45, for the trick whereby, 420 B.C., he discredited the Lacedæmonian embassy at Athens.

² See Grote, vol. vii. p. 11.

³ See note ², p. 69, on the Thucydidean use of *αἰσχίον* for *αἰσχρόν*.

⁴ See Thucyd. v. 35, 42.

⁵ See Thucyd. v. 26.

⁶ Corinth is chiefly alluded to: see Thucyd. v. 52, 115. The *ἐιχίμυροι σπονδαί* were the terms of the

Athenian relation to the Bœotians (Thucyd. v. 26) and the Chalcidians (vi. 7).

⁷ Bloomfield conveniently disposes of the *καί* which precedes *διὰ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίους* as an Attic pleonasm. A critic quoted by Poppo (ed. maj.) thus explains it: 'primum illud *καί*, quod est proxime post *οἱ δὲ*, hosce ad eos, qui sunt antea dicti, adjungit, alterum vero *καί αὐτοί* eosdem illos Lacedæmoniis opponit.'

⁸ Göller refers *τινά* to Alcibiades: Poppo (ed. min.), more probably, in consonance with Thucydidean usage, and in harmony with the context, makes it equivalent to *ἡμᾶς*.

stead of presumptuously challenging danger while the vessel of our country is rocking on the waves, or grasping at a second empire before we have consolidated our existing dominion; recollecting, too, that the Chalcidians on the Thracian border, after so many years of revolt, are still unsubdued, and that others of our allies on various parts of the mainland¹ are wavering in their allegiance. In the teeth, however, of all this, we must, it seems, rush to succour the people of Eggesta, our pretended allies, because they complain of wrongs: while we still adjourn the chastisement of rebels, whose defection, so many years ago, is a standing wrong to ourselves.

11. And yet the latter, once reduced, might be kept in subjection; whereas, even if we conquered the Sicilians, we should find it very difficult to govern a dependency so distant and so populous. And it is pure folly to invade a country which even conquest cannot firmly hold; while failure leaves you in a worse position than before you made the attempt.

Looking to the present condition of the Sicilian Greeks, I should say they were likely to prove decidedly less dangerous to us, if they were subject to Syracuse; the very contingency with which the envoys of Eggesta are trying to frighten us. As things now are, some of the Sicilian states might perhaps be induced to attack us, to oblige Lacedæmon; but, in the former case, it is not likely one imperial city would take up arms against another: there being every probability that, if Syracuse aided the Peloponnesians to despoil our empire, the same process² would be applied to her own, which

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) thinks Erythræ, Miletus and other towns on the coast of Asia, which revolted on the news of the Athenian disasters in Sicily,

are tacitly referred to.

² The Lacedæmonians always pulled down tyrannies and dominant states.

would in turn be pulled down by those very Peloponnesians. Besides, the Sicilian Greeks would hold us in far more awe, if we did not go there at all; and, next¹ to that, if, after making a brief display of our power, we were to retire; for,² as we all know, reverence is increased by distance,³ and by difficulty in subjecting renown to a crucial test. If, on the other hand, we met with any reverse, it would instantly excite their contempt, and they would join our enemies here in assailing us. And this, Athenians, is the feeling you entertain for the Lacedæmonians and their allies; your triumphs over them, so unexpected, compared with your apprehensions at the outset of the war, have taught you to despise them, and to aim forthwith at the conquest of Sicily. Your elation, however, should not be founded on the mere misfortunes of your enemies: you should reserve your self-confidence till you have broken their spirit:⁴ and meanwhile regard the Lacedæmonians as bent solely, owing to the dishonour of their arms, on compassing the means whereby, if possible, they may yet foil us, and creditably close an epoch of disgrace; a point upon which their anxiety is proportioned to their long and passionate pursuit of military glory. The question, therefore, now before us, if we are wise, is not the defence

¹ Ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ εἰ· καὶ does not belong to εἰ, but repeats ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἂν εἴεν.

² I have ventured to transpose this and the following sentence; for, as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, the clause commencing ὅπερ νῦν, κ.τ.λ., refers to ὑπεριδόντες, κ.τ.λ. and the intervening clause τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστον, κ.τ.λ., awkward, as it stands, even as a parenthesis, is connected with the previous declaration of the policy of keeping aloof from Sicily.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) quotes Tacitus' maxim 'Major e longinquo reverentia' (*Ann.* i. 47). He might have added Virgil's 'minuit præsentia famam.'

⁴ Dr. Arnold aptly compares a fine sentence of Livy: 'Habere Samnites victoriam, non præclaram solum, sed etiam perpetuam: cepisse enim eos non Romam, sicut ante Gallos, sed quod multo bellicosius fuerit, Romanam virtutem ferociamque.'

of the barbarous population of Egesta, but the means of vigilant precaution against a state which is intriguing against us through the agency of the oligarchical interest.

12. We should also remember that it is but lately we have enjoyed a brief respite from the ravages of pestilence and war, enabling us to replenish our exchequer and recruit our population; and surely we may fairly be allowed to spend our money for our own purposes, at home, rather than in patronising these exiles, just because they beg our aid: men whose purposes it suits to tell plausible falsehoods, and who find it convenient—while they throw all the risk on their allies, and offer nothing of their own¹ but promises—to make no adequate return if they succeed, or, if they meet with any reverse, to involve their friends in their own ruin. And if a certain personage, all the more delighted with his appointment to a high command, because he is so very young for its duties,² urges the expedition, consulting only his own desire to win admiration by the beauty of his stud, and at the same time³ to reimburse his extravagance by means of the appointment: do not, I say, suffer him to display his personal splendour at the hazard of his country, but rest assured that men of his stamp, while ruining their own fortunes with one hand, wrong the public with the other: and that the enterprise itself is a critical affair, and not one for the brief⁴ deliberation and hasty execution of a youngster.

¹ I have followed Poppo's reading (ed. min.), *αὐτῶν λόγους μόνον παρασχομένους*, which he renders, 'quum de suis nihil suppedient præter verba.'

² Here again, I have been compelled to transpose a clause, on the authority of Poppo (ed. min.), who says, 'hæc (ἄλλως τε—ἄρχειν) statim

post *αἰρεθείς* posita velis: certe cum verbis τὸ ἑαυτοῦ, κ.τ.λ., cohærere non videntur.'

³ Καὶ ὠφεληθῆ· καὶ refers to *θauμασθῆ*, and indicates a second motive, that of ὠφέλεια, as operating at the same time.

⁴ Βουλευσασθαί τε καὶ ὀξέως μετα-

13. I almost tremble when I see the satellites¹ of his policy sitting, by previous concert, in this assembly, close to their leader: and I would make a counter appeal to the more experienced, if any of these partisans try to intimidate them, not to be shamed out of their purpose for fear of being thought cowards, if they do not vote for war: nor to surrender themselves, like these men, to an infatuated passion for acquisitions beyond their reach: recollecting that mere ambition reaps but few successes, a prescient policy many. Yes, I call upon them to oppose the war, in the name of their country, now on the verge of a crisis of unprecedented danger; and to decide that the Sicilian Greeks shall satisfy themselves with the limits which define their relation to us—limits which no one complains of—and which allow them the coast navigation of the Ionian gulf, and the open navigation of the Sicilian sea; and that, as they enjoy their own possessions, so they shall settle, at home, their own differences. The Egestæans, in particular, we must require to dispense with Athenian aid in closing, just as they dispensed with Athenian sanction in commencing, the war with Selinus; and for the future we must decline the alliance of states whom we shall have to aid in their hour of misfortune, without the slightest prospect of aid from them when we request it.

14. I call upon you, therefore, President, if you

χειρίσαι the particles *τι—καί* here express the close union of the two verbal notions which they connect: so that the adverb *ὀξέως* extends its qualifying influence to *βουλευσασθαι* as well as to *μεταχειρίσαι* the idea being that a young man would soon get his deliberation over and act at once. If, however, *ὀξέως* is taken in a favourable sense, the passage might be construed: 'demanding a wisdom

in planning, combined with (*τε—καί*) a promptitude in executing measures, not to be expected in a youngster.'

¹ Güller reads in this passage a significant revelation of the influence of political clubs at Athens, and refers to Æschines (*c. Ctes.* § 1), and to Thucyd. (viii. 54), where this machinery is described as in full action during the war.

think it becomes you to care for your country, and you wish to prove yourself a patriotic citizen, to put this issue to the vote, and allow the Athenian people a reconsideration¹ of the question: in the assurance that, if you are alarmed at the repetition of the vote, there can be no responsibility in infringing the law with so many witnesses to attest your motives: that you will be proving yourself a skilful physician of the policy² of the state: and that a good administration consists in conferring every possible service on one's country, or, at any rate, in shielding her from any mischief one can prevent.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) construes γνώμας προτιθέναι by 'sententias dicendi potestatem facere.'

² The word βουλευσαμένης seems to require the qualification κακῶς. but Poppo (ed. min.) refuses it

admission into his text, on the ground of its absence from all the MSS. except two; and Gölter remarks that Nicias probably avoided it, as likely to affront his audience.

SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES,

Before the Athenian popular assembly, in reply to the preceding speech of Nicias.
Bk. VI. chs. 16-19.¹

CH. 16. Athenians, I have not only a better title than others to the command—a topic with which, attacked as I have been by Nicias, I am compelled to commence—but I also consider myself personally worthy of it; since the very qualities for which I am denounced not only reflect honour on myself and my ancestors, but are of positive advantage to my country. In proof of this latter assertion, I need only remind you that the Greeks, who had previously hoped that the resources of our capital had been pulled down by the war, were induced even to overrate them by the magnificent style in which I represented Athens at the Olympic festival, when I sent down seven chariots to the lists—more than any private citizen had ever entered—gaining a first, a second, and a fourth prize: nor did the style of my equipments disparage the lustre of my triumph. Public opinion honours trophies such as these: and the pageantry itself creates an impression of power.² Again, the distinction with which, within the city, I have served the office of choregus, among other public functions, though it may naturally excite the envy of a fellow-citizen, is,³ to the eye of a foreigner, eloquent of large resources. My wild extravagance, then, as you call it, is not devoid

¹ See Grote, vol. vii. p. 207.

² Καὶ δόραμις* καὶ compares δόραμις with τιμῆ, above.

³ Καὶ αὐτῆ* καὶ compares the im-

pression produced by his civic magnificence with that excited by his appearance at the Olympic festival.

of use, when its votary serves the public as well as his personal interests at his own cost. And it certainly is not unfair that a man who is proud of his wealth and station, should repudiate equality with the mass; society¹ acts on that principle every day: the man of broken fortunes, for instance, finds none to share his calamity. On the contrary, just as people take no notice of us in our hour of adversity, so must they, when their turn of misfortune comes, brook the disdain of prosperity; they can only expect others to make no difference towards them, when they deal with them on that principle.

Men of the class I was describing, men of distinction in the various fields of honour, have, I know, during their lifetime, often been unpopular with the world in which they moved, and especially with their equals: but, after their death, posterity often claims a connection with them, even without grounds: and their country takes an exulting pride in them, regarding them not as aliens or offenders, but as her own children and the authors of brilliant achievements. Such is my ambition: and if, in its pursuit, a cry is raised against my private life, I will only ask you to consider whether I am inferior to others in administering public affairs. It was I who united in a league the chief powers of the Peloponnese without any serious risk or expense to you, and forced the Lacedæmonians to put their all to the hazard of a single day's fighting at Mantinea; a hazard so great, that, though victors on the battle field, they have never yet regained a steady confidence in their own strength.

17. With such results did my extreme youth and, reputedly, portentous folly, confront the Peloponnesian

¹ Ἐπεὶ καὶ is often used thus, to usher in a familiar illustration: especially when it assumes the form of

an *à fortiori* argument. So in Plato (*Apol.* p. 20, A): comp. ἐπεὶ τοὶ καὶ Πιππ. *Mag.* p. 288, c.

power:¹ and, combining dexterous diplomacy with an earnestness of tone that inspired faith, won assent to my views. Let² not then my age alarm you: but, while I am still in the flower of my youth, and Nicias is, apparently, a favourite of fortune, make the most of our respective services; and do not think of countermanding the expedition to Sicily, under the impression that it will have a mighty power to encounter. If her cities are populous, it is only with motley crowds of various race: their constitutions, too, are often in a state of fluctuation, and sometimes of radical change. On this account, the citizens do not provide themselves with arms for their personal protection, or the land with the usual appliances of cultivation and defence, as they would do, if they had a country all their own to guard. Everyone's object is to secure for himself out of the common stock, either by eloquence in debate, or by active partisanship, what he thinks will enable him, in the event of a reverse, to settle in a foreign land. And it is not likely that a rabble of this kind will with one heart rally round a statesman, or enter on the field of action with the spirit of a common cause. Every man would act for himself, and quickly side with any proposal that suited his views: especially if, as we hear, the country is at this moment torn by factions. Then, again, as to their heavy infantry:³ they do not possess the force they boast of; their

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) justly doubts whether τὴν Πελοποννησίων δύναμιν can be regarded as equivalent to the preceding expression Πελοποννήσου τὰ δυνατώτατα, as the Scholiast and Götter take it, and renders ἐς by 'contra.' He also objects to Dr. Arnold's explanation of ὠμίλησε by ὠμίλησασα ἐπραξε: a notion, however, apparently endorsed by Götter, who

renders ταῦτα ὠμίλησε, 'hæc transegit.'

² I have here adopted Bekker's conjecture, received into the text of Arnold and Götter, and confessed by Poppo (ed. min.) to be a great improvement on the old reading, which he still allows to disfigure his text.

³ 'Hi soli commemorati sunt. quod Græci eos in bellis maximi æstina-bant.'—Poppo, ed. min.

returns are about as reliable as those of the rest of the Greeks, whose infantry has been transparently proved to be much below the amount at which the several states kept rating it; Greece, indeed, has grossly exaggerated the muster-roll of her heavy infantry: and, even during the present war, has hardly been adequately armed with troops of this class.

Such, then, as I have reason to believe from all accounts, will be the state of things there: indeed, our prospects are even more promising; for we shall find many allies among the non-Greek population, whose hatred of Syracuse will dispose them to join us in assailing her; while, if your counsels are wise, no additional¹ difficulty need arise from the interests we have to defend at home. Our fathers acquired their empire in the teeth of the enmity of those very states—independently of the enmity of the Medæ—whose hostility it is now alleged we shall be leaving behind us, when we set sail: and this they achieved simply and solely through the superior strength of their marine. There never was a time when the Peloponnesians were more hopeless of reducing us than they are now; and, even if they recovered full confidence, though they are strong enough to make incursions into Attica, whether we send the expedition or not, their fleet could not, in either contingency, do us any mischief: for our naval reserves at home are a match for them.

18. What reasonable grounds, then, can we find for shirking the enterprise ourselves? What excuse can we plead to our Sicilian allies for failing to succour them? We certainly ought to aid them, especially as we have actually sworn to do so, instead of contenting ourselves

¹ 'Ἐπιωλόβει' i.e. no difficulty beyond the natural difficulties of the expedition.

with the counterplea that they have never aided us. For, when we espoused their alliance, it was not with the view of their returning the favour by coming here to fight for us: we hoped they would keep our Sicilian foes constantly embroiled, and prevent their assailing us at home. Besides, it was by a policy of intervention that we, in common with all who ever¹ won dominion, acquired our empire: it was by heartily assisting communities, whether Greek or barbarian, which from time to time invoked our aid. Indeed, if there were no dissensions to interfere in, and if distinctions of race were made in choosing whom to succour, the extension of our empire would be a very slow process; or, rather, we should run a risk of losing it altogether. For every state is on the watch not only to repel the aggression of a superior power, but to defeat,² by anticipation, the possibility of such aggression. And it is out of the question for us to cut and carve at pleasure the area of our rule: we are compelled, by our position as an imperial city, to intrigue systematically for the subjection of one state, while we tighten our rein upon another: threatened as we are with the risk of foreign subjugation, should we halt in our career of aggrandisement. In your situation, you cannot regard political quietism from the same point of view as other communities,³ unless, at the same time, you choose to recast your national character and pursuits on the model of theirs.

Concluding, then, that this expedition will probably

¹ Ὅσοι δὲ. Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. p. 405) quotes this passage in illustrating the use of δὲ, with indefinite pronouns, when, as he shows, it adds to their indefiniteness of meaning.

² Göller says μὴ ὡς is used for ὡς μὴ by Isæus (*De Apoll. Hered.* § 27); otherwise, ὅπως μὴ would be a na-

tural correction of μὴ ὅπως.

³ Compare the remark of the Corinthian envoy at Sparta, ἡσυχάζουσα μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζόμενοις εἶναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ.—Bk. i. ch. 71.

lead to the increase of our existing dominion, let us undertake it at once, and thereby lay low¹ the arrogant pride of the Peloponnesians, who will see, when we actually sail for Sicily, how little we prize the present interval of peace. Besides,² the acquisition of those realms will in all probability enable us to sway the whole of Greece, or, at the least, to ruin Syracuse, to the great advantage of ourselves and our confederates. Our fleet will render it perfectly safe for us either to stay, should any of the Sicilian states come over to us, or to return home; for we shall be more than a match for the naval forces of Sicily, even if combined. Let not, then, Nicias turn you from your purpose by pleading the policy of non-intervention, and setting the old on one side of the question and the young on the other; let us follow our traditional custom, the custom of our fathers, who intermingled the young with the old in the councils of the state, and raised our national honour to its present height. Let it be your aim, by similar means, to advance still further the glory of your country, convinced that youth and age are of no avail without each other's aid, and that the true strength of a deliberative council lies in its tempering by fusion the impetuosity³ of the young, the moderation of manhood, and the ripe experience of age: and that our country, if condemned to

¹ See Poppo's note (ed. maj.) on the poetical term *στορέσωμεν*.

² I have not ventured to construe *ἄρξομεν* as a subjunctive, though Thucydides must have intended to govern the mood by the particle *ἵνα*, when he placed *τε* after *Πελοποννησίων*, where it answers to *καί* in the clause commencing *καὶ ἡμα*.

³ If *φαῦλον*, *μέσον*, and *ἀκριβέες* are referred to the various stages of

youth, manhood, and age, as the context seems to require, the word *φαῦλον* must be taken as a jocosely allusion to the satirical remarks of Nicias on the precipitancy of youth. 'His vocabulis,' says Poppo (ed. maj.), 'utentem Alcibiadem cavillari apparet.' Portus takes the terms as describing the various ranks of society: an explanation at variance with the context.

political inaction abroad,¹ would follow the general law of nature and wear away her strength in internal agitation, her skill in all its branches growing dull from desuetude : whereas, if her energies are kept in constant play, she will always be adding to her stock of experience, and will be more familiar with the art of self-defence, when, instead of being discussed in debate, it is practised in reality. On the whole, I am of opinion that the change from political enterprise to political inaction would very soon be fatal to a state, and that those communities enjoy the safest position, whose political action is most in harmony with the national character and customs, even if they fall materially below the highest standard of excellence.

¹ Compare Livy (xxx. 44): 'Nulla si foris hostem non habet, domi in magna civitas diu quiescere potest: venit.'

SPEECH OF NICIAS,

Delivered on the same occasion as the two preceding harangues. Bk. VI. chs. 20-24.

INTRODUCTION.

THE impression produced by the speech of Alcibiades, seconded by the entreaties of the envoys from Egesta and Leontini, made Nicias despair of inducing the Athenians to revoke their decree for the expedition. He thereupon changed his tactics : and, in the following address, tries to dissuade them by representing the magnitude of the force required to ensure success.

CH. 20. Athenians, I see that you are fully resolved on this expedition. Trusting that its issue may be such as we desire, I will tell you plainly my view of our position. The cities we intend to attack, are, judging from all accounts, powerful, independent of one another, and therefore not in want of a revolution to enable them to make a happy escape from an oppressive servitude to a pleasant change of lot : nor is it likely they will be disposed to accept our rule in preference to freedom ; they are also, to speak of the Greek cities only, numerous for a single island. Apart from Naxos and Catana, whose accession to our cause I expect from their affinity to the people of Leontini, there are other cities, seven in number, provided with all the appliances of defence, in a style similar to that of our own (armament) ; and this is especially the case with Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. They have a large force of heavy infantry within their walls, of archers and slingers : a considerable fleet, and plenty of hands to man their ships ; they have also ample funds,

partly in private coffers, partly, as at Selinus, stored in temples.¹ Syracuse, too, apart from² her other sources of revenue, has long been receiving a tribute from some of the non-Hellenic tribes. But their chief advantage over us lies in their abundant stock of horses:³ and in the circumstance that the corn they consume is not imported but of home growth.

21. To cope with such a power, we want something more than an armament of seamen and marines, which would be inefficient; a large infantry force must accompany the squadron, if we intend to achieve something worthy of our ambition, instead of being debarred from landing by their numerous cavalry: and it will be the more needful, if terror should lead the cities to combine against us, and we should fail to find friends more able than the Egestæans to supply us with a counter⁴ force of cavalry to repel them. It would be disgraceful to be compelled to leave Sicily, or to have to send, subsequently, for reinforcements, owing to our plans having been at the outset inconsiderately laid. No: we must set out from the Piræus with a competent armament, remembering that we are about to sail to a great distance from our own shores, and that our present expedition does not resemble those we have hitherto undertaken, within the sphere of our dominion in Greece, in the guise⁵ of allies, against

¹ The temples, as I have before remarked, often served as the banks of antiquity. Among other instances, Göller reminds us of the temple of Saturn at Rome, and that of Pallas at Athens.

² This seems to be the meaning of *καί*, in the words *καὶ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων*, κ.τ.λ. See note¹, p. 7. In the following words, I have adhered to Poppo's reading, *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φέρεται*.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that

Athens relied on Bœotia and Thes-saly chiefly, for horses; and on Pontus for corn.

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.), on the authority of Ducas, gives this force to the compound preposition in *ἀντιπαρά-σχωσιν*.

⁵ The term *ξύμμαχοι* 'expresses the well-known Roman policy, of never making war in any country without having first secured an ally in it, whose quarrel the Romans

various states, when it was easy to obtain the needful supplies from a friendly land. On the contrary, we shall have removed to an utterly alien realm, from whose shores not even¹ a despatch can reach you during four of the winter months.

22. I think therefore that we must take a strong infantry force with us, composed both of Athenian and of federal troops, including among the latter those of our own subjects and any Peloponnesian contingents whom we can win by influence² or allure by pay: besides a large body of archers and slingers, to enable us to make head against the Sicilian cavalry. We must also secure a very decided superiority in ships, if only³ to facilitate our importation of supplies. Transports, too, we shall want, to take our home⁴-corn, consisting of different wheats and parched barley, with an army of bakers from the mills, compelled, in proportion to their numbers at each establishment,⁵ to serve for pay: in order, should we chance to be weatherbound, to ensure a supply of provisions for the armament, which will be too large for every city to entertain. With other requisites we must provide ourselves to the utmost of our ability, instead of depending on foreign markets; but, above all things, we must take from home as large a sum of money as possible. As to the funds which are to come from Eggesta, and

might profess to maintain' (Arnold). This trait of Roman policy has been summarised in the maxim, 'Dividere et imperare.' Compare the preceding Speech of Alcibiades, ch. 18, above.

¹ 'Οὐδέ insolentius trajectum eum vν. ἀγγελον ῥάδιον ἰλθειν jungendum est.'—Poppo, ed. min.

² Ducas, cited by Poppo (ed. min.), thinks the Mantineans and Argives

chiefly alluded to by the verb πείσαι: the Arcadians by the term μισθῶ.

³ This seems to be the sense of the particle καί, which precedes τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. See note ¹, p. 7, above.

⁴ See Poppo's note, ed. min.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) approves Böckh's interpretation of πρὸς μέρος by 'pro ratâ portione in singulis pistrinis.'—*Public Econ. of Athens*, vol. i. p. 308.

which are said to be ready there, think of them as likely enough to be *said* to be ready, when they are wanted.¹

23. Ample² resources are indeed indispensable; for, if we were to leave our shores with an armament not merely a match for our foes—except, of course,³ as regards their available force of heavy infantry—but far surpassing them on every point, even in that case we should hardly be able to seize some positions and to hold permanently⁴ others. The fact is, we must look upon ourselves as setting out to found a city amid an alien and hostile population: and a force bound on such⁵ an expedition must gain a footing in the country on the very day of its landing, on pain, in case of miscarriage, of finding everyone in arms against it. Fearful of such a catastrophe, conscious that we must owe many successes to our tactics, and still more to good fortune—a trying position for mere men—I am anxious, in setting sail, to place myself as little as possible in the hands of chance, and to feel, when the voyage is over,⁶ that, in point of equipment, I have taken every reasonable precaution against failure. By these means we shall, I think, best

¹ 'Præpositum *καί* ad superius λέγεται referri existimat Haack' (Poppo, ed. min.). This seems to be correct. Literally rendered, the clause commencing *καί λόγῳ*, would mean: 'they will be said to be ready, when wanted, as well as now.'

² *Γάρ* points to a suppressed clause, connecting this section with the last. See note², p. 43.

³ 'Because, as on the one hand it was impossible for the Athenian expedition to match the Syracusan infantry in point of numbers, so on the other hand they were so superior in discipline, that even with a great

disparity of numbers they were fully able to cope with them.'—Arnold.

⁴ Bloomfield and Dale have copied Hobbes' mistranslation of τὰ δὲ *καὶ* διασῶσαι. *Καί*, as Mr. Frost shows, repeats *κρατεῖν* so that the clause, rendered literally, means: 'and to hold *en permanence*, as well as take possession of.'

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that *ὄν* means 'quales homines.'

⁶ I have adopted Mr. Shilleto's explanation of the force of the opposition between *ἐκπλεῖν* and *ἐκπλεῖσαι*. See his edition of Demosth. *F. L.* 443.

secure the interests of the country at large, and the welfare of our force about to take the field. If, however, any of my audience is of a different opinion, I am ready to resign my command to him.

SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES,

Addressed to the popular assembly at Syracuse, B.C. 415. Bk. VI. chs. 33-35.

INTRODUCTION.

ALTHOUGH intelligence had reached Syracuse of the resolution of Athens to assist Leontini and Egesta, it was not till the muster of the Athenian armament at Corcyra, about July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became convinced of its approach, and began to suspect the real objects of the expedition. Even then, the magnitude of the enemy's force was underrated, and the preparations for resistance insufficient. Hermocrates, in the following harangue, endeavours to impress upon his audience the real nature of the impending invasion, and the urgent necessity of taking prompt measures to ensure its repulse.

CH. 33. Perhaps, when I insist on the reality of the impending descent of the Athenian fleet, I shall share the fate of others, and my assertion will be voted incredible; nor am I unaware that those who circulate, either on their own or on others' authority, intelligence that provokes incredulity, not only fail to convince, but are regarded as the victims of illusion. No dread, however, of such an imputation shall close my lips, at a crisis of danger to my country, while I cherish the conviction that I have surer information to give than others possess. The fact is, greatly as it may surprise you, the Athenians have set out to attack us with a vast naval and military force, ostensibly as allies of Egesta, and under colour of re-establishing the Leontine exiles, but in reality from a passion for the conquest of Sicily, above all of our own city, whose capture they believe would ensure them an easy command of the whole island. Since, then,

we shall probably speedily see them here, you should weigh the means your resources afford for a glorious repulse of their attack, securing yourselves from being surprised when off your guard through contempt of your foe, and from being led by incredulity to neglect your vital interests. Those, however, who believe my report, must not be dismayed by the enemy's audacity and strength. He cannot do us more mischief than we can retaliate: and the very size of the approaching armament will prove of some advantage to us: nay, as regards the rest of the Siceliots, it will be far better than a smaller force, since the terror it excites will throw them into our arms as confederates. And, if in the issue we either annihilate our foe, or foil his enterprise and drive him from our shores—for certainly the consummation of his hopes is the very last¹ thing I fear—in either case it will be a glorious result for us, and one for which I am not unprepared. It is well known that few large armaments,² whether Greek or barbarian, have succeeded in operations far from home. In such cases the invading forces are not more numerous than the native population and that of the neighbouring realms—for all instinctively combine through fear—while, if they miscarry from want of supplies in a strange land, they leave a name full of pride for their intended victims, even if they have been the chief authors of their own failure. It was thus, indeed, that these very Athenians, after the unexpected but signal defeat of the Mede, grew in celebrity through the prevalent report

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) shows that γε belongs to φοβοῦμαι, and arranges the words as follows: οὐ γὰρ ἐὶ τοῦτό γε φοβοῦμαι, κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτό γε answers to the English 'this of all other things.'

² Ducas, cited by Poppo (ed. min.), thinks the speaker had in his eye the Persian invasion of Greece, and the Athenian expedition to Egypt.

that Athens was the aim of his expedition ; and I do not despair of a similar issue in our case.

34. Let us, then, in a spirit of confidence, set about our preparations at home : and, by opening communications with the Sicels, confirm the loyalty of some and try to conciliate the friendship and alliance of others ; despatching, at the same time, envoys to the other Sicilian communities, to convince them that the danger threatens all in common : and to the Italian cities, in the hope of either winning their alliance, or of inducing them to refuse to receive the Athenians. I think, too, that it will be desirable to send to Carthage also. The invasion will not surprise the Carthaginians, who are in constant apprehension of some day seeing the Athenians attack their capital ; it is very possible, therefore, that under an apprehension of being themselves involved in trouble, if they resign us to our fate, they may be disposed, if not openly, at any rate secretly, or by some means or other, to assist us. And, if inclined, they can give more effective aid than any other power : possessing, as they do, an ample supply of the precious metals, those sinews of military success as of general prosperity. Let us also send to the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians, imploring them to come speedily to our aid, and to distract the enemy by rekindling the war at home.

There is an expedient which I think would exactly meet the crisis, but to which, with your characteristic love of ease, you will be the last men to yield a quick assent. I will, however, explain my plan. It is this.¹ If we Siceliots, all in one body, if possible : if not, as many as will join us, would make up our minds to launch our whole existing fleet, with two months' pro-

¹ On this introductory use of γάρ, see note ¹, p. 165.

visions, and go to meet the Athenians off Tarentum or the Iapygian foreland, thus showing them they will have to fight for a passage across the Ionian gulf before they fight for Sicily: we should probably completely scare them, and make them reflect that, in defending our country,¹ we have a friendly shore to sally from, the shelter of Tarentum being open to us, and that they will have a wide expanse of sea to cross with their whole armament, which can hardly keep in line throughout so long a passage, and will be easily assailable, because it will come up slowly, and can only close with us in small divisions. If, on the other hand, they were to lighten² their ships, and attack us with a compact squadron of fast sailers, we might, if they took to their oars, fall on them when fatigued; and, if this did not suit us, we could still retire to the harbour of Tarentum. In that case the enemy, who, with a naval action in view, would have crossed the gulf with a small stock of provisions, would suffer from scarcity on a desolate shore, with the prospect, if they lingered, of being blockaded by us: or, if they tried to run down the coast, of leaving the rest of the armament behind: disheartened, too, in all probability, by their uncertainty as to the willingness of the Italian cities to receive them. For my part, therefore, I believe that, debarred by these considerations, they will not even lift their anchors in the harbour of Coreyra: but that they will either, after weighing various³ plans, and reconnoitring our numbers and position, be precluded from action by the lateness of the season till winter over-

¹ Dale copies Bloomfield's mistake in connecting *φύλακες* with Italy. The Scholiast, cited by Dr. Arnold, appends to *φύλακες* the following comment: *Λείπει τῆς Σικελίας*. See Poppe, ed. min.

² By removing the heavy-armed troops. See the Scholiast's explanation of the words—*ταῖς ναυσὶ κούφαις*.—Ch. 37, below.

³ See Mr. Frost's *Thucydides*, p. 209.

takes them: or else, panicstricken by the unexpected turn of events, they will break up the expedition: and this is the more likely, as the ablest of their generals—so I hear—took the command against his will, and would gladly seize an excuse to return, if he saw that an effective resistance would be offered by us. Their scouts would, I am sure, exaggerate our numbers; men's resolutions veer¹ about with every breeze of rumour: and they stand in greater awe of those who strike before they are struck, or at any rate give their assailants the clearest² assurance of a resolute defence, because they consider them equal to the danger.

And this is likely to be the case with the Athenians now. They are advancing against us in the belief that we shall make no defence, justly despising us, because we did not second the Lacedæmonian effort to demolish their power. Should they, on the contrary, find us cheating their calculations by a daring manœuvre, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than by any force we can bring into the field. Follow, then, my advice: if it is not too much to hope, by the bold move I suggest; if you will not do this, lose not an hour in completing³ the rest of your preparations for the campaign: and let every man feel that it is very well to show contempt of an assailant by courage on the battle field, but that, at this crisis, our best chance of a favourable

¹ Αἱ γινῶμαι ἴστανται. According to Poppo, the metaphor is drawn from the action of the wind on a sail. Baner, whose explanation he endorses, says: 'a vento ductum, ad quem vela conversa consistant.' Mr. Frost explains the particle καί, preceding αἱ γινῶμαι, as used to compare the idea contained in those words with τὰ λεγόμενα: e.g. 'as the reports are, so also are men's

feelings.' See note ¹, p. 41, above.

² If the preposition πρό in προδηλοῦντας is taken in a temporal sense, the participle must be construed 'who show, before the struggle commences.'

³ The dependance of ἐτοιμάζειν and παραστῆναι on πείθεσθαι is so awkward, that a translator finds a relief in Bauer's suggestion, that these infinitives may be imperatives in disguise.

result is to make up our minds that it will be safest to let a sentiment of fear dictate our preparations, and to act as in the presence of danger. For that the expedition is really descending upon us, I am absolutely sure: it is actually on its way: indeed, it is all but within sight.

SPEECH OF ATHENAGORAS,

Delivered before the Syracusan assembly on the same occasion as the preceding address of Hermocrates. Bk. VI. chs. 36-41.

INTRODUCTION.

HERMOCRATES, who belonged to the oligarchical party, 'was so far,' says Dr. Thirlwall (vol. iii. p. 380), 'from being able to carry the vigorous measure which he recommended, that a large part of the assembly persisted in treating the rumour as incredible; some made a jest of it; others, supposing it well founded, could see no danger; a very small number adopted his views. A popular orator, named Athenagoras, who seems to have been invested with a kind of tribunician character as the official advocate of the commonalty, not only rejected the report, but inveighed severely against its authors.' Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 257) remarks that Athenagoras represented the popular jealousy of the richer classes and the magistrates, whose proceedings were liable to the scrutiny and the censure of the public assembly. The doubts expressed by Athenagoras as to the reality of the impending invasion, were unreasonable enough; but he had grounds for imputing to the oligarchical party an interest in spreading public alarm and in promoting military organisation. Very recently, 'the democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organise and train the select regiment of One Thousand Hoplites, chosen from the oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the democratical constitution. Now the persons respecting whose designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select Thousand at Argos.'—Grote, p. 258.

Aristocratic influence naturally rises in war; and we find that, as danger thickened around Syracuse, the tribune was thrown into the shade; indeed, the present is his last as well as his first appearance on the political arena. Hermocrates, on the other hand, becomes a more and more prominent figure.

CH. 36. As to the Athenians, anyone who does not wish they may be so ill-advised as¹ to place themselves in our power by coming here, must either be a coward, or a traitor to his country: as to the men who circulate intelligence of this kind, and try to excite consternation among you, though not surprised at their audacity, I wonder at their simplicity, if they fancy their motives are not transparent. The fact is, those who have any private grounds for alarm, want to throw the city into a violent panic, in the hope of their personal fears being eclipsed by the general terror. Such, indeed, is the true value of these announcements: they are not idle rumours, but are concocted by the very party which is always agitating here. You, however, if wise counsellors, will not, in trying to ascertain the truth, construe probabilities by the bulletins of these professional alarmists; you will be guided by what men of talent and of great experience, qualities I claim for the Athenians, would be likely to do. Surely it is improbable that they will leave the Peloponnesians in their rear, and, before they have satisfactorily concluded the war in that part of the world, plunge gratuitously into another war of equal magnitude; nay, I imagine they are thankful enough that we, who represent cities so populous and so powerful, are not on our march to attack them.

37. If, however, the report should be verified by their actually coming, I believe that Sicily is less likely to be exhausted by hostilities than Peloponnesians, in proportion as she is better provided with all the appliances of war: and that our city, by her own unaided strength, would prove far more than a match for the armament they describe as now on its way to assail us, even were

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) endorses Bauer's remark that *καί* is used for the more usual *ὥστε* after *οὕτω*.

its force doubled. I am sure that the fleet will have no horses on board, and that they cannot be procured here, save in small numbers from Egesta : nor will their heavy infantry numerically equal ours, since they can only come by sea.¹ It would, indeed, be difficult even for the ships themselves, unencumbered by troops, to accomplish the long voyage to our shores : it would be difficult, too, to provide stores, on the vast scale required, for an attack upon a city of such magnitude as ours. I am so far, therefore, from agreeing with Hermocrates, that I think that, even supposing they possessed, on their arrival, a city rivalling Syracuse in size, and made war upon us from a safe position on our borders, they could hardly escape annihilation : much less,² then, when all Sicily is against them—for the whole country will combine : when their troops must hurriedly encamp the moment they leave their ships, and will be cooped up by our cavalry within a short distance from their miserable tents and beggarly commissariat. On the whole, however, I do not believe they could even effect a landing : so decided in my opinion is our preponderance of force.

38. But—we have nothing to fear ! The Athenians,³ as I tell you, are well aware of all this, and, I feel sure, are taking care of their own interests : while, here, oligarchical agents are manufacturing events that never happened and never could have happened. It is not the first time they have played this trick ; it has, I know, been the constant aim of this party, if not by overt acts, at any rate by fictions of this kind, and others still more mischievous, to spread terror among our commonalty, and make themselves the rulers of our capital. And I really fear lest their repeated efforts may at last be crowned

¹ See note ¹, p. 157.

³ See Mr. Grote's remarks, vol. vii.

² See Donaldson's *Gr. Gram.* p. 569. p. 258.

with success; while we, alas! are not disposed to protect ourselves, before we are actually sufferers, by vigilant precautions, and to pounce upon the traitors at the moment of detection. Such are the agencies which so habitually rob our city of repose; she is constantly plunging into party feuds, into civic conflicts as frequently as foreign wars: sinking, at one time, beneath a despot's sword, at another, beneath the sway of a tyrannical cabal. Only resolve to support me, and I will exert myself to prevent any of these calamities happening in our time, if, by commanding the confidence of the popular party among you, I am enabled to chastise the authors of these treacherous manœuvres, I do not say¹ on detection only—it is hard to surprise an overt act—but when they show the will and want but the power. For we ought to foil by anticipation the meditated as well as the actual thrust of an enemy: the last to parry being the first to suffer. As to the oligarchical party, I shall meet them by exposing their plots, watching their movements, and denouncing their principles: a mode of treatment likely, I think, to turn them aside from their profligate designs.

39. And you, young men, I would ask² of you, what is³ your aim? a question I have often pondered. Is it instant elevation to power? But the law⁴ forbids it. And the law was passed in consequence of your incapacity for office at so early an age, rather than from any

¹ Dale and Bloomfield construe *μη μίνον αὐτοφώρους* as if the words were *οὐ μόνον αὐτ.*

² See Klotz (*Devar.* vol. ii. p. 437) on the use of *δητα* in expostulations and appeals.

³ See note ¹, p. 139, where a parallel

passage is cited from Xenophon, in which the particle *καί* is similarly used to emphasise the verb *βούλομαι*.

⁴ There was a limitation of age as a qualification for office, at Syracuse, as in most other states. See Poppo's note on Thucyd. v. 43, ed. min.

intention¹ of slighting your pretensions, when capable of holding it. Is it then² to avoid an equality of privilege with the people at large? If so, is it fair that citizens of the same capital should be held unworthy of the same rights? I may be told that democracy is an institution neither intelligent nor just: and that ownership of property is, by a logical necessity,³ the best qualification for good government. To this I reply that the term 'democracy' means government by the whole community,⁴ 'oligarchy' government by a section of it only: and, admitting that the rich are the natural guardians of property, I contend that men of talent are likely to prove the best statesmen, and that the whole body of the people, after hearing measures discussed, are the most competent to decide;⁵ and that all these classes,⁶ whether in their several spheres, or in their collective capacity as

¹ 'Infinitivus ἀτιμάζειν, ex ἐτίθη pendens, consilium significat.'—Poppo, ed. min.

² Ἄλλὰ δὴ is similarly used in Plato's *Apol.* p. 37, to usher in the last of a series of suppositions, where Socrates asks, ἀλλὰ δὴ φρυγῆς τιμήσωμαι;

³ A similar use of καί will be found above (bk. iv. 18; see note ⁴, p. 143). It represents one clause as the logical counterpart of the other.

⁴ Mr. Frost (*Thucydides*, p. 214) thus elucidates the argument: 'The true meaning of democracy is a government embracing the *whole* state, and not a portion only: democracy therefore, in its proper acceptation, as embracing the wealthy and noble as portions of itself, could not be opposed, in contra-distinction to their government, as the rule of one part distinguished from the rule of another, but as the rule of the whole, opposed to the rule of a part only. In

a true democracy, all, rich, noble, as well as others, had their proper sphere, whereas in an oligarchy all but the rich and noble were excluded from power. So Burke, "a true natural aristocracy is not a separate interest in the state, or separable from it. When great multitudes act together, under that discipline of nature, I recognise the people."'

⁵ Compare the statement of Pericles (bk. ii. 41), that, if the people at large could not originate measures, they were at any rate competent judges of them. Dr. Arnold quotes a striking parallel from Aristotle's *Politics*, iii. 7: τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ὡς σίμπαντας.

⁶ Ταῦτα de hominibus dixit etiam Demosth. (*Philipp* i. 8). Poppo, ed. min.

members of the commonwealth, enjoy, under a democracy, a virtual equality of privilege. Oligarchy, on the other hand, while it gives the masses a liberal share of public danger, not only grasps an exorbitant share of public advantages, but monopolises them to the utter exclusion of the people. Such is the ambition of the powerful and the young among you: an ambition which, in so large a city as ours, it is impossible to gratify.

40. Even ¹ now, however, it is not too late for you, though your infatuation is without a parallel—for, if you are not sensible of the iniquity of your aims, you are the most wrongheaded of the Greeks I ever met with: or the most unprincipled, if you dare to persist in conscious wrong—even now, I say, it is not too late for you, if not by learning wisdom, at any rate by discarding an iniquitous ambition, to devote yourselves to advancing the prosperity of your country, in which all unite a common interest. Rest assured that you patricians ² will enjoy an equal, if not a larger, share of that prosperity than the mass of your fellow-citizens; but that, should you choose to take another course, you run the risk of losing all. Let us have no more, too, of these false reports, addressed to men who see through your motives, and

¹ It is almost impossible to make sense of this obviously corrupt passage, as it stands: but I have not ventured to deviate from the received text, though Poppo's rearrangement of the sentence (ed. min.) would clear the meaning. He thus restores the passage: 'Ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ὧ πάντων ἀξυνετώτατοι, εἰ μὴ μαθάνετε κακὰ σπείδοντες, ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα Ἑλλήνων, ἡ ἀδικιώτατοι, εἰ εἰδότες πολμαῖτε. He thinks the words ἡ ἀμαθίστατοι ἴσπε were inserted by some copyist, to balance, antithetically, the words ἡ ἀδικιώτατοι, the interpolator not seeing

the connection between ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν and τὸ κοινὸν αὐξεῖτε, clearly denoted by the repetition of ἀλλί, which marks the resumption of the direct construction of the sentence, which had been broken by the parenthesis.

² Οἱ ἀγαθοὶ iterum optimates surt (Göller). Οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὑμῶν of course means lit. 'the patricians among you:' but, as Poppo (ed. min.) observes, the nominative, ἀγαθοί, shows that they are directly addressed by the speaker. I have therefore rendered the words, 'you patricians.'

will not tolerate the fraud. For our capital, supposing the Athenians are really coming, will beat them off in a style worthy of her fame, and we have generals to look after these matters; while, if there is no truth in the report, as I believe, she will not be so appalled by your intelligence as to choose you for her rulers, and to rivet on her own neck the chains of a self-imposed subjection. No! she will ascertain the truth without¹ your aid, believing that, if you are capable of circulating treacherous reports, you are capable of treachery in the conduct of affairs;² and, instead of being beguiled by your bulletins of the freedom she enjoys, she will struggle to preserve it by taking active precautions to prevent³ its violation.

At the conclusion of this harangue, one of the generals—perhaps a partisan of Hermocrates—interposed, stopped the debate, and, after addressing his fellow-citizens in the following terms, dissolved the assembly.

41. It is a breach of propriety for members of this assembly to interchange personal imputations, or for their audience to listen to them; our duty is, looking to the prevailing reports, to take care that we citizens and our capital at large are effectively armed for the repulse of the invaders. Should it turn out that we have no need to fight, still there can be no harm in providing the public service with cavalry, heavy infantry,⁴ and all the other resources which are the pride and ornament of war. It is our province to superintend these arrangements, and

¹ 'Εφ' αὐτῆς est 'per se sola.'—Poppo, ed. min.

² Göller thus explains τοὺς λόγους —κρινεῖ· 'judicabit, vos, qui infidi et falsi estis in renunciando, item infidos fore in ductu civitatis.'

³ So Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold take ἐπιτρέπειν. Göller, however, understands τὴν ἀρχήν.

⁴ See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on the similar idiom of ὅπλοις (bk. i. 80-3).

to test their efficiency: as well as to despatch embassies to the various cities, to watch their movements, and to serve any other useful purpose. A part of our task we have already discharged; and, whatever we discover, we will report to you.

SPEECH ADDRESSED BY NICIAS,

The Athenian commander, to his troops, on the eve of their first serious conflict with the forces of Syracuse, about the middle of October, 415 B.C. Bk. VI. ch. 68.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Athenian armament, instead of attacking¹ Syracuse on its first arrival in the Sicilian waters, in July—when the city would probably have fallen an easy prey—lounged away three months in a calamitous inaction hardly redeemed by the acquisition of Catana and Naxos as allies, since their adhesion to the Athenian cause might have been presumed from the circumstance of their Chalcidic origin. At last Nicias—who, since the recall of Alcibiades, had shared the command with Lamachus—stung by the insults of the Syracusans, sailed by night from Catana into the great harbour of Syracuse: and, after landing his men, drew them up, next morning, in order of battle. The Syracusan greatly outnumbered the Athenian infantry: it was, however, the imperfectly disciplined fruit of a hasty levy *en masse*: while the enemy's force represented the flower of the Athenian, Argive and Mantinean troops. But Nicias had no cavalry to oppose to the squadron of horse, 1420 in number, which flanked the right wing of the Syracusan army.

CH. 68. Soldiers! I need not address you at any length, as we are all about to fight in a common cause. Indeed, the very sight of our troops, in battle array, is in my opinion far more likely to inspire confidence than the most eloquent appeals, with a weak force to support them. On a field where Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and

¹ Lamachus, the third commander, recommended this course: but his counsels were overruled by Nicias and Alcibiades. Hannibal's omission to crown the victory of Cannæ by a sudden assault on Rome, will occur to every student of ancient history as a similar contempt of a golden

opportunity. It appears from Livy that, when the battle had been won, a Carthaginian officer, after urging in vain an immediate advance on the Italian capital, thus addressed his chief, 'Vincere scis, Hannibal: victoriâ uti nescis.' Livy's opinion of the probable success of a rapid attack

the flower of the insular cities, are drawn up, can any soldier, backed by allies so staunch and so numerous, fail to cherish the most sanguine hopes of victory? considering, too, that the enemy is defending himself with levies *en masse*,¹ instead of picked troops—as ours emphatically² are—and those levies composed of Sicilian Greeks, who will find it easier to despise than to withstand us, their skill not being quite a match for their presumption. Let us all remember, too, that we are not only a long way from our own shores, but have no friendly country at hand, unless indeed your own swords acquire one for you. So that,³ in giving you a hint, I shall exactly reverse the argument with which the enemy, I know, is raising the courage of his men; they are being told that they are about to fight for their country: I remind you that the battle field is not your country, but⁴ ground wherefrom, if you do not conquer, your retreat will be difficult: for a cloud of cavalry will press upon you. Mindful, then, of the high character you bear, charge your adversaries gallantly, in the assurance that there are more terrors in the constraint of our position, and the absence of any feasible alternative, than in the enemy.

may be gathered as clearly from his remark, 'Mora ejus diei satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio,' as Mr. Kinglake's conviction of the fatal effects of the omission to attack the northern side of Sebastopol immediately after the battle of Alma, may be gleaned from the concluding words of his second volume; 'It (the battle of Alma) established the allies as invaders in a province of Russia. It did more: upon condition that they would lay instant hands upon the prize, it gave them Sebastopol.'

¹ Bauer, whose comment is cited by Poppo (ed. min.), surely goes too

far when he thus explains *πανδημεί* 'vis τοῦ πανδημεί non est "in universis," quod augendæ sit formidini, sed in "colluvie promiscuâ," "inconditâ multitudine" [an undisciplined rabble].'

² *ὄσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ* seems here rather to emphasise than to compare.

³ *καὶ* seems here to mean 'therefore:' as Donaldson (*Gr. Gram.* p. 570) shows that it does in ch. 89, below.

⁴ *ὄκ ἐν πατριῶν* may be taken for *ἐν οὐ πατριῶν*, with Dobree, Bauer, and Arnold: or *ἀλλά* supplied, with Göller, before *ἐξ ἧς*.

SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES,

Addressed to the public assembly at Camarina, in the winter of the year 415-414 B.C.
Bk. VI. chs. 76-81.

INTRODUCTION.

AFTER the battle which forms the subject of the preceding speech, and in which the Athenians gained the advantage, Nicias, instead of pushing his victory, returned to Catana, where he spent the winter. During that season of the year, an effort was made to gain the alliance of Camarina, hitherto not openly committed to either of the contending parties; 'and the Athenian envoy Euphemus was sent thither to propose a renewal of the alliance between that city and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermocrates the Syracusan went to counteract his object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the public assembly.'—Grote, vol. vii. p. 311.

CH. 76. People of Camarina—our embassy was not despatched from any apprehension of your being dismayed by the force the Athenians have at command: but rather from a fear of your being won over by the representations which their envoys are about to address to you, before hearing a word from us in reply. You are familiar with the pretexts, and we all suspect the motives, which have brought them to Sicily; indeed, in my opinion, their intention is not to restore the Leontines to their homes, but to turn us out of ours. For it would surely be very inconsistent in them, after depopulating cities in Greece, to set about re-establishing them here: and to feign the solicitude of kinsmen for the Chalcidic blood of the people of Leontini, after keeping the Chalci-

dians¹ of Eubœa, whose colonists the Leontines are, in a state of political vassalage. The fact, however, is, that they are compassing dominion here by the same method which achieved it there. It was this;² having been elected chiefs of the confederacy by the free choice of the Ionians, and of all their own colonists³ included in the league, for the avowed purpose of chastising the Mede, they reduced their allies to subjection on various pretexts, charging some with shirking military service, others with making war on members of the confederacy, and impeaching the rest on any colourable ground which the several cases afforded. So that, as it turned⁴ out, it was not to vindicate freedom that the Mede was resisted: Athens did not fight for the liberty of the Greeks, nor they for their own; her object was to transfer their allegiance from the Mede to herself: to them, the result was a change from one master to another, more intelligent,⁵ indeed, but more likely to turn intelligence to evil.

77. But⁶ I will not pursue this topic; for we did not come here to expose the numerous wrongs of which, as

¹ After the Persian war, Chalcis, with the rest of Eubœa, became a tributary of Athens. In the year B. C. 445, she joined her fellow-countrymen in a revolt: but the whole island was speedily reconquered by Pericles, who changed the government of Chalcis. Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 312) construes δουλωσάμενους ἔχειν, 'held in slavery.' But this is much too strong a term.

² See a similar use of γάρ, in ch. 34, above.

³ This is Poppo's (ed. min.) version of ἀπὸ σφῶν· it is accepted by Arnold, and supported by the Scholiast, who explains it by the words ὅσοι ἀποιοῖσι ἦσαν ἀντῶν. Göller con-

strues the expression by 'sponte:' it will then mean, 'all who voluntarily joined the league.'

⁴ See Madvig's *Greek Syntax*, § 258, on the particle ἄρα.

⁵ See Poppo, ed. min. He explains οὐκ ἀξυνειτώτερον by the figure litotes.

⁶ 'Ἄλλὰ γάρ· ἀλλά here points to an elliptical clause, the reason of which is given by γάρ. Hoogoveen, *On the Particles* (ἀλλὰ γάρ, § iii.), illustrates this use of ἀλλά from Plato (*Rep.* ii. p. 366): ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐν ἄδου δίκην ἐώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν· where, between ἀλλά and γάρ, we must understand οὐκ ἀζήμοι ἀπαλλάξομεν.

you all know, the Athenian government, so open to censure, has been guilty: but rather to reproach ourselves, because, though we had warnings¹ before our eyes in the loss of independence which had overtaken the Greeks in that part of the world from their failing to succour one another:² though we now find the same artifices levelled at ourselves, in the shape of pretended resettlements of kinsmen at Leontini, and expeditions in aid of allies at Eggesta—notwithstanding this, we still want the courage to combine together and resolutely show them that our countrymen are no Ionians,³ nor settlers on the Hellespont nor colonists of the Ægean islets, whose passive submission⁴ to the loss of freedom is varied only by occasional changes from the Persian to some other tyrant: no! we are freeborn Dorians, who came direct from the Peloponnese, that home of independence, to colonise Sicily. Are we, then, to wait⁵ till, one after another, city by city, we fall a prey—conscious as we are that it is only by this means, through our disunion, we can be conquered—seeing, as we do, that the Athenians are trying this very method of attack, that of setting some of us at variance by diplomacy, of inciting others with hopes of alliance to make war on one another, and, in other cases, availing⁶ themselves of any

¹ Götter remarks that Poppo and Arnold rightly consider the particle *τε*, which follows *τῶν*, out of its place, as it should follow *παραδείγματα*. It is omitted altogether by Dionys. Hal., who quotes this passage (p. 932).

² *Σφίσιν ἀπ' αὐτοῖς* pro *ἀλλήλοισι*.—Poppo, ed. min.

³ Poppo (ed. min.) quotes Thucyd. (i. 124: v. 9: vii. 5: viii. 25) to illustrate the contempt in which Dorians habitually held Ionians.

⁴ *Δουλοῦνται* verteris 'patiuntur se in servitum redigi.'—Poppo, ed. min.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) refers to Matth. (*Gr. Gram.* § 516, 2) for instances of this use of the indicative for the conjunctive.

⁶ Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold nearly agree as to the order of the words in this passage. Portus thus arranges them: *τοῖς δὲ λέγοντες τι προσμηνίς, ὡς ἐκάστοις λέγειν δύνανται, κακοῦργεῖν*.

opportunities of conference to pretend to meet men's views, and then using their confidence to sap their freedom? Do we suppose, too, that, when our distant fellow-countryman falls a sacrifice before us, the danger will fail to come home to every one of us as well: but that, instead of this, the first sufferers will keep their calamity all to themselves?

78. If, however, it happens to have struck any of you that, though the Syracusan¹ is the Athenian's foe, he himself is not: and that it is hard for him to be imperilled in defending *my*² capital; he should remember that, when he is fighting within my territory, it will be full as much in defence of his own city as of mine, and, besides, with comparative safety, since³ he will be entering the field before the resources of Syracuse have been exhausted: and, instead of standing alone,⁴ will find an ally in us. He should also reflect that the object of the Athenians is not to chastise the enmity of Syracuse, but to avail⁵ themselves of our unpopularity as a means of

¹ Dionysius Hal. (p. 936) complains, with some justice, of the constant substitution of the singular for the plural number in this passage. So far, however, as his censure applies to the terms *Συρακόσιος* and *Ἀθηναῖος*, numerous precedents will be found both in Thucydides and Herodotus. Thus, Herod. (viii. 136), we find *τὸν Ἀθηναῖον* (ix. 12) *τὸν Σπαρτιάτην*. Thucyd. (vi. 84), *ὁ Χαλκιεύς*. It is a common idiom of Livy: and is defended by the authority of Quintilian. 'Maxime,' says that rhetorician, 'in orando valebit numerorum illa libertas. Nam et Livius sæpe sic dicit: *Romanus prælio victor, quum Romanos vicisse significat*' (viii. 6, 21). If the subsequent use of *ἐμῆς*, *ἐμοῦ*, *ἐμὲ*, κ.τ.λ., carries the idiom to a fanciful length, it

serves to impersonate the representation of Syracuse by Hermocrates, who, says Ducas, *συμπεριλαμβάνει ἑαυτῷ πάντα τοὺς συμπολίτας*.

² The force of *γε* may be given by emphasising the possessive pronoun.

³ *Ὅσῳ*, says Bauer, is equivalent to *ὅτι*.

⁴ Göller and Arnold show conclusively that *ἐρήμος*, not *ἐρήμων*, is the true reading.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) suggests *βιάσασθαι* for *βειβαιώσασθαι*: but, as Göller remarks, the received reading is not devoid of sense. He renders the passage thus: 'Meum odium prætexens illius (i. e. aliorum Siceliotarum, qui Syracusanos oderunt) ambitionem maxime firmare Atheniensis studet.'

strengthening to the utmost the bonds of amity between themselves and the other Siceliot cities. Now, if any of you entertain feelings of jealousy or even apprehension of us—and both these passions find a home in powerful states—and if, thus influenced, you long to see the pride of Syracuse humbled by a heavy, yet not, for the sake of your own security, a fatal, blow: such hopes and wishes are more than man can expect to realise. For it is impossible for anyone to make the fortune of war square exactly with his own wishes. And should fortune, in this instance, foil your calculations,¹ the day may chance to come, when, lamenting your own calamities, you may wish you had once more even our prosperity to envy. But this can never be, if you abandon us, and decline to share our perils in defending interests which, though not nominally, are really your own: for though, in name, you would be propping our power, you would, in effect, be securing your own safety.

It might have been expected that you, citizens of Camarina, above all others, living on our frontier, and the first to be endangered by our fall, would, for your own sakes, have foreseen all this: and, instead of giving us, as you are now doing, a fainthearted support, would rather have been the first to repair to Syracuse, and to have openly encouraged us not to yield an inch, in the very words and with all the earnestness of the imploring appeal you would have made to us, had the territory of Camarina been the first object of Athenian attack. Neither you, however, at any rate as yet, nor others, have shown any such intention.

79. Perhaps, however, cowardice will lead you to consult your notions of duty, in your relation to the

¹ That is—as Ducas explains—if destroying the independence of Syracuse. The Athenians should succeed in

Athenians as well as to ourselves: and you will point at the alliance you contracted with them. That alliance, however, was not formed to prejudice your friends, but to meet the contingency of an attack by your foes: and it bound you to aid the Athenians only¹ when wronged by other powers—not, as in the present case, when they are the trespassers. If² you doubt it, look at the people of Rhegium: they went further: they actually refused, though of Chalcidic race, to join in resettling the Leontine exiles, Chalcidians as they were. And it would be monstrous, if, while that people, divining the real meaning of the specious plea³ set up by the invaders, discard logic⁴ and obey policy, you should be led, by your fine logical principles, to support your natural enemies, and to join their bitterest foes in destroying those whom nature has made your kinsmen by a double⁵ tie. But no! this is not your duty: it binds you to succour your kinsmen, instead of cowering before the Athenian armament. That armament has terrors only, if, as these envoys are so anxious we should, we stand aloof

¹ Γε seems here to emphasise the limitation.

² The particles ἐπεὶ οὐδέ usher in an *à fortiori* proof: the Rhegians being regarded as having less reason to refuse the Leontines than the Camarineans had to refuse the Athenians: the resettlement of the former being wrongful only in its tendency to favour Athenian ambition: whereas the compliance of the people of Camarina with the request of the Athenians would have involved them in a direct attack on Syracuse.

³ See Poppo, ed. min.

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) says: 'Videtur ἀλόγως ad vulgi iudicia et speciem rei referendum esse.' A far better version than that of Gøller: who

translates ἀλόγως σωφρονεῖν by 'cautè agere, ita tamen ut rationem tuam non defendere possis' ('play a prudent part, without being able to give a very good reason for your conduct'). Poppo thinks that ἐλόγως προφάσει cannot signify 'quum habeatis probabilem excusationem,' 'when you have a fair pretext for refusing Athens,' without the preposition ἐν. I have therefore referred the term to the plea on which Hermodrates fears the people of Camarina may decline alliance with Syracuse—the plea of their previous treaty with Athens.

⁵ As Dorians and Sicilians.—Poppo, ed. min.

from one another : if, on the contrary, we stand firm together, it has none ; for, even when the Athenians attacked us singly, although they gained the advantage in the battle, their main object miscarried,¹ and they speedily retired.

80. So long, therefore, as we are united, there is no ground for despondency : but there is every reason for our entering heartily into alliance, especially as succours will shortly arrive from the Peloponnese, whose troops are superior to the Athenians in every branch of military art. Nor should anyone regard that politic device—your professed² inability to aid either party, owing to your being allies of both—as fair to us and safe for you ; it is not quite so fair in reality, as in semblance.³ For if, through your refusal to join our standard, the beleaguered city falls and her powerful foe triumphs, will you not, by one and the same act of neutrality, have failed to aid⁴ in the rescue of the one party, and to hinder the other from violating right ? Yet it would surely be more honourable to throw your weight on the side of those who have a double claim as your kinsmen and as sufferers from outrage, and thus at once secure the national welfare of all Sicily, and save the Athenians, those excellent friends of yours, from an act of iniquity.

And now we, the representatives of Syracuse, must briefly conclude our address : for it would be useless to enlighten you or the other Siceliot, familiar as you are with the state of affairs, by laying everything before you in detail. But we do implore your aid, and at the same time we call you to witness that, if you reject our suit,

¹ Alluding to the recent engagement, the Athenian success in which was not crowned by the capture of Syracuse.

² Δίη, here, and below, in φίλους δὴ

ἄντας, is clearly ironical.

³ Δικαιώματι. 'specie juris' is Poppo's rendering (ed. min.).

⁴ See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on the two aorists.

we, besieged by the plots of Ionians, our constant foes, though Dorians ourselves, find Dorians to desert us in you. If the Athenians succeed in our reduction, they will owe their triumph, indeed, to your counsels, but all its honours will grace their own name, and the prize of their victory will be the very state which allowed them to win it. If, on the other hand, we gain the day, you will still have to suffer from our vengeance as responsible for our perils. Weigh, then, the alternatives before you: embrace at once subjection with its temporary immunity from danger, or take the chance¹ of avoiding a disgraceful submission to Athenian rule by aiding us to defeat the invaders, and of escaping an enmity on our part, the duration of which it might be difficult to limit.

¹ Dr. Arnold, after ascertaining from Poppo and Göller that *κάν* should be construed with *λαβείν*, takes it, in his version, with *περιγενόμενοι*.

SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS,

The Athenian envoy, addressed to the public assembly at Camarina, in reply to the preceding speech of Hermocrates. Bk. VI. chs. 82-88.

CH. 82. Although the renewal of the previously subsisting alliance was the object of our mission, the invective delivered by the ambassador of Syracuse compels us to touch on the subject of our dominion, and to show that we have reasonable grounds for its retention. Now his own assertion of the immemorial enmity prevailing between the Ionian and the Doric race, is a very strong proof of this. But¹ it also admits of the following vindication. The fact is,² we Ionians had to consider the best means of maintaining our independence against the Dorians of the Peloponnese, who, besides outnumbering us, lived on our frontier. Accordingly, after the Persian war, we availed ourselves of the naval force we had acquired, to shake off the dominion and even the political ascendancy of Lacedæmon, who had no better title to dictate to us than we had to dictate to her, unless it was derived from a temporary³ preponderance of power. The states previously subject to the king elected us their political chiefs, and we retain the supremacy thus conferred, thinking it our best protection against the risk of subjection to the Peloponnesians, as it provides us

¹ See Mr. Frost's note, p. 241. Haack, quoted by Poppo (ed. maj.), takes the same view: 'Hæc verba (ἴλασε—οὐτως) non tam ea, quæ antecesserunt, vera esse denotant, quam adsequentem potius demonstrationem

transitum præparant.'

² See Donaldson's *Greek Gram.* p. 605.

³ At the epoch of the Persian invasion, Lacedæmon was a far more powerful state than Athens.

with the means of self-defence: besides—to speak the literal truth—there was not a particle of injustice in our subjugation of the Ionians and the insular states, in reducing whom, the Syracusans say we have enslaved our own kinsmen. For they joined the march of the Mede against their mother country, against ourselves: they had not the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property, as *we* did, when we abandoned our capital; not content, too, with choosing servitude for themselves, they wanted to impose it upon us.

83. Such, then, was the origin of the dominion we consider ourselves entitled¹ to hold, not only from our having contributed to the Grecian cause the largest fleet and the most uncompromising patriotism, but because the Ionians, by volunteering these services to the Mede, were injuring us; besides,² we needed the³ material force our dominion supplied, to confront the Peloponnesian power.

We discard all affectation of higher than ordinary motives: we will not ground our right to rule either on our single-handed⁴ demolition of the barbarian, or on the fact that, when we first⁵ braved the Persian, we had the freedom of the Ionians more at heart than our own liberty and that of our common country. No one, how-

¹ As Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, the clause commencing with ἄμα δὲ answers to the words ἀξιοί τε· the two intermediate clauses belong to ἀξιοί τε ἄρχειν, for which, i. e. their title to empire, they assign two grounds.

² Καὶ εἰότε καί· Bauer explains the second καί by 'adeo:' 'Persis adeo, Græciæ hostibus.' But it is more probable that the words simply mean, as Poppo (ed. min.) suggests, 'and also because.'

³ Τῆς ἰσχύος· 'articulo,' says Poppo (ed. min.), 'significatur ea potentia, quâ opus est.'

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) thinks that the speaker, in using this expression, had the battle of Marathon in view.

⁵ Haack is doubtless right in referring this allusion to the aid given by Athens, and refused by Sparta, to the revolt of the Ionian cities on the coast of Asia Minor from the Persian king, B.C. 500. See Herod. v. 99.

ever, will question the right of every state to work out the conditions of its own security. It was this consideration—regard for our own safety—that, on this occasion, brought us here; and we feel convinced that our presence¹ is conducive to your interests as² well as to our own. In proving this, we can well afford to join issue with the very calumnies³ launched by the Syracusan envoys against us—calumnies invested with additional terrors by your suspicions; for we are well aware that though, when alarm and distrust are excited, men may be beguiled for the moment by arguments congenial to those feelings, yet, in the later stage of action, they will follow their real interests. We have already told you that fear⁴ is our motive for retaining our dominion in Greece: we now assure you that the same⁵ motive has brought us to your shores to place affairs here on a safe footing in concert with our friends: and that, so far from our having any intention of enslaving you, we are anxious to shield you from that fate.

84. No one should suppose that we are affecting a concern for you which our mutual relation does not warrant, when he reflects that, if your freedom is preserved, and you are in a position to offer a strong resistance to Syracuse, we should be less likely to suffer, should that city despatch a force to aid the Peloponne-

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold read *ταῦτα*. Göller *ταῦτά*. I have followed Poppo, who explains *ταῦτα* as equivalent to *τὸ ἡμᾶς παρῆναι*.

² *Καὶ ὑμῖν*. see note¹, p. 7.

³ Alluding, chiefly, to the assertion of Hermocrates that Athens was guided by policy and self-interest alone, and was playing the same game in Sicily as she had already played in Greece. Euphemus accepts the first part of the charge: but

contends that the policy of Athens required the freedom of her allies in Sicily.

⁴ Compare the very similar language of the Athenian speaker at Lacedæmon, bk. i. 75, 3.

⁵ Their apprehension that Syracuse, if she became the dominant power in Sicily, would aid the Peloponnesians to pull down the Athenian empire.

sians. And surely this consideration alone¹ brings you into the closest relation² to us. For this reason, too, we are only acting as you might expect, in reinstating the Leontines, whom we are resettling not, indeed, in the character of subjects, like their kinsmen in Eubœa, but armed with all possible power, so as to enable them to aid us by harassing Syracuse with sallies from their frontier soil. In Greece, we are strong enough, by ourselves alone,³ to cope with our foes: and it suits us best to keep the Chalcidians⁴—whom Hermocrates says it is inconsistent in us to enslave in Eubœa and liberate here—unprepared for war, their quota being paid in money instead of ships; in Sicily, on the contrary, our policy requires that both the Leontines and the rest of our friends should enjoy the utmost independence.

85. Despotism,⁵ whether embodied in one absolute ruler, or represented by an imperial city, thinks nothing inconsistent that is politic, and recognises no relationship⁶ where no confidence is felt: its enmity or its friendship towards other⁷ states can only be a question of passing

¹ Ἠδὴ perhaps means literally 'without going further.' Madvig (*Gr. Syntax*, p. 219) cites a similar use of the particle from Xen. (*Hell.* vii. 1, 12): ποιήσας δὲ τοῦτο, τὰ ἄλλα ἤδη ἤρχετο διοικεῖν, 'without more ado.'

² There is, as Poppo (ed. min.) says, a play on the double sense of προσῆκον and προσήκετε, the latter inflection being used in a more personal sense, the speaker trying to shut his eyes to the difference of race, and to argue a community of political interest from a community of political danger.

³ Bauer makes καὶ equivalent here to the Latin 'vel.'

⁴ Of Eubœa.

⁵ We must remember that despotic authority, within the limits of Greece, generally meant usurped authority. This idea underlies the passage. The Athenian empire is often treated, by its professed advocates in Thucydides, as an usurpation: requiring, for its maintenance, a mixed system of policy and force.

⁶ The speaker, as Bloomfield shows, is thinking of the Chalcidians of Eubœa, who, though of the same race as the Athenians, were distrusted by them.

⁷ Πρὸς ἕκαστα, i.e. πρὸς ἑκάστους, Poppo (ed. min.); lit. 'towards the several states with which it is brought into contact.'

convenience. This rule applies to us: but we should not be serving our interests here, were we to pull down our friends: it is our policy to strengthen them to such a degree as to paralyse our foes.

Can you doubt it? Look at the principle on which we govern our confederates in Greece: we treat them according to their relative utility to us. Thus we leave the people of Chios and Methymna independent, subject only to the contribution of ships: the majority, however, are more strictly ruled and pay their tribute in money: while others,¹ though islanders and easy of reduction, are our allies on terms of perfect freedom, because they hold convenient positions around the Peloponnese. You may therefore reasonably conclude that our own interests, and those apprehensions of Syracuse on which we touched, will be the key of our policy towards the Sicilian states. Dominion over you is her ambition: she is anxious to avail herself of the prevalent distrust of our designs, in order to combine your forces with her own against us: and either by violence, or through your isolation, should we retire without success, to become the absolute mistress of Sicily. And this she must effect, if you join her standard. For it will no longer be easy for us to deal with so large a force when united: nor will you find a weak antagonist in Syracuse, if we retire from the scene.

86. An opposite opinion, if entertained by any of you, is amply refuted by the fact that, when, some years² ago, you invoked our aid, the very weapon of alarm with which you tried to influence us, was the prospect of eventual danger to *ourselves*,³ if we connived at your

¹ Haack thinks the islanders of Zacynthus and Cephallene chiefly alluded to. Compare Thucyd. vii. 57.

² See Thucyd. iii. 86.

³ On *καὶ αὐτοὶ* and *καὶ ἡμᾶς*, see Mr. Frost's note, p. 243.

subjugation by Syracuse. And now it is hardly fair to distrust the very argument which you thought good enough to persuade *us*, or to suspect our motives because we have brought a larger armament than before to¹ oppose the power of Syracuse; surely, it is Syracuse you should distrust. Why—*we*² cannot possibly hold our ground in Sicily without your aid: and, even supposing we were to turn villains and reduce you, it would be just as impossible for us to retain our conquests, owing to the length of the voyage, and the difficulty of guarding cities of great size, and which, though insular, are armed with the resources of continental³ states. The Syracusans, on the other hand, with their base of operations close⁴ to your doors, not in the shape of a camp, as in our⁵ case, but of a city more powerful than the force we have at command, are always intriguing against you, and never let slip a single opportunity of assailing any of you: a disposition they have shown in many cases ere now, especially in that of Leontini. And now they are actually impudent enough to invite you, as if you were senseless idiots, to aid them against those who up to the present day have always checked their aggression, and saved Sicily from sinking beneath the waves⁶ of their dominion. How much more real, at any rate, is the safety to which *we* invite you, when we implore you not to throw away

¹ Bauer, quoted in Poppo's ed. maj., leaves us at liberty to take *πρός, κ.τ.λ.*, in a comparative sense, or as I have construed it. But the former construction seems at variance with *πόλει μείζονι τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας*, below.

² Γε emphasises *ἡμεῖς*, and contrasts it with *οἱ δὲ*, below.

³ That is (as the Scholiast explains it), they had plenty of cavalry and infantry: and did not rely on their

navy.

⁴ Poppo (ed. maj.) distinguishes *ἐποικοῦντες*, 'living in hostile proximity to,' from *παροικοῦντες*.

⁵ *Οὐ στρατοπέδῳ· sicut Athenienses στρατοπέδῳ τε ἐκ νεῶν ἰδρυθέντι, κ.τ.λ.*, c. 37.—Poppo, ed. maj.

⁶ *'Ανέχοντας· Tropicè dictum interpretatur Abr., a navi ductum, quod appareat ex loco Aristidis: τῷ μεγίστῳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν, ὃς τοὺς λόγους ἀνείχε μὴ καταδύναι.*—Bauer.

the protection we are mutually ensuring one another, and to remember that, while their numbers will always open for them, even without allies, an easy path of attack on you, you will not often have the chance of defending yourselves with so strong an auxiliary force. And if, through jealousy, you allow us to retire, after the miscarriage, perhaps even the defeat, of that force, you will some day long for the sight of even the smallest fraction of it, when it can no longer serve you by coming to your aid.

87. But—no! neither you, citizens of Camarina, nor your compatriots, will be misled by the calumnies of the Syracusans. We have given you, without reserve, full explanations on the points which have caused suspicion of our designs: and we will hope that a brief recapitulation will serve to remind you, and win your assent. We say, then, in answer to the charge of inconsistency, that, while in Greece it is our policy to maintain our dominion over our allies, in order to prevent our subjugation by another power: here it is our policy to keep them free, to prevent our being compromised by their incorporation with a hostile league; in answer to the charge of meddling, we reply, that the numerous dangers¹ against which we have to guard, compel us to embark in a great variety of enterprises: and that, in coming on this as on former occasions to rescue some of your cities from oppression, we did not come without an invitation, but in answer to your own appeal. It is not, however, for you to sit in judgment on our proceedings, or to assume the censorship of our political career, and try to divert us from our scheme—that would be difficult now! What you have to do, is this: take just as much

¹ Διότι καί· see note¹, p. 41, above.

of our—so-called—meddlesome policy and restless ambition as may chance to suit *your*¹ views, and turn it to your own account: in the assurance that those qualities of ours, so far from being uniformly mischievous, are actually beneficial to the great majority of the Greeks. For as in every country, even where we are not at hand to interfere, all those, who either dread or meditate encroachment, have in the background a clear prospect, in the one case, of obtaining redress² through our interposition, in the other, of our being likely to cause them some alarm, should we appear on the scene of their intended aggression: both these parties, I say, are obliged, the one to forbear against their will, the other to accept our protection and save themselves trouble. Reject not, then, that protection, open impartially to every suitor, and now at your command; but act as others act: and, instead of having constantly to stand on your guard against the Syracusans, take part at last with us in compassing their fall as³ they have compassed yours.

¹ Τὸ αὐτό· ut Latinè *idem est simul* (Poppo, ed. min.). Literally, it would mean 'your views as well as ours:' but perhaps the effect may be better given by emphasising 'your.'

² Ἀντιτυχεῖν· ἄντι Haack explicat

spectare ad injuriam adversarii compenzandam auxilio Atheniensium.—Poppo, ed. min.

³ Ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου· 'pari modo atque illi vobis insidias tendunt.'—Poppo, ed. min.

SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES,

Delivered before the Congress at Sparta, B.C. 415. Bk. VI. chs. 89-93.

INTRODUCTION.

ALCIBIADES, having escaped from the escort which was accompanying him to Athens, crossed from Thurii to Cyllene in the Peloponnese, and shortly afterwards appeared at Sparta on special invitation from the Lacedæmonians, whom he addressed in the following harangue, at a Congress summoned to consider a petition for aid presented by envoys from Syracuse, and seconded by deputies from Corinth.

CH. 89. I must commence my address with a few remarks on the imputations current against myself, lest a feeling of distrust should induce you to listen to my statements on public affairs with prejudiced ears.

You will remember that my ancestors, upon some ground of complaint, renounced¹ the representation of your interests at Athens. I wished to resume that function in my own person, and did my best to promote your interests in several ways, especially on the occasion of your disaster at Pylos. But, though my zeal for your service never slackened, nevertheless, when you were making peace with Athens, you carried on negotiations through my enemies,² thus rewarding them with power, and me with discredit. The damage, therefore, which you sustained, when I fell back on the alliance of Argos and Mantinea, and the general opposition you encountered from me, were well deserved. By this time, however, a candid examination of the case ought to disarm

¹ See Thucyd. v. 43.

² Nicias and Laches are apparently meant. See Thucyd. v. 43.

the not very reasonable anger which, at the moment of suffering, any of you may have felt. And if anyone thought the worse of me on another¹ ground, from the favour I showed the popular party, he ought to be convinced that even from this point of view he has no right to feel aggrieved. Hostility to despotism has been an immemorial trait of my family: and, in common language, popular government is habitually opposed to despotic² government. It was thus³—hatred of the one engendering partiality for the other—that we continued the persevering champions of popular power. Besides, as we were living under a democratic *régime*, we had no choice, in most cases, but to acquiesce in existing arrangements. Still we did our best to signalise our public policy by a moderation strikingly contrasted with the reigning license. It was not, indeed, by my kinsmen, but by other⁴ politicians, that the mob, in earlier times as well as in our own day, was led on to its worst acts; it was, in fact, by the very men who exiled me. My family supported the cause of popular government, from

¹ Διότι καί· Poppo (ed. min.) explains *καί* by the following paraphrase: διότι οὐ μόνον ἡναντιούμην ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ καί.

² Mr. Grote translates this sentence: 'My family were always opposed to the Pisistratid despots; and as *all opposition to a reigning dynasty takes the name of The People*, so from that time forward we continued to act as leaders of the people.' But the clause underlined is surely untrue, as the Grecian despots were often upset by oligarchical partisans. Sparta herself, whenever she upset a despot, replaced him by an oligarchy. Alcibiades covertly recommends himself to Spartan sympathies on the ground of his hostility to

despots; while he excuses his patronage of popular rights as a natural reaction from his hatred of tyrants.

³ Dr. Donaldson (*Gr. Gram.* p. 570) instances this use of *καί*, in the words *καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου*, as an example of the syllogistic force of *καί*.

⁴ Poppo (ed. min.) quotes with approval Bp. Thirlwall's (*Hist. of Greece*, iii. p. 405) comment on Dr. Arnold's exposition of this passage: 'Dr. Arnold's opinion that these words refer to the high aristocratic party, seems extremely improbable. The natural interpretation is to be sought in Thucydides (viii. 65), where the demagogue Androcles is described as the man ὅσπερ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην οὐχ ἤκιστα ἐξήλισεν.'

a feeling that it was right to aid in maintaining a constitution which we had inherited, and under which our country was enjoying a degree of power and freedom she had never known before. Otherwise, we, in common with all men of any sense, were no strangers to the true character of democracy; perhaps, indeed, it was better known to me than anyone, as I have had more reason than others to complain of it. However, nothing new can be said of a form of government acknowledged to be a type of insanity.¹ I should add that we did not think it safe to change² the constitution, while you were encamped, as enemies, at our gates.

90. Such, then, is the history of the prejudice felt against me. I must now lay before you the business of this meeting: and, in so doing, can perhaps give you information which will be new to you. The first object of our expedition was the subjugation, if possible, of the Sicilian, and, in the sequel, of the Italian Greeks: to be followed by an attempt on the dependencies of Carthage and on that capital herself. Should these schemes be crowned with complete or even general success; we intended, in the next place, to attack the Peloponnese, with an armament composed of the united force of the Greeks who had joined us in Sicily, taking a strong corps of barbarians into pay, drawn from Spain, and such other uncivilised regions in that part of the world as are reputed, at the present day, to produce the best soldiers; building, too, a numerous fleet of triremes in addition to our own, from the abundant timber which Italy supplies. By thus

¹ Herodotus places a similar sentiment on the lips of Megabyzus; ὁμίλον οὐδὲν ἴστιν ἀξυνετώτερον. Dionys. Hal. (*Ant.* p. 1179) is not far behind, when he denounces democracy as ἀμαυεστάτη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις

πολιτειῶν.

² 'All political change is fatal in the presence of a foreigner invading the soil of a fatherland.'—*History of Julius Cæsar*, by the Emperor Napoleon III., vol. i. p. 224.

blockading the whole coast of Peloponnese, and simultaneously attacking her with our soldiery on the land side, we expected, after storming some cities and walling in others, the easy reduction of the whole peninsula, and the eventual establishment of our rule over the rest of Greece. And there was every prospect that our new acquisitions in Sicily would alone contribute money and provisions to facilitate these operations in ample sufficiency, without drawing on our home revenue.

91. Such, then, were the objects of the expedition which has already sailed, as you have now heard from one who knows exactly what we intended; and the remaining generals, if they are able, will carry on hostilities on the same plan. I have now to prove that the Sicilian cities cannot hold out without succour from you. The Siceliots, indeed, though half trained, might possibly, by rallying in one united body, even now defeat the invaders. But the Syracusans, standing alone—vanquished as they have already been in a general action, hemmed in as they are by sea—will find it impossible to resist the armament the Athenians have at this moment on the spot. And, if their capital is taken, that moment all Sicily, and, presently afterwards, Italy also, falls into the invaders' grasp: nor would it be long before the danger which I just now predicted from that quarter, would overtake you. None of you therefore should regard Sicily as the only subject of your deliberations: the safety of the Peloponnese is at stake, unless you speedily adopt the following measures. Embark and despatch to Sicily a force capable of working their own passage, and of acting as heavy infantry¹ on their arrival; and—a point I consider still more important than an army—a

¹ Καὶ ὀπλιτεύουσιν· καί, as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, signifies 'etiam,' 'as well.'

Spartan commander to drill and discipline¹ the troops already enrolled, and to impress unwilling recruits. Such a course will inspire fresh confidence in states already friendly to you, and will embolden waverers to join your league. It will be needful at the same time to prosecute the war more openly and vigorously in this part of the world, so as at once to encourage Syracuse to resist, when she finds you interested in her cause, and to indispose the Athenians to send fresh reinforcements to their own army. You must also build a permanent fort at Decelea in Attica: the very expedient Athens has always most dreaded, and believes to be the only calamity incident to this war, that she has not suffered. Indeed, the surest way of damaging an enemy lies in ascertaining what is the blow he most fears, and then inflicting it; for men may well be supposed to know best, for themselves, in each case, their own dangers, and to regulate their fears accordingly.

As to the advantages that will reward you, and the embarrassments that will cripple the enemy, from your occupation of the fort, I will briefly state, among many, the salient points. It will throw into your hands the greater part of the material stock of the country, in many instances from seizure, and, in the case of slaves,² from voluntary desertion: it will involve the immediate loss of the proceeds of the silver mines at Laurium, together with the income accruing from land and the courts of law;³ but the greatest damage will be the irregular payment of the revenue due from their allies, who, finding

¹ See chapters 69 and 72, for complaints of the imperfect discipline of the Syracusan troops.

² See Poppo's note (ed. min.). It is difficult to see how *ἀπρόματα* can apply to anything but slaves, the

meaning being restricted to the live-stock of the country.

³ The fees and fines arising from the adjudication of cases brought before the Athenian courts by the allied states.

you now determined on a vigorous prosecution of the war, will slight their claims. The realisation of these advantages depends, Lacedæmonians, on your promptitude and zeal; for, as to the feasibility of the scheme, I feel the utmost confidence: and I believe the issue will prove the truth of my opinion.

92. Nor do I think that the vigorous attack which I, who had formerly the character of a patriot, am now organising against my country, in concert with her declared enemies, ought to lower me in your opinion: or that my overtures ought to be distrusted as simply betraying the busy zeal of an exile. An exile, indeed, I am from the villany of those who banished me, but not from the power of aiding you, if you listen to my counsels; nor are you, who in open war perhaps have injured me, my¹ worst enemies: but rather those, who forced a friend to become a foe. Love of my country was a passion with me, when my political rights were secure: I cherish it no longer, now that I am wronged. Nor do I conceive that the land I am assailing, is still my country; I look upon myself as trying to win back a country that is such for me no more. The true patriot is not he, who scruples to invade his native land, when iniquitously robbed of it: it is the man whose passion for his country exhausts every effort to regain her.

On these grounds I call upon you, Lacedæmonians, fearlessly to employ me in every service of danger or of hardship: admitting the cogency of the plea advanced

¹ Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 325) construes this passage, 'The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like you,' etc. But surely the commentators are right in following the Scholiast, who paraphrases *καὶ πολεμώτατοι, κ.τ.λ.*, by the words, *οὐχ οὕτως ἡμᾶς ἡγοῦμαι*

πολεμίους, ὡς Ἀθηναίους. Alcibiades is contending that it is natural for him to take up arms against the country which had banished him: for she, while under the influence of his foes, was a worse enemy to him than the Spartans, who had only opposed him in open warfare.

by all in my position—the plea, that if I did you great mischief as a foe, I could serve you effectively as a friend; and the more, as I *know* the secret of the Athenian plans, while I could only conjecture yours. I conjure you, then, remembering the vast interests involved in your present deliberations, to carry your arms, without hesitation, into Sicily as well as Attica: enterprises which, if combined, give you every hope of maintaining your Sicilian connections on an influential footing,¹ by succouring them with a fraction of your forces: and, nearer home, of pulling down, for the future as well as the present, Athenian ascendancy; with the prospect, in the sequel, of permanent security at home, and of supremacy, abroad, over the willing submission of all Greece—a submission not yielded to coercion, but flowing from good-will.

¹ Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that the position of *μεγάλα* makes it a predicate.

SPEECH OF NICIAS,

Addressed to the Athenian and auxiliary forces about to engage in the great naval action in the harbour of Syracuse, fought in the month of September, 413 B.C.

Bk. VII. chs. 61-65.

INTRODUCTION.

DEMOSTHENES and Eurymedon, the colleagues of Nicias in the command of the Athenian armament, had, several weeks previously, urged Nicias to withdraw the fleet from the harbour of Syracuse, the limited circumference of which, not exceeding five English miles, combined with the increased nautical skill of the Syracusans, and the large force at their disposal, placed it in imminent peril. Nicias at last assented to the step: when, on the night of the 27th of August, an eclipse of the moon, exciting the superstitious terrors of the troops and, above all, of their infatuated chief, interposed a further and a most disastrous delay. In the interval, the Syracusans not only defeated the Athenian fleet, but actually blocked up the mouth of the harbour, about an English mile in breadth. Finding their retreat thus intercepted, Nicias and his colleagues resolved on a desperate attempt to force their way into the open sea; an enterprise in which, but for the presence of malignant conditions,¹ they would have had every chance of success, their fleet opposing a hundred and ten triremes to seventy-six on the side of their foes. As the troops and crews, on the eve of embarkation, mustered on the shore, Nicias tried to raise their evidently drooping spirits and to revive their shaken confidence, by the following harangue.

CH. 61. Soldiers of Athens and her allies!² We have all alike a common interest in the approaching struggle, every man's safety and that of his country being at stake

¹ Admirably summed up by Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 451).

² Mr. Dale translates: 'Soldiers of the Athenians, and of the other

allies.' As if the Athenians were mere auxiliaries! As Göller points out, the full phrase would be *καὶ ἄλλων ξυμμάχων ὄντων*.

with us, as with our foes ; for it is only by gaining a naval victory now, that we can hope to look upon our various homes again. We must not, however, despond, nor act like raw recruits, whose failure in their first battles clouds their after anticipations with constant fear, and colours them with the hues of disaster. On the contrary, all who are here in arms—you, Athenians, the veterans of many former wars : and you, confederates, the constant comrades of our campaigns—remember, all of you, how often war cheats expectation, and nerve yourselves for the fight, in the hope that Fortune may once more prove our ally, and that¹ this engagement may retrieve our defeat in a style worthy of the imposing force of your fellow-countrymen, which you see arrayed before you.

62. Looking to the probability of the ships being crowded together, owing² to the narrowness of the harbour, and to the annoyance we might suffer, as we did in the last engagement,³ from the troops on the enemy's decks : we have, after consulting the steersmen, adopted every expedient of which our resources admit, to meet these contingencies.⁴ With this view, we shall embark a strong force of archers and darters, and a number of men whom we should not have wanted if about to engage in

¹ Καὶ ὡς ἀναμαχοῦμενοι· Poppo (ed. maj.) suspects that *καὶ* has been interpolated ; but Kriiger, whom I have followed, takes it with ἐπίσαντες, as equivalent to καὶ προσδοκῶντες ἀναμαχῆσθαι.

² See Poppo's note (ed. min.).

³ See Thucyd. vii. 40.

⁴ Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 440) extracts from this passage the astounding intelligence that 'the best consultation was held with the steersmen as to arrangement and manœuvres of

every trireme : ' as if each trireme differed specifically from every other. A curious contradiction should be noted at p. 365, of the same vol. Here we are told that Gylippus reached Himera 'without either troops or arms : ' an assertion rebuked by the statement at p. 362, that he left Himera 'at the head of 700 hoplites *from his own vessels!*' the vessels with which he had set sail from Leucas for Sicily.

the open sea, because, by overloading the ships, they might cripple our manœuvres: but who, forced as we now are to fight a land battle afloat, will be very useful. All the appliances, too, of the counter-armament our ships should carry, have been provided: among others, grappling-irons, to prevent our suffering, as we recently did so severely, from the thick-ribbed prows of the enemy's vessels: for these engines will disable a trireme which has once charged us, from backing water to repeat her attack, if the rest of the work is well done by the marines. The fact is, we are actually driven to fight a land battle on board ship; and it is apparently our policy neither to back¹ water ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so; especially as the shore, except where held by our infantry, is thronged with our foes.

63. Bear this in mind, and fight to the last, as long as your strength endures, taking care not to be driven ashore, and, when one ship closes with another, not to think of loosing the grappling-irons till you have swept the troops off her deck. An injunction I address to the soldiery full as much as to the sailors, because this particular service devolves chiefly upon those on deck; and, fortunately for us, we have still, at least at this moment, a decided advantage in point of troops. As to you, sailors, I recommend, and, while I recommend, I entreat you, not to be unduly disheartened by our previous defeats, considering the increased efficiency of our armament on deck, and the reinforcement of our fleet. I beseech you, too, to reflect that there is one gratifying privilege, which may well be thought worth preserving by those among you, who have hitherto commanded respect throughout Greece, because, from your knowledge of our dialect and imitation of our

¹ See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on the term ἀνάκρουσις, ch. 36, 5, above.

habits, you have been taken for Athenians, though not really such: enjoying, all the while, an equal share of the material benefits of our dominion, and more¹ than an equal share in the awe it inspires in subject states, and the protection it gives from outrage. Since, then, you alone are partners, on independent terms, in the advantages of our empire, do not surrender it now: it would be iniquitous; but beat the Corinthians off with all the scorn engendered by repeated triumphs over them, and the Siceliots, not one of whom dared even meet us at sea, while our marine was in its prime: and prove your nautical skill, even amid the clouds of sickness and disaster, to be more than a match for alien strength with fortune at its side.

64. And you, citizens of Athens! I wish once more to remind you that you left in the docks at home no reserves of ships equal to these, nor youths to recruit your infantry: and that, should any result but victory await you, your enemies here will instantly set sail for Attica, where our remaining fellow-countrymen will find it impossible to repel at once the foes already on the spot, and the fresh assailants who will join them. Your forces here would then fall into the hands of the Syracusans—and you well know with what intentions you attacked them—while our friends at home would lie at the mercy of Lacedæmon. Committed, therefore, as you are, to this one decisive struggle to avert both these calamities, stand firm now, if ever, reflecting, each and all, that those among you on the eve of embarking, are the sole stay of Athens—her soldiery, her fleet, all that is left² of her capital, and her heroic name: in whose

¹ See Dr. Arnold's note.

² The significance of the phrase ἡ ἐπόλοιπος πόλις, is illustrated by the

sentiment attributed to Nicias, ch. 77, below—*ἀνέρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τεύχη.*

defence, should any man surpass another in skill or courage, he cannot hope for a finer opportunity of promoting, by the display of those qualities, his personal interests, and of ensuring the safety of his country.

SPEECH ADDRESSED BY GYLIPPUS,

As the spokesman¹ of the Syracusan generals, to the soldiers and sailors about to embark on board the Syracusan and allied fleet, on the same occasion as that which forms the subject of the preceding speech. Bk. VII. chs. 66-69.

CH. 66. Syracusans and allies! although most of you seem to us to be sensible of the splendour of our past achievements, and of the glorious future involved in the impending battle—otherwise, indeed, you would not have shown such devotion to the cause—still, as some of you may not fully appreciate the issues now at stake, we will endeavour to impress upon you their vital consequence.

When the Athenians, possessing, already, a wider dominion than any former or cotemporary Hellenic state, first invaded this realm, with a view to the subjugation of Sicily, and afterwards, if they succeeded, of the Peloponnese and the rest of Greece, you were the first to withstand their navy, the instrument² of all their sway, and you defeated them in several engagements: a triumph you will in all probability repeat now. For when men's pretensions are cut down at the very point of their fancied excellence, all their remaining pride sinks to a lower ebb than if they had never dreamt of eclipsing others: and, losing ground from mortified ambition,³ they fall back

¹ Thucydides (vii. 65) says: *καὶ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ἐτοῖμα ἦν, παρεκελεύσαντο ἐκείνοις οἱ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιαῦτα.* Poppo (ed. min.) explains the words *οἱ τε στρ., κ.τ.λ.,* by the Latin equivalent 'quum reliqui duces, tum maxime vel nominatim Gylippus.'

² Dr. Arnold, mistaking *κατέσχον* for the imperfect tense, construes *ὃ̄περ πάντα κατέσχον*, 'with which they were overbearing everything.'

³ I have made *ἀνυήματος* depend on *τῷ παρ' ἑλπίδα*, as Gölle suggests. Poppo (ed. min.) rather summarily decides that *τῷ παρ' ἑλπίδα* does not

further than their real strength warrants. Such, probably, is now the case with the Athenians.

67. On our side, on the other hand, the courage¹ we derive from nature, which made us venturesome and bold even when little versed in seamanship, has been braced and strengthened by experience: and each of us, reinforced by the conviction that our defeat of the strongest power afloat, proves us to be the strongest, finds his hopes of victory doubled. And, in general, the more sanguine men's hopes, the more daring the gallantry of their enterprise. Besides, the contrivances they have devised in imitation of our armament, are very well suited to our mode of fighting, and there is not one of them that we are not prepared to foil.² But the enemy—his decks crowded with heavy infantry, contrary to his custom, and obliged to embark a multitude of javelin-men, mere landsmen,³ for the most⁴ part, from Acarnania and elsewhere, who, with no room⁵ to move about, will be quite at a loss how to discharge their weapons—how, I say, can his ships fail to be imperilled, and his troops thrown into general confusion, when tossed about in a style so novel to them? Why—even the numerical superiority of their fleet will do them no good—a point I mention in case any of you should be alarmed by the prospect of

admit of this construction, and takes *αὐχήματος* with *σφαλλόμενοι*. The clause may then be rendered, 'their pride being mortified by disappointment.'

¹ 'Τὸ ὑπάρχον πρότερον' i. e. *insita Doriensium virtus*.—Poppo, ed. min.

² The Syracusans 'had been apprised of the grappling-irons now about to be employed by the Athenians, and had guarded against them by stretching hides along their bows, so that the "iron-hand" might slip

off without acquiring any hold.'—Grote, vol. vii. p. 445.

³ Poppo (ed. maj.) compares Livy's epithet, *mediterraneus*, as applied to Philopœmen (bk. xxxv. 26), with *χερσαῖος* here.

⁴ Bauer shows that *ὡς εἶπεν* must signify *maximam partem*, not *ut ita dicam*, here.

⁵ Poppo (ed. min.) takes *κατ'εἶξ-μίρονος* in its literal sense: Göller thinks it means 'with just room to stand,' but none to move about.

engaging a larger squadron than his own ; for a numerous fleet in a narrow harbour will be slow to execute the desired manœuvres, and very easily damaged by the engines of attack devised by us.

There is one fact of which you may rest assured, for we have certain information of its truth. It is only because their miseries exceed endurance—because they are constrained by positive distress—that they have resorted to the desperate expedient of fighting a decisive action ;¹ not that they rely on their resources : they are simply resolved, in the conviction that they cannot be worse off than they are, to risk a daring throw in any way they can, in the hope of either getting to sea by forcing the blockade : or, failing this, of attempting their retreat by land.

68. Let us, then, now² that our deadly enemies are thus in disarray, and fortune, once their ally, offers us her aid, let us close with them in a spirit of resentful passion, convinced that, in dealing with our foes, we are thoroughly justified in thinking³ ourselves at liberty, when avenging acts of aggression, to satiate the animosity of our hearts : remembering, too, that, in wreaking vengeance on our enemies, we shall taste what is proverbially the sweetest of all earthly pleasures. That they *are* enemies, ay, and deadly enemies, you want no assurance ; they came to our land to make us slaves, and, if they had succeeded, they would have brought upon our men a miserable fate, on our children and wives the most

¹ Göller, after noticing the doubts as to the genuineness of ἀποκινδυνεύσει, remarks : 'si reputas, in ἐς ἀπόνουσαν καθιστήκασιν non alium sensum esse, nisi *deertare volunt pugná decretoriá*, vulgatam fortasse se recte habere existimabis.'

ἀταξίαν, κ.τ.λ., with προσμίξωμεν' but Bauer, whom I have followed, denies that the preposition depends on the verb, asking 'Quippe adversus fortunam—*semet præbentem*—quomodo pugnarent ?'

³ See Poppo's note, ed. min.

² Poppo (ed. min.) takes πρὸς

shocking indignities, and upon our country a most shameful reproach. Remembering this, none of us ought to relent, or think it all the better for us, if they depart, and save us further risk; depart they will, just the same, even should victory crown their efforts. No: we have a glorious prize to struggle for: for if, as we may fairly hope, we accomplish what we wish, not only will these invaders be chastised, but we shall bestow on all Sicily, blessed with freedom heretofore, a freedom yet more sure. And it is very seldom that in venturing to brave a danger, we find that failure works so little mischief, and such vast advantages reward success.

SPEECH OF NICIAS

To his soldiers, on commencing their retreat from Syracuse. Bk. VII. ch. 77.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Athenians, defeated in their attempt to break the blockade of the harbour of Syracuse, commenced, after a delay of two days, their retreat by land. Although they amounted to forty thousand men in all, their miserable condition led them to despair of forcing their way into the interior of the island; and Nicias—worn down himself by an incurable complaint—found it needful to urge them in the strongest accents to exertion.

CH. 77. Dangerous as our position is, Athenians and allies, we must still cherish hope: ere¹ now men have been saved from perils yet more terrible than this: nor should you allow either past disasters, or the undeserved hardships you are now suffering, to plunge you into excessive self-abasement.² Even I, who am very far from being one of the strongest among you—in fact, you can see for yourselves how illness has pulled me down—I, who am supposed to be second to none in the favours showered by fortune on my private life and public career, have to share at this crisis all the dangers and anxieties of the humblest soldier. Yet religious observances have ever been habitual with me, and I have acted, on the whole, justly and irreproachably towards my fellow men. This leads me still to entertain sanguine hopes of a favourable issue, though I am alarmed by disasters confessedly unmerited. But calamity, perhaps, may yet

¹ 'Asyndeton incitatione orationis defenditur.'—Poppo, ed. min.

² See Poppo's note on *κατάμεμψις* (ed. min.), ch. 75, above.

abate; for our enemies have already been sufficiently fortunate:¹ and if our enterprise offended any of the Gods, we have paid our penalty in full. Other powers, before us, have, I imagine, invaded foreign realms, and, as they have only done what it is man's nature to do, so they have only suffered what man can bear. We have therefore reason to hope for some mitigation of the displeasure of the Gods—at this moment, indeed, we are objects of their pity rather than their jealousy: while, if you look at your own ranks, and observe the experience, the number, and the compact order of the troops on their march, you should not be too much cast down; you should reflect that, wherever you encamp, you form to all intents and purposes a city: and that no Sicilian town, Syracuse excepted, could easily dispute your entrance, or dislodge you from any position you might seize. Be on the watch yourselves to secure the safety and good order of our march: and let every man remember that the ground he is forced to contest, will, if he maintain it, prove his country and his fortress. We must, however, hurry on our journey, alike by night and by day: for we are short of provisions; and, if we can but reach some friendly village of the Sicels, whose terror of Syracuse keeps them true to us, you may consider yourselves, from that hour, perfectly safe. We have already sent messages to them, enjoining them to meet us on our march with fresh supplies of provisions.

In one word, soldiers, recollect that the last necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave, if only because there is not a position in the neighbourhood that can protect you, should you give way; while, if you now escape your

¹ Would Nicias, a stately and dignified Athenian, have thought this sentence adequately echoed by Mr.

Grote's version: 'our enemies have had their full swing of good fortune?'

foes, you, our allies, will yet be restored to the homes you doubtless long to see again : and you, Athenians, will live to reconstitute the mighty, though fallen, power of our country ; for it is men, not walls, nor ships without men, that make a country.



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